Financial and Economic Review 15. by unknown
2 Financial and Economic REviEw
June 2016
vol. 15. issue 2.
The interaction between fiscal and monetary  
policy in Hungary over the past decade and a half 
György Matolcsy – Dániel Palotai
The controversial treatment of money and banks  
in macroeconomics
István Ábel – Kristóf Lehmann – Attila Tapaszti
Review of Hungarian EU transfers –  
at the border of two fiscal periods
Anna Boldizsár – Zsuzsa Kékesi –  
Péter Koroknai – Balázs Sisak
Key features of the chinese bond market 
Zsanett Sütő – Tamás Tóth
Risk management approaches and bank size
Dániel Homolya
macroeconomic effects of the increase of  
electronic retail payments – a general  
equilibrium approach using Hungarian data
Tamás Ilyés – Lóránt Varga
Financial personality types in Hungary –  
research methods and results
Erzsébet Németh – Dániel Béres –  
Katalin Huzdik – Boglárka Zsótér
Financial and Economic Review
Scientific journal of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank
Chairman of the Editorial Board:
ÁDÁM BALOG
Editorial Board:
TAMÁS BÁNFI, ÁKOS BOD PÉTER, ÉVA HEGEDŰS, GÁBOR P. KISS, GYÖRGY KOCZISZKY,  
LEVENTE KOVÁCS, CSABA LENTNER, KOPPÁNY NAGY, DÁNIEL PALOTAI, ANETT PANDURICS, 
MIHÁLY PATAI, GÉZA SEBESTYÉN, ROLAND STRAUB, RÓBERT SZEGEDI,  




Assistants:  BERTA DRAPCSIK,  
BÁLINT VADÁSZI
Publisher: Magyar Nemzeti Bank
Publisher in Charge: ESZTER HERGÁR




Cover design: MARIANNA IZSÓNÉ BIGAI
© Copyright: Magyar Nemzeti Bank
The papers in this issue contain the opinion of the authors which is not necessarily  




vol. 15. issue 2.
Financial and 
Economic REviEw
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC REVIEW






Géza Sebestyén Editor-in-Chief, E-mail: geza.sebestyen@uni-corvinus.hu
Szabolcs Pásztor Editor-in-Charge, E-mail: pasztorsz@mnb.hu
Published regularly in every three months. 
HU ISSN 2415–9271 (Print)
HU ISSN 2415–928X (Online)
Page setting and printing: 
Prospektus – SPL consortium
H-8200 Veszprém, Tartu u. 6.
3
Contents
Vol. 15. Issue 2., June 2016
STudiES 
György Matolcsy – dániel Palotai: 
The interaction between fiscal and monetary policy in Hungary  
over the past decade and a half . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
istván Ábel – Kristóf Lehmann – Attila Tapaszti: 
The controversial treatment of money and banks in macroeconomics . . . . . .  33
Anna Boldizsár – Zsuzsa Kékesi – Péter Koroknai – Balázs Sisak: 
Review of Hungarian EU transfers – at the border of two fiscal periods . . . . .  59
Zsanett Sütő – Tamás Tóth: 
Key features of the Chinese bond market. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  88
dániel Homolya: 
Risk management approaches and bank size. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  114
Tamás ilyés – Lóránt Varga: 
Macroeconomic effects of the increase of electronic retail payments –  
A general equilibrium approach using Hungarian data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  129
Erzsébet Németh – dániel Béres – Katalin Huzdik – Boglárka Zsótér: 
Financial personality types in Hungary – 
research methods and results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  153
diSCuSSiON 
György Németh: 
About ageing – for economists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  173
4  
BOOK REViEW
Stefan A. Musto: Core-Periphery Relations in the European Union –   
Power and Conflict in a Dualist Political Economy (J. M. Magone –  
B. Laffan – C. Schweiger (Eds.): Core-Periphery Relations in the European  
Union – Power and Conflict in a Dualist Political Economy) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  181
Zsigmond Pálvölgyi: The future is spontaneous, yet predictable  
(Albert László Barabási: Bursts – The Hidden Patterns Behind Everything  
We Do, from Your E-mail to Bloody Crusades) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  188
Antal Mester: India – The contradictions of economic growth  
(Jean Drèze – Amartya Sen: An Uncertain Glory – India and its  
Contradictions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  191
Viktor Eszterhai: China's secret strategy to replace the USA  
(Michael Pillsbury: The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy  
to Replace America as the Global Superpower). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  194
Palicz Alexandr Maxim: European Spring: Why Our Economies  
and Politics are in a Mess – and How to Put Them Right?  
(Philippe Legrain: European Spring: Why Our Economies  
and Politics are in a Mess – and How to Put Them Right?) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  197
CONFERENCE REPORT
Márton Teremi: Stock Exchange Development and Growth – 
Report on the lessons from the capital market conference  
of the Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE) and the Association  
of Hungarian Economists (AHE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  203
Péter Csóka – dániel Havran – Kata Váradi: Conference on financial  
market liquidity – Report on the 6th Annual Financial Market Liquidity  
Conference (AFML 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  208
5
The interaction between fiscal and monetary 
policy in Hungary over the past decade and a half*
György Matolcsy – Dániel Palotai
After the introduction of inflation targeting in 2001, fiscal and monetary policy were 
out of sync for 12 years, which wreaked havoc on the Hungarian economy due to 
the close relationship and interaction between the two. After 2013, on the back of 
the fiscal reforms of the previous two to three years, and the subsequent monetary 
policy reforms restored the desired harmony, which contributed to achieving 
the objectives of the two parties, including price stability, financial stability and 
sustainable fiscal policy, while also laying the groundwork for long-term growth.
This paper investigates which mix of fiscal and monetary policy has shaped the past 
15 years and the channels through which fiscal and monetary economic policy of 
different activity or dominance impacted each other, and the degree of success of 
their (co)operation. The model devised by Eric Leeper provided the conceptual and 
theoretical framework for our study, while the actual data and experiences are drawn 
from Hungary’s economic history of the past 15 years. This paper also takes a closer 
look at the causes, objectives, main elements and impact of the turnaround in fiscal 
policy that took place between 2010 and 2013 and in monetary policy after 2013. 
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Classification: E52, E63, O23
Keywords: monetary policy, fiscal policy, economic policy consistency, fiscal 
dominance theory, Hungarian economic history 
1. introduction
The relationship between two key areas of economic policy, fiscal and monetary 
policy, is decisive in terms of the success of economic policy. The theory of fiscal 
dominance1 elaborated by Leeper (1991) provides a compelling theoretical 
framework for investigating their relationship. Put in simple terms, Leeper 
examined the type of monetary policy required and allowed by a restrictive and an 
 *  The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the offical view 
of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
György Matolcsy is the Governor of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
Dániel Palotai is the executive director and chief economist of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. E-mail: palotaid@mnb.hu.
The manuscript was received on 1 April 2016. 
The authors would like to express their gratitude to Ákos Szalai, Lóránt Kaszab, Ádám Reiff, Gergely Baksay 
and Gábor Meizer for their contribution to this article.
1  The latest Handbook of Macroeconomics dedicates an entire chapter to the topic of the fiscal dominance 
theory, a testament to its relevance (see Leeper and Leith (2015)).
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expansionary fiscal policy (tight or loose) and vice versa, and also what happens 
when the two policies do not conduct compatible strategies.
In the following section, we present the past 15 years of Hungarian economic policy 
based on Leeper’s theory. As we will see, Leeper’s approach is highly suitable for 
demonstrating instances where harmony could not be achieved between the two 
economic policy decision-making powers, instances where it could be achieved but 
was deficient, and instances where true harmony was achieved. It is apparent that 
the success of economic policy hinges upon the cooperation of these two factors, 
and Hungary’s most successful period was the time when fiscal and monetary policy 
took advantage of the available synergies, while its least successful period was 
the time when one functioned but pushed the other into a constrained situation, 
eliciting increasingly unsuitable responses.
The first part of this paper presents Leeper’s theory in simplified terms, the second 
part addresses the period characterised by flawed fiscal policy (2002–2009), 
the third part looks at the three years when fiscal policy would have enabled 
cooperation but monetary policy failed to seize the opportunity (2010–2012), 
and the fourth part looks at the harmony between these two policies and the 
achievements of this constellation so far (2013–2015). In the final chapter, we draw 
our conclusions.
1.1. The fiscal dominance theory
In Leeper’s theory, both fiscal and monetary policy can be active or passive 
depending on the degree to which they follow their original target. We can 
distinguish between fiscal or monetary dominance depending on which economic 
policy decision-maker is active and which is passive. We will now define these 
targets and behaviours more precisely.
The goal of monetary policy in the model is to steer the inflation rate towards the 
target at the end of the forecast horizon. Monetary policy is active (or tight) if it 
consistently follows this target in terms of the decisions made, and is passive (or 
loose) if it allows itself to diverge from the target towards higher inflation.2 Leeper 
defines opposing active and the passive roles for fiscal policy as compared to the 
monetary decision-making. Fiscal policy is active (or expansionary, loose) if it allows 
a deficit which is higher than the sustainable budget deficit, and is passive (or tight) 
2  In keeping with the spirit of Leeper, in other words, according to the monetary policy rule (or Taylor rule), 
when inflation exceeds the inflation target by 1 per cent, then — as the real interest rate calculated as 
the difference between the nominal interest rate and inflation must increase — the nominal interest rate 
grows by more than 1 per cent (compared to the valid nominal interest rate alongside on-target inflation).
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if it ensures long-term equilibrium.3 We can distinguish between fiscal dominance 
(active, expansionary fiscal policy and passive, accommodative monetary policy) and 
monetary dominance (active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy) depending 
on the casting of the active and passive roles. In addition, there are of course active-
active and passive-passive economic policy mixes.
Monetary dominance refers to an active monetary policy coupled with a passive 
fiscal policy in the Leeperian sense. The central bank follows its inflation target 
strictly, and therefore fiscal policy has no other choice but to remain passive (or 
contractionary in the fiscal sense), otherwise its long-term sustainability would be 
disrupted. Leeper considers this type of economic policy mix to be the default case, 
which guarantees a stable cooperation possibility between the two main economic 
policy branches.
Fiscal dominance refers to the economic policy combination where fiscal policy 
is active (expansionary) while monetary policy is passive (loose). Fiscal policy 
therefore allows excessively high deficits which cannot be sustained over the long 
run. In order to maintain the long-term budget balance of the consolidated general 
government, Leeper’s model calls for the central bank to abandon its inflation target 
and to allow higher inflation to emerge, i.e. to conduct a loose monetary policy. As 
a result, as the central bank generates seigniorage revenue which it can transfer 
to the budget, or otherwise put, can inflate away debt. Of course, this matter is far 
more complex in reality, with numerous legal and credibility constraints alongside 
economic ones, but Leeper’s model addresses the question in the above specified 
manner. Fiscal dominance therefore ensures the long-term sustainability of the 
general government, not by keeping the primary balance in equilibrium, but by 
generating higher inflation than warranted, that is, at the price of the central bank 
– partly or entirely – abandoning its original target and adopting a passive (loose) 
policy.4
Fiscal dominance has prevailed in several countries during certain periods. For 
instance Blanchard (2004) demonstrates that until 2003, the Brazilian economy 
could be closely described using the theory of fiscal dominance, where active 
fiscal policy led to a high deficit, but the central bank essentially did not react 
to the inflationary pressure materialising around 2002 by raising interest rates. 
Fan, Minford and Ou (2014) argue that a model where a regime based on fiscal 
3  Based on Leeper, according to the fiscal policy rule, when debt in real terms exceeds a threshold, the budget 
surplus must increase.
4  Under fiscal dominance, the so-called wealth effect also increases the prevailing inflation alongside an 
expansionary fiscal policy. In this sense, households hold more (nominal) assets due to higher transfers 
and/or lower taxes (or put more simply, “people have more money left”) and this higher perceived wealth 
spurs households to spend more, further pushing up inflation.
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dominance appears provides an accurate description of England in the 1970s. Davig 
and Leeper (2008) examine time series pertaining to the US and identify periods 
shaped by fiscal dominance before the 1980s. It should be noted that in the early 
1980s, a change of monetary regime took place in the US: the former passive 
monetary policy (necessary for maintaining an active fiscal regime) was supplanted 
by an active monetary regime (after the appointment of Paul Volcker as chair of 
the Fed).
The question arises as to what happens when – in contrast to the previous scenarios 
– monetary and fiscal policy are both active or passive. It can be foreseen in the 
original model (Leeper 1991) that when monetary and fiscal policy are both active 
or passive, a state of equilibrium cannot be achieved.5 The central bank therefore 
plays a pivotal role in achieving system stability: it must know whether fiscal policy 
is currently active or passive and pursue an appropriate strategy.
We can see that the central bank is unable to give an adequate response in the 
context of active (expansionary) fiscal policy. It can only choose to either – partly 
or entirely – abandon its target or strictly follow the target (remain active). In the 
former case, inflation rises above the defined target, while in the latter case the 
long-term equilibrium of the consolidated general government is not achieved, and 
this may ultimately lead to bankruptcy or crisis in extreme cases.
Davig and Leeper (2008) generalise this analysis by investigating what happens when 
an economic policy mix is currently not sustainable, but has a certain probability of 
becoming sustainable in the future. According to their results, if the current system 
is unstable (for instance because monetary and fiscal policy are both active), the 
system nevertheless continues to remain stable if there is at least a small chance 
of fiscal policy becoming passive in the future. In other words, even a seemingly 
unsustainable economic policy combination may be tolerated by investors if they 
expect a future turnaround in policy.
The following section presents Hungarian economic policy of the past 15 years 
in the above specified framework, adding in advance that in our view, Leeper’s 
terminology is not always fitting from an economic policy decision-maker’s 
perspective. On the one hand, in Leeper’s model active and passive policy means 
different things with regard to prudence on the fiscal and the monetary side. While 
monetary activity means keeping inflation on target at all costs, fiscal activity is an 
unsustainable and spendthrift policy. Consequently, fiscal dominance in fact refers 
5  If both policies are active, the long-term budget balance of the consolidated general government is not 
achieved. Fiscal policy accommodates an elevated deficit, while the central bank keeps inflation low, 
ultimately disrupting the budget and leading to a crisis. If both policies are passive, the budget deficit is 
low but the central bank nevertheless accommodates high inflation. This is a less relevant combination.
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to a mix of the economic policy defined by fiscal policy, the most central element of 
which lies in the fact that fiscal policy is in and of itself unsustainable and requires 
a monetary policy response. At the same time, monetary dominance does not in 
fact refer to a dominant, decisive monetary policy, but rather to a central bank that 
purely follows the inflation target using the tools at its disposal. In a nutshell, true 
cooperation is not possible under fiscal dominance, as the central bank can either 
opt to allow inflation or to conduct an excessively tight policy, while cooperation 
is possible under active monetary policy (referred to as monetary dominance by 
Leeper). Finally, it should be emphasised that in Leeper’s model, dominance refers 
to an economic policy combination, rather than to “importance”.
2. Fiscal dominance, powerless monetary policy, lack of harmony 
between the two main branches of economic policy (2002–2009)
After presenting the theory of fiscal dominance, it is worth looking at the 
developments in Hungary’s economic policy in practice within this framework, 
alongside the resulting developments in the main macro variables over the period 
between the introduction of inflation targeting in 2001 and 2010. In advance of 
the findings, it can be said that the period of Hungarian economic policy between 
2002 and 2010 was a wasted period, mainly due to irresponsible fiscal policy (mildly 
referred to in Leeper’s model as active). This cannot be offset by a loose monetary 
policy aiming to inflate away debt, nor by an excessively tight monetary policy 
sacrificing growth. The behaviour of irresponsible fiscal policy from 2002 in theory 
left no room for harmony between fiscal and central bank policies for most of the 
period under review. Needless to say, this does not exonerate monetary policy from 
the errors made in this period, which led, amongst other things, to the spread of 
foreign currency lending.
Looking at the relationship between real economic growth and a balanced budget, 
we can see that perhaps the two most essential factors of sustainable development 
and convergence did not concurrently prevail in the Hungarian economy during any 
single year in the 2002–2010 period. The external global boom strongly driving the 
2000s and the consistently overly expansionary fiscal policy (from 2002) led to real 
economic growth (until 2006), but did not result in a balanced, responsible fiscal 
policy by any means (Figure 1).
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The growth rate of the Hungarian economy, which expanded at around of 4 per cent 
until 2006, was unsustainable as the fiscal policy of the governments in office prior 
to 2010 generated permanent structural imbalances. Under fiscal dominance, they 
characteristically attempted to induce growth through a high general government 
deficit (averaging 7.9 per cent between 2002 and 2006 and 6.4 per cent between 
2002 and 2010) and to conceal the mounting structural problems within the 
economy’s structure. As a result of the hefty tax burden on labour income – even 
by international standards – and the unwarrantedly lax social welfare system, by 
the mid-2000s Hungary had come to exhibit one of the lowest employment and 
activity rates in Europe.6 Low net lending of the household and corporate sector 
was typically coupled with an elevated budget deficit, resulting in a substantial twin 
deficit. The rapid rise in the national economy’s net external borrowing gave rise to 
6  Matolcsy–Palotai (2014)
Figure 1
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Note: The years 2016–2017 are the MNB’s forecast included in the March 2016 Inflation Report. Accor-
ding to the statistical rules valid at the time, the budget registered a 4 per cent surplus, but the statisti-
cal methodology was later modified retroactively, resulting in a budget deficit for the year according to 
current figures. The reason for this was that after the EU’s adoption of the ESA2010 statistical methodo-
logy in 2014, the increase in wealth stemming from the assumption of pension fund assets by the state 
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a growing external vulnerability risk, exacerbated after 2003 by the rapidly rising 
popularity and dynamic spread of foreign currency-based household housing loans 
(Figure 10). Growth without stable macroeconomic foundations – employment 
resting on a broad base, and internal and external macro-financial balance – 
therefore lost steam in 2006 and essentially ground to a halt in the two years 
preceding the onset of the global money and capital market crisis in 2008 (Figure 2).
This flawed dominant fiscal policy, essentially founding growth on external 
indebtedness, with no structural reforms aimed at bolstering domestic factors 
of production, and which maintained an unwarrantedly high fiscal deficit, led to 
elevated inflation, which the central bank – unsuccessfully – attempted to offset 
with a persistent excessively high key policy rate, focusing solely on its primary 
statutory mandate (price stability). The Hungarian consumer price index typically 
exceeded the inflation target defined within the framework of the MNB’s inflation 
targeting regime introduced in 2001 (Figure 3); in other words, the central bank 
was unable to fulfil its primary role despite the high policy rate.
Figure 2
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Persistently high inflation in Hungary is attested by the fact that in the 2001–2014 
period, the inflation rate was, on average, 2.5 percentage points higher in Hungary 
than the average registered in Poland, the Czech Republic or Slovakia (V3) (Figure 
4). This is a significant difference in inflation, which essentially disappeared from 
early 2013 once fiscal and monetary policy came into sync: the difference shrank to 
0.3 percentage points in 2013–2015 compared to the earlier 2.5 percentage points.
Inflation remaining persistently far above the target was detrimental to the Hungarian 
economy, unnecessarily eroding not only the real value of property and investment 
instruments, but also real household wages and the profits realised by corporations, 
which also exerted a negative impact on aggregate domestic demand. The boosting 
of inflation by fiscal policy and its maintenance at an unwarrantedly high level 
served the purpose of reducing the real value of government debt in the absence 
of structural reforms and in lieu of cutting back the primary government deficit.
One of the most detrimental consequences of this flawed policy – by forcibly 
achieving a higher nominal base interest rate and yield curve higher than what 
would have benefited the economy – was to drive the Hungarian private sector 
towards foreign currency-based loans available at far lower interest rates than 
domestic loans, with Swiss franc loans accounting for the lion’s share and euro 
loans for a smaller portion. For a long time – until the onset of the 2008 crisis 
– the significant interest spread, accompanied by a stable and relatively strong 
Figure 3
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forint, may have exacerbated foreign currency indebtedness, which prevented 
economic agents from perceiving the exchange rate risk. The pegged exchange 
rate regime prevailing between 2001 and 2008 may have also played a part in the 
aforementioned process and the emergence of the unfavourable economic policy 
mix.7 Economic agents’ foreign currency indebtedness within the economy wreaked 
havoc and also substantially eroded the efficiency of the MNB’s monetary policy 
transmission mechanism (as the majority of loans thus lost their direct interest rate 
sensitivity), and also resulted in high exposure to exchange rate risk in international 
comparison, in both the private and public sector. In addition, high forint interest 
rates burdened the government budget with high interest expenditures, further 
swelling the budget deficit and government debt.
Due to the flawed management of economic policy after 2002, Hungary’s economy 
was weakened significantly in its fundamentals, was unable to grow in a stable 
manner, was characterised by high inactivity and exhibited a twin deficit and 
indebtedness, making it one of the most vulnerable economies in the entire 
European Union. In this condition, it found itself faced with the 2008 global money 
and capital market crisis. This significant negative external shock filtered through 
very rapidly to Hungary, and Hungarian economic policy was unable to react 
adequately.
7  Csajbók–Hudecz–Tamási (2010)
Figure 4
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Due to this precarious vulnerability and in the wake of the sudden outflow of foreign 
institutional investors, Hungary’s government securities market essentially froze 
immediately. To address this issue, to stabilise the capital position of Hungarian 
commercial banks and to increase the formerly insufficient central bank foreign 
exchange reserves, the Hungarian government and central bank management 
in power at the time were compelled to seek assistance from the IMF and the 
European Union, and to drastically hike the key policy rate. The loan package 
contracted from international creditors further swelled public debt (with the burden 
of repayment passed on to the government in office after 2010), and once again 
tied the hands of the government’s economic policy.
Developments in the general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio can serve as 
a good measure of economic policy successfulness, as this macroeconomic indicator 
incorporates the impact of changes in the primary balance, general government 
interest expenditures, inflation, exchange rate and real growth changes. A testament 
to the fundamentally flawed economic policy conducted between 2002 and 2010 
is that, despite the positive external global economic environment, the extremely 
expansionary fiscal policy and elevated inflation, it failed to stimulate the real 
economy to the extent that would have been needed to scale back the government 
debt ratio (or at least maintain it). Instead, the general government debt-to-GDP 
ratio, which stood at barely 52 per cent in late 2001, had climbed to 66 per cent 
before the crisis and to over 80 per cent by late 2010 (Figure 5), while Hungary 
continuously and increasingly lagged behind compared to the development of its 
regional neighbours in terms of GDP per capita.8 In this regard, we can confirm 
that the economic policy characterised by strong fiscal dominance conducted up 
to 2010 was a failure and was barely able to produce any economic growth after 
2006, while disrupting the macroeconomic balance.
3. Turnaround in fiscal policy and consolidation of the budget  
(2010–2013)
A sharp change in the fiscal policy conducted during the first decade of the 
second millennium – which was characterised by high government deficits and 
a permanently rising general government debt ratio – occurred after 2010. The 
government that took office at that time defined the sustainable reduction of 
Hungarian general government debt, which was high by both regional and broader 
international standards, as a declared objective, in addition to bringing the general 
government deficit as a share of GDP to below the 3 per cent defined under the 
Maastricht criteria. Along with these key objectives, injecting dynamism into the 
real economy by increasing employment, combatting the shadow economy and 
reducing the economy’s external vulnerability, and as part of this, phasing-out 
8  Matolcsy (2008)
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foreign currency lending became priorities for economic policy. After the reversal 
of the negative macroeconomic trends prevailing prior to 2010, meaningful progress 
was made in all of these priority areas, and thus “the former growth model based 
on substantial external indebtedness was replaced by the opportunities for a more 
sustainable convergence path relying instead on domestic financing”.9
In terms of the link between fiscal and monetary policy, the most important 
consequence of the outcomes of fiscal policy was that they put an end to the 
earlier detrimental fiscal dominance and paved the way for cooperation between 
the two areas while respecting each other’s autonomy but ultimately serving the 
same objectives. Nevertheless, monetary policy was not yet aiming for harmony 
with government policies during this period, and was unable to make most of the 
opportunity afforded by fiscal consolidation. There was neither price stability nor 
financial stability, and the management of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank at the time 
also did not support the Hungarian government’s economic policy.
The primary objective of the fiscal turnaround that materialised after 2010 was to 
interrupt the negative trend of the sharply rising general government (gross) debt-
to-GDP ratio prevailing since 2002 and to set this on a downward path (Figure 5), 
without impeding the economic recovery from the years of recession, but rather by 
9  Matolcsy–Palotai (2014)
Figure 5
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fostering this recovery. High government debt – and the elevated foreign currency 
ratio and the excessive non-resident portion within this debt – carried substantial 
macro-financial vulnerability and important real economic risks as well. The 
general government stressed the importance of scaling back public indebtedness 
by enshrining this objective in the debt rule and elevating it to the constitutional 
level in the Fundamental Law adopted in 2011.
The first and most important tool for reducing the debt ratio was to restrict the 
deficit ratio as a percentage of GDP to a low level. The drastic improvement in the 
general government balance was not only called for by the substantial indebtedness 
generated by the irresponsible fiscal policy of the 2000s, but also by the European 
Union’s fiscal obligation. As perhaps the only case in Europe, right from the time 
of Hungary’s accession to the European Union (in 2004), it was continuously under 
the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), as it failed to meet the 3 per cent deficit ratio 
defined under the Maastricht criteria. The persistent breach of this criterion entailed 
the risk of suspension of EU cohesion funds, especially in the years following the 
global money and capital market crisis of 2008 and the European debt crisis of 
2011, when Brussels strove to enforce compliance with the European Union rules 
more strictly than before. The government could not risk losing the EU funds, which 
significantly bolstered the economy, and therefore responded by consolidating the 
budget in meaningful and sustainable manner.
The government intended to consolidate the budget without negatively impacting 
households’ disposable income to the extent possible, while creating a fair 
sharing of burdens based on the broadest possible base by involving multinational 
corporations. A set of so-called unorthodox fiscal instruments (including special 
taxes levied on the financial, retail, telecommunications and energy sector) were 
one of the key elements to create this fiscal leeway. The other key element was 
increasing the rate of sales taxes (including excise taxes and the upper VAT rate). 
Along with increasing the role of taxes on consumption, another core economic 
policy objective was to scale back the high taxes on labour incomes. This direction 
of the restructuring of the tax structure coincides with the competitiveness-boosting 
concept, as well as international experiences and recommendations, and aims to 
shift the centre of gravity in taxation from income-type taxes to sales taxes. The 
fiscal policy conducted after 2010 made sure to consistently enforce these two 
approaches, as a result of which these two types of taxation accounted for roughly 
the same weight within the Hungarian tax regime by 2015 (Figure 6).
The linking of retail sector transactions to the National Tax and Customs 
Administration database using on-line cash-registers also significantly contributed 
to increasing the weight of consumption taxes. This step plays a major role in the 
fight against the shadow economy, as attested by the increase in the estimated 
effective VAT rate in 2014–2015 (of 2 percentage points), along with the increasing 
expansion of retail sales volumes (Figure 7). This means that sales tax revenues 
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linked to consumption were successfully increased without hiking the VAT rate, 
which also decreased the competitive disadvantage of companies lawfully paying 
tax compared to their tax-avoiding peers.
The social and economic target groups supported on a priority basis by the fiscal 
policy conducted after 2010 – similarly to the 1998–2002 cycle – were once again 
families and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In an effort to improve 
the income position of families, the government created a flat-rate, proportional 
personal income tax (PIT) regime, and introduced and is continuously expanding the 
institution of the family tax base incentive that offers significant support to families 
with children. The introduction of the flat-rate PIT regime not only reduces the 
burdens on labour, but also incentivises work intensity and reduces the concealment 
of income by reducing marginal tax rates to the regional level. Along with the PIT 
regime, the Job Protection Action Plan was also introduced, in the context of which 
the government specifically targeted the employment of groups characteristically 
disadvantaged on the labour market (the unemployed below the age of 25 or above 
the age of 55, mothers returning from maternity leave, unqualified individuals and 
the long-term unemployed) by vastly reducing employer contributions for these 
groups.
The government fostered SME sector profitability and competitiveness by 
significantly expanding the discounted (10 per cent) corporate tax rate – increasing 
the upper threshold to HUF 500 million – and by introducing discounted small 
entrepreneur tax schemes (KATA [“small taxpayers’ itemised lump-sum tax”], KIVA 
[“small business tax”]).
Coupled with an increasingly dynamic Hungarian economy and the reduction of 
the shadow economy, and despite the protracted global real economic slump, the 
tax and pension reform supported by these novel measures contributed to the 
increase in the revenue side of the budget balance, while implementation of the 
Széll Kálmán Plans ensured the structural reform and adjustment of expenditure 
side. One of the priority objectives of these schemes was to tighten the excessively 
lax social welfare system in place prior to 2010 and to channel individuals capable 
of working from inactivity back to labour market activity, in light of the fact that 
prior to 2010, Hungary’s activity and employment rate were among the lowest in 
Europe. The extension and state support of the public work programme and the 
addition of educational programmes was also a key element of the economic policy 
of providing “work instead of benefits”.
In the wake of the significant restructuring of both sides of the budget, in 2012 the 
general government’s primary balance as a percentage of GDP exhibited a surplus 
for the first time in 12 years, and the general government deficit-to-GDP ratio 
dipped well below three per cent, to 2.3 per cent, stabilising at a similar level in 
the subsequent years (Figure 1). A special achievement lies in the fact that the 
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restructuring and consolidation of the government budget was achieved while the 
total tax burden relative to GDP decreased by 1.5 percentage point according to 
Eurostat data, and by roughly 2.5 percentage points if we factor in mandatory 
private pension fund membership fees compared to the period preceding the 2010 
change in government, thus dipping below the European Union average (Figure 8).
Following the fiscal turnaround, in 2013 the European Union’s Excessive Deficit 
Procedure was finally lifted against Hungary after nine years. This is a significant 
achievement not only because the constant economic policy threat of suspension 
of EU funds was removed, but also because the Hungarian government’s fiscal 
policy was finally also recognised as successful internationally, despite the criticism.
The (expected) developments in the central bank’s profit/loss also played a role in 
the lifting of the Excessive Deficit Procedure. The opposition of the central bank 
and fiscal policy of the time is attested to by the fact that in late 2012 the MNB 
forecasted a central bank loss of HUF 203 billion for the following year, based on 
which the European Commission deemed additional budgetary adjustments as 
warranted. However, the new central bank management that took office in March 
2013 demonstrated that this could be avoided, and the MNB closed 2013 in the 
black.
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As a result of the sustainable consolidation of the government deficit and the 
government measures taken to foster and spark economic growth, government 
debt-to-GDP ratio was stabilised by 2010–2011 and gradually decreased from 2012 
in spite of the European economic slump caused by the financial, economic and debt 
crisis.10 The debt ratio, which stood at a historical peak of over 80 per cent in 2011, 
was reduced by over 5.5 percentage points by late 2015 (Figure 5). Meanwhile, 
the foreign currency ratio of government debt also decreased continuously and 
substantially: it peaked in 2011 (52 per cent) before shrinking to 35 per cent by late 
2015, which may have reached 32 per cent by 2016 Q2 with the repayment of the 
last instalment of the EU-IMF loan package.
It should be noted that the average debt ratio of the 28 European Union member 
states was still 11 percentage points lower than the Hungarian debt ratio, but the 
average debt-to-GDP ratio in the European Union has been continuously on the 
rise ever since, in contrast to Hungary, approaching 90 per cent. By late 2014, 
the average debt ratio in the EU was over 12 percentage points higher than the 
Hungarian figure, and this difference may have been sustained in 2015 despite 
10  Baksay–Szalai (2015)
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the expected decrease in the EU’s average debt ratio (Figure 9). The upward debt 
trend in Hungary between 2002 and 2010 reveals that Hungary was unable to 
take advantage of the sound economic conditions of the 2000s, and not even real 
economic growth (of approximately 4 per cent) fuelled by external borrowing and 
characteristically above-target inflation were able to offset the debt-increasing 
effect of the budget deficits that were persistently high at the time (6–7 per cent 
on average).
Resolving the situation of foreign currency debtors and a gradually phase-out 
foreign currency-based lending was a key economic policy priority, along with 
comprehensive fiscal consolidation. This was warranted by the fact that by 2010, 
the majority of private sector loans were denominated in foreign currency, which 
rendered the entire Hungarian economy highly sensitive to exchange rates. Besides 
the fact that such a high prevalence of foreign currency loans significantly dampened 
the efficiency of the Hungarian monetary policy transmission mechanism, it also 
created an exceptional source of macro-financial vulnerability, salient even by 
international standards. The economy’s exchange rate sensitivity became significant: 
in addition to the exchange rate depreciation, the rising burdens of foreign currency 
debtors substantially eroded households’ and corporations’ income position and 
profitability, while also posing a significant and systemic risk for the entire financial 
system, which was reflected in the rapid rise of non-performing loans after the 
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onset of the 2008 global crisis. Foreign currency-based mortgage loans in the 
retail segment implied the biggest issue, as the weight of these loans spiked after 
2003 (Figure 10) and the increasing related repayment burdens put hundreds of 
thousands of citizens at the risk of losing their home.
To address this issue, which had become pressing by 2010, as a first step the 
government essentially prohibited foreign currency mortgage lending to households 
and rolled out measures that helped avert a social catastrophe. It imposed 
a moratorium on evictions, reduced households’ foreign currency exposure through 
the early repayment scheme, introduced the institution of the exchange rate cap 
and set up the National Asset Management Agency for the socially most vulnerable 
citizens. The government assistance did not provide a total solution in 2012, but 
broadly and materially improved the situation of foreign currency debtors. The 
government was unable to achieve a total solution, because in order to convert 
foreign currency loans to forint, the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves were 
needed for the conversion in order to maintain financial stability. At the time 
however, the government could not count on the central bank’s support.
The positive developments that occurred in the general government deficit and 
government debt as a share of GDP, and the significant reduction in external 
indebtedness led to a substantial improvement in Hungary’s risk perception in 
the course of 2012. Hungary’s improving market perception translated not only 
to a narrowing of risk spreads (e.g. CDS), but also to a significant reduction in 
government securities market yields (Figure 11).
The establishment of internal macro-financial balance created significant leeway, 
and the decreasing inflation outlook (to which the government measures 
contributed significantly) called for the easing of monetary policy in 2012. However, 
the key policy rate cut only began “hesitantly” in August 2012, prompted by the 
votes of external Monetary Council members at the time, in opposition to the votes 
of the internal members. The leeway for the easing cycle which subsequently lasted 
for over three years was therefore ensured by the progressively improving fiscal 
credibility created by the post-2010 budgetary consolidation, which in addition to 
falling inflation and increasingly anchored inflation expectations, was also fostered 
by the global rise in the risk appetite of international investors.
4. Satisfactory harmony between fiscal and monetary policy and the 
resulting outcomes (from 2013)
March 2013 marked a new period for monetary policy once the new central 
bank management took office, and also marked a new era in terms of fiscal and 
monetary policy cooperation in Hungary. From this date forward, the Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank (MNB) used, along with its main policy instruments, various novel 
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and innovative instruments and schemes to meet its primary objective (achieving 
and maintaining price stability), and attempted – without prejudice to its primary 
objective – to support “the maintenance of the stability of the system of financial 
intermediation” and “the economic policy of the government using the instruments 
at its disposal” (Article 3 (2) of Act CXXXIX of 2013). An adequate economic policy 
mix in combination with a prudent fiscal policy is one that achieves a positive 
equilibrium outcome (as in Leeper’s model) and the attainment of the objectives 
of both economic policy branches (sustainable budget, price stability).
Since 2013, several aspects of the central bank’s efforts have exerted a positive 
impact on fiscal policy. The following section presents the main steps of the 
turnaround in the monetary policy and the achievements thereof based on these 
key measures and schemes: (i) the easing cycles, (ii) the Funding for Growth 
Scheme (FGS), (iii) the Self-Financing Scheme, (iv) active cooperation in the forint 
conversion of foreign currency household loans, which also improved the monetary 
transmission mechanism, and more recently, (v) the Growth Supporting Programme 
(GSP).
4.1. Reform of monetary policy through active, innovative monetary 
instruments
i.  The easing cycles. The persistently above-target inflation before 2013 started 
to fall in Hungary (and globally) after 2013, partly due to slack domestic and 
external demand and partly due to negative cost shocks, which posed the threat 
of deflation in other places. This risk only materialised formally in Hungary in the 
form of a negative consumer price index in 2014–2015, to which the multi-step 
government administrative price cuts – referred to as utility cost reduction – 
contributed significantly (Figure 3). The annual consumer price index had already 
fallen below the 3 per cent inflation target by early 2013 and had practically 
reached zero at the end of the year, therefore inflation fell significantly and 
persistently short of the level deemed optimal by monetary policy. This, in and of 
itself, warranted a steady easing of monetary conditions, as did the performance 
of the Hungarian economy, which fell short of its potential level.
 In an effort to address these issues and promptly remedy them, the new central 
bank management decided to continue the prudent, consistent easing cycle 
launched in 2012 by the external members. To meet the inflation target and 
concurrently stimulate the real economy, the key policy rate, which stood at 7 per 
cent in August 2012, was cut to 1.05 per cent by late April 2016 (Figure 11). The 
reduction of the key policy rate to a historic low point occurred in several cycles.
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ii.  The Funding for Growth Scheme. Bank lending activity has slowed substantially 
due to the Hungarian real economy’s performance, falling significantly short of 
its potential, and commercial bank deleveraging. In response, the MNB decided 
to implement novel instruments, starting with the rollout of the “Funding for 
Growth Scheme” (FGS) in June 2013, which was similar to the Bank of England’s 
“Funding for Lending” scheme, but also different in many aspects. In the context 
of this scheme, the central bank grants refinancing loans at 0 per cent interest 
to commercial banks, which in turn lend to the SME sector at an interest margin 
of no more than 2.5 per cent, supporting purposes as new investment financing, 
working capital financing, EU grant pre-financing and foreign currency loan 
replacement. A total of some 31,000 companies accessed HUF 2,100 billion in 
funding under the two pillars of the scheme. The FGS, introduced as a provisional 
instrument, therefore achieved the market-building and growth objectives 
defined by the MNB at the time of its launch. At the same time, the FGS plays 
an increasingly decisive role in banks’ standard product range, which may impede 
a return to market-based lending in the long run. The central bank therefore 
Figure 11
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launched its Growth Supporting Programme in early 2016 to help banks revert 
to market-based lending by gradually phasing out the FGS and announcing a new 
funding scheme providing positive incentives.
iii.  The Self-Financing Scheme. The MNB rolled out additional unconventional 
instruments in 2014 in an effort to reduce Hungary’s external vulnerability. The 
central bank’s Self-Financing Scheme fosters the reduction of external and foreign 
currency-denominated gross public debt, which had continuously risen until late 
2011; this programme was launched by the MNB in the summer of 2014 and 
expanded in 2015–2016 in several steps.
  In the context of the scheme, the central bank’s main policy instrument and 
other elements of its toolset were transformed with the intention of prompting 
Hungarian banks to keep their liquid funds in non-central bank liquid instruments 
eligible to be pledged as collateral, instead of the MNB’s sterilisation instrument. 
Given the nature of Hungarian financial markets, this primarily meant 
government securities. As the first step of the Self-Financing Scheme, the main 
policy instrument, the two-weeks bill was converted to a deposit, followed 
by the introduction of the central bank’s conditional interest rate swap (IRS) 
facility which drives Hungarian banks towards longer maturity non-central bank 
securities, primarily government securities, by managing interest rate risk. By 
announcing the second phase of the scheme in 2015, the MNB continued the 
transformation of its monetary toolset, spurring banks to reduce their funds 
held in central bank instruments. One of the main elements of this effort was to 
extend the maturity of the two-week main policy instrument to three months, 
further supported by additional measures.11
  The Self-Financing Scheme fostered a substantial improvement in the Hungarian 
economy’s financing structure, and specifically of government debt, and greater 
reliance on domestic funding, which significantly reduces Hungary’s macro-
financial vulnerability. In addition to fostering domestic financing, the Self-
Financing Scheme also allows the debt manager to finance the bulk of its foreign 
currency maturities from forint funding, allowing a reduction of the foreign 
currency ratio of government debt and thus significantly mitigating exchange 
rate exposure (Figure 12).
11  The two other key elements of the transformation of the toolset implemented in the context of the Self-
Financing Scheme are the gradual restriction and phasing-out of the two-week deposit at the end of April 
2016 and the central bank IRS facilities.
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iv.  The forint conversion of foreign currency household loans. A constructive 
relationship is also essential in other areas besides the direct channels between 
the two main branches of economic policy and the mutual impact mechanisms. 
The forint conversion of foreign currency household loans is a prime example of 
an economic policy area affected by both fiscal and monetary policy. The central 
bank played a pivotal role in the introduction of the government measures to 
bail out foreign currency debtors and in the phasing-out of schemes involving 
substantial systemic – including monetary transmission, financial stability and 
growth – risks. As the leading institution of the Hungarian banking system, 
the MNB assumed a proactive, and even an initiatory role in the negotiations 
between the banking sector and the government, in providing professional 
guidance and supplying the foreign currency liquidity needed to phase out 
foreign currency household loans (supplying approximately EUR 9.6 billion).
The timing, the professional competence and the constructive negotiations 
between the parties were instrumental in the successful phasing-out of foreign 
currency household loans.12 The uniformity decision by the Curia (which is the 
12  Kolozsi–Banai–Vonnák (2015)
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Supreme Court in Hungary) passed on 16 June 2014 laid the legal foundations for 
implementing the series of steps preparing and allowing settlement and forint 
conversion. The implementation was preceded by numerous industry debates 
and consultations, given the many options and potential scheduling for the 
phasing-out of foreign currency loans. Due to the high level of foreign exchange 
reserve adequacy, the MNB opted for single-step conversion. In light of the 
nature of conversion, the conversion exchange rate first had to be fixed, which 
required close cooperation between the three parties (the government, banks 
and the MNB). What is more, the plan had to be implemented while making sure 
that money and capital market players did not obtain any information on the 
method, timing and fixed exchange rate of forint conversion, as any potential 
market speculation based on this information could have undermined complete 
and successful forint conversion.13
The foreign currency tenders linked to the phasing-out of household mortgage 
loans were conducted in autumn of 2014 and in early 2015, while the forint 
conversion tenders for personal and vehicle loans were conducted in August 
and September 2015; consequently, Hungarian households closed 2015 having 
essentially cleared their balance sheets of foreign currency loans.
v.  The Growth Supporting Programme. The new Growth Supporting Programme 
(GSP), launched on 1 January 2016, is aimed at promoting banks’ return to 
market lending by gradually phasing out the FGS and by introducing the Market-
Based Lending Scheme (MLS) as a positive incentive. The aim of the programme 
is to support a smooth return by banks to market-based lending as the FGS is 
phased out, and to expand the stocks of corporate and SME loans by a targeted 
amount of HUF 250–400 billion in 2016, corresponding to annual lending 
growth of 5–10 per cent. During the third, phasing-out pillar of the FGS, the 
MNB provides an additional HUF 300 billion in funding twice for the purpose 
of lending to the Hungarian SME sector (half in foreign currency). In addition, 
the Market-Based Lending Scheme (MLS) aims to provide positive incentives for 
banks’ credit market activity. As part of the scheme, the central bank’s toolset 
was supplemented with an interest rate swap conditional on lending activity 
(LIRS) and a preferential deposit facility to foster bank liquidity management. 
These targeted central bank instruments contribute to boosting lending through 
access conditions, as participating banks must commit to increasing their stock 
of loans granted to SMEs by one quarter of their LIRS volume used. The MNB is 
also working on creating a corporate credit reporting system that allows banks 
to assess credit risks as accurately as possible.
13  Nagy (2015)
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4.2. Positive growth and fiscal impacts of the turnaround in monetary policy
The easing cycles of the key policy rate, the persistently low level of the main policy 
instrument and the rollout and extension of the FGS and the MLS also foster the 
real economy and an increase in growth potential by promoting investment and 
employment, along with the primary objective of achieving and maintaining price 
stability.
Stimulating the economy using monetary instruments in such a context not only 
serves the attainment of central bank objectives, but also of fiscal policy objectives, 
which are mutually reinforcing processes. As the real economy expands, so does 
employment, the outflow of wages, the volume of consumption and investment 
spending, generating sales and income tax revenues while budgetary spending on 
labour market benefits is reduced. These may all contribute to an improving budget 
balance on both the revenue and expenditure side.
In addition, an improving general government balance as a percentage of GDP 
reduces the government debt ratio, which in turn improves the country’s risk 
perception. Improving investor sentiment reduces risk spreads and leads to 
a decline in the yield curve. These generate an improvement in the budget balance 
not only through the primary balance, but also by reducing interest expenditures. 
The decline in yields stemming from credibility creates more room for maneuver, 
ceteris paribus, for interest rate cuts, and the repeated feedback continues until 
inflation and real growth reach the optimal level desired by the economy’s structural 
factors, which entails the appropriate adjustment of the central bank base rate.
The above impacts can also be estimated in quantified terms. According to the 
calculations of the MNB’s experts, the central bank has supported nearly half of 
the economic growth achieved since 2013 through its monetary policy, and has 
contributed significantly to real GDP growth by supporting increased investments. 
The reduction in the key policy rate over the past three years substantially boosted 
the Hungarian economy’s performance, by approximately 1.5 per cent, and 
contributed to bringing inflation closer to the target level by over 1.5 percentage 
points.14 This development was fostered by the growth impact generated by the 
Funding for Growth Scheme, which is estimated to have contributed to stimulating 
the economy in 2013–2015 to a similar degree as the easing cycles.15
Likewise, the impact of central bank policy on the government’s interest 
expenditures is also significant. Thanks to the greatly improving risk perception in 
the wake of the disciplined Hungarian fiscal policy, the central bank’s easing cycles 
(totalling 595 basis points) and the Self-Financing Scheme, Hungarian government 
14  Felcser–Soós–Váradi (2015)
15  Magyar Nemzeti Bank (2016)
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securities market yields have decreased significantly over the past period of more 
than three years (Figure 11). Compared to a baseline scenario assuming the 
yields prevailing in August 2012, the interest savings generated by the declining 
yield curve may amount to over HUF 300 billion in 2015 and HUF 410 billion in 
2016. The former amounts to nearly 1 per cent, while the latter amounts to 1.2 
per cent of GDP, and this figure may reach up to 1.7 per cent of GDP.16 The fiscal 
leeway afforded by lower interest expenditures may allow the implementation of 
additional national competitiveness-boosting schemes while adhering to disciplined 
financial management and maintaining a low deficit. According to the European 
Commission’s 2015 forecast, the reduction of the Hungarian budget’s interest 
expenditures between 2013 and 2015 may be salient by both regional and European 
Union standards, and the reduction of its debt ratio, partly stemming from the 
former, is exceptional (Figure 13).17
The reduction of the yield curve and of the central bank’s key policy instrument is 
able to not only improve the budget position, but also influences the central bank’s 
profit or loss. This is because the central bank pays interest on the majority of its 
16  Kicsák (2015)
17  Kicsák (2015)
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balance sheet liabilities through its sterilisation instrument, which features the key 
interest rate, and therefore a reduction in interest improves the MNB’s profit or loss.
A positive side effect of the interest rate cuts started in August 2012 is that they help 
avoid central bank losses and the related budgetary reimbursement of losses. In the 
wake of the interest rate cuts continued in 2013, and of the rising exchange rate 
profit stemming from an exchange rate that was weaker than previously expected 
and higher conversion (such as the prepayment of the IMF loan), the central bank 
loss expected for the end of 2013 was annulled, with the MNB even posting a nearly 
HUF 30 billion profit that it was able to maintain in 2014 and 2015, thus avoiding 
being an additional burden for the budget.18
5. Summary
The relationship between fiscal and monetary policy, as well as the points of 
contact and correlations between these two branches play a key role not only on 
a theoretical level, but also in the effective conduct of monetary policy and the 
active shaping of macroeconomic developments. Due to fiscal dominance, fiscal 
balance and real economic growth could not be achieved simultaneously in the 
18  Matolcsy (2015)
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Hungarian economy between 2002 and 2010, and neither balance nor growth 
prevailed between 2007 and 2010. Following 2010, a fiscal turnaround, followed 
by a monetary turnaround took place in two steps. The former gave rise to fiscal 
balance, while the latter took the necessary steps for achieving price stability and 
financial stability, building on budgetary stability. The independent but constructive 
harmony that emerged between the two economic policies after 2013 is reflected 
in the sustained improvement in Hungary’s macroeconomic developments 
(real growth, inflation, employment, government deficit, external and internal 
indebtedness, vulnerability, risk perception).
On balance, a harmonious and fruitful cooperation between the two economic 
policy branches forms an essential basis for concurrently achieving macro-financial 
balance and dynamic growth (Figure 14).
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The controversial treatment of money and 
banks in macroeconomics
István Ábel – Kristóf Lehmann – Attila Tapaszti 
This paper offers a basic overview of the practical aspects of money creation. A brief 
presentation of the history of money and a critical summary of the commonly 
accepted theories highlight the current understanding of the emergence and 
operating characteristics of money in the modern economy. We follow the distinction 
between inside and outside money creation. Inside money is jointly determined by 
the private sector’s need for money, together with the banking system’s money 
creation potential. This paper focuses on inside money along the lines of the 
endogenous money theory. We demonstrate the main features of money flows and 
the money created by banks. Outside money is created by the state (not the private 
sector), and its creation can only be indirectly influenced by the money demand 
of the private sector. A brief overview of the historical process of the emergence 
of money provides a framework to assess and compare the main elements of the 
chartalist and metallist concepts of money. Concerning the current debates about 
the role of the banks in money creation, we compare three theories focusing on 
money creation. These three theories treat the role of banks in money creation 
differently. The endogenous money theory based on a convincing description of 
money flows offers a reliable interpretation of the current monetary policy. One 
striking conclusion of the endogenous money theory is that banks do not need 
savings in advance to lend, as lending in itself is considered money creation.
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1. introduction
People’s view of microeconomics based on their own observations is often far 
removed from what actually happens in the economy. Not because their world view 
is distorted, subjective or because their ideological or religious beliefs influence it, 
but because they cannot perceive the restrictions, forces and dynamics resulting 
from macroeconomic constraints. This problem is indicated by the fact that the 
same economic category often reflects a completely different content in the 
macro and the micro approach. For example, it is widely known that increasing 
savings at the level of individuals is a laudable virtue, while at the macro level it 
is often a hindrance to recovery because it dampens demand. At the individual 
level, indebtedness is associated with recklessness, while demand is boosted most 
through borrowing, since if we did not want to spend, people would not incur debt. 
Savings and debt are linked to money, so one might suspect that our view of money 
may be hampered by similar contradictions. This paper concentrates on certain 
contradictions of money theories. Among the theories aimed at clearing up the 
mysteries surrounding the origin of money, we will briefly touch upon those that 
are the most widely accepted. In describing the interpretations and formulating our 
doubts linked to them, we seek to gain a deeper understanding of the role banks 
play in money creation.
Since its inception more than two and a half thousand years ago, money has 
undergone several changes. The circumstances of its origin, however, may provide 
a basis for distinguishing between the misconceptions and the apparent facts about 
money. For the modern man, gaining an insight into the mechanism of money 
creation is even more important than learning about the origin of money. Even 
today, several conflicting theories of modern money creation are widely held. 
Identifying the correct and accurate mechanism of money creation among the 
competing misconceptions is also vital, because only a verified theory – or one that 
seems to be verified by the facts of the modern economy – can provide a useful tool 
for managing or at least understanding the understanding the current problems.
2. is money an innovation to reduce transaction costs?
This chapter reaches a conclusion different from the commonly accepted economic 
thinking described in textbooks. Arguments against money theories hinging on 
the reduction of transaction costs are based on two unresolved questions. First, it 
should be clear whose transactions are examined, and it is also important to know 
what types of transactions of the participants are being analysed. Both questions 
remain unanswered in most money theories.
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The direct exchange of goods (barter) is complicated and makes the exchange of 
goods very difficult. Many theories attributed the emergence of money to the fact 
that it facilitated the temporal and spatial separation of selling and buying goods 
and of the parties concerned. If goods are not exchanged directly for goods, the 
buyer of a good does not have to be a seller of another good at the same time, 
and they do not have to find an extremely rare occasion for the exchange when 
the buyer wishes to buy exactly the good offered by the seller, and vice versa. Not 
to mention the fact that the value of the goods sought to be sold and bought may 
be different, and the difference cannot be settled by dividing up the goods. This 
problem is solved if money acts as an intermediary in the exchange of goods.
It is important to determine the circumstances when barter can be substituted by 
money in the exchange. Money is only accepted by the seller if it carries value. But 
what lends value to money? Let us assume that gold represents this value. The 
metallist commodity money theory flourished and became widespread based on 
such assumptions. It seems an obvious hypothesis, but surprisingly gold nuggets 
have basically never been used as a means of payment (with the exception of 
the California Gold Rush). Goodhart (1998:411) considered this exchange a form 
of barter, since he believed that gold nuggets were not suitable for fulfilling the 
role of money, as both the seller and the buyer knew little about its value, while 
both of them knew the precise value of beans.1 Determining the value of a gold 
nugget required an expert, which added to both the duration and the costs of the 
transaction. Gierson (1977) confirmed that precious metals emerged as means 
of payment in parallel with minting. This suggests that the sign put on the metal 
during minting solved the problem of assessing the value of precious metals. The 
imprint indicated the value, and therefore people did not have to weigh the metal 
and analyse its composition every time. Thus the coinage, with the minted imprint 
solved the problem of identification. However, together with the imprint, another 
element was also introduced, namely the authority that was legally allowed to 
engage in minting. This leads us from the concept of metallist commodity money 
to chartalism. According to the chartalist theory, the “value and utility” of money is 
not linked to its inner metal content, but to the power of the state. As the imprint 
identifies, it only takes one more step to disregard the significance of metal content, 
and to replace gold with a paper print. Thus, the value of money does not arise 
from its metal content.
1  Goodhart (1998) presents a detailed overview of the origin and nature of money. His article had a marked 
influence on the present study. The history of money is presented from another aspect, the safe asset 
function, by Gorton (2016), who gives a detailed account of the events in today’s global financial crisis, 
which confirm the essential nature of precisely this function.
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The involvement of the state authority had a beneficial effect of reducing transaction 
costs, which fostered the spread of money. Several events in history suggest that 
the origin of money is not linked to the exchange between individuals.2 Quiggin 
(1949) gives a more detailed account of this while providing an overview of the 
“primitive” forms of money in ancient societies. In such societies, money did not 
serve commercial purposes, its power or status aspects were more important. In 
other words, status and authority was more central in the inception of money than 
the transaction element. From this perspective, the reduction of transaction costs 
was a collateral benefit of the emergence of money, but not its underlying goal or 
reason. Readers familiar with the accounting of economic transactions know that 
money creation is the same as incurring debt. Money is recognised on the assets 
side of the balance sheet, while the debt incurred is entered on the liabilities side. 
When a king builds a castle from the money, his money on the assets side turns 
into a pile of stones, but his debt on the liabilities side is retained. The debt is an 
obligation to accept the money minted by him from his subjects when they pay their 
obligations. This is similar to the situation when a state institution charged with 
printing banknotes does so. This process is regulated by strict laws, but the same 
strict laws stipulate that taxes, duties and consideration for all state services may 
only be paid in domestic currency. One of the most important innovative features 
of money is that it improves the efficiency of tax collection. As long as the fiscal 
function of the person in power was constrained by the physical necessity to visit all 
his subjects with his entourage during the year and eat all their products deemed 
appropriate by him as a form of taxation, no vast empires could be established, not 
even when the entourage expanded over time.
According to chartalists, facilitating taxation is the key function leading to the 
emergence of money. Chartalists dispute the core assumption of the metallist theory 
that the value of money is derived from its metal content or gold backing. This 
theory does not view money as a kind of good with exchange value and does not 
stress its function as a means of exchange, but emphasises its function as a means 
of payment and record-keeping. In the metallist approach, the market functions 
as the dominant element, and the state does not play a special role in either the 
creation of money or its functions. By contrast, the chartalist theory maintains 
that all “means of payment” emerge as generally accepted money only because 
the authority declares that people and organisations are required to pay and keep 
records of certain obligations against the state in that currency. For example, the 
king may finance a war by giving his soldiers coins, and levy a tax on his subjects, 
demanding that everyone pay one coin to the treasury. This makes these coins 
instantly fit for circulation, as taxpayers seek to obtain them in exchange for goods. 
2  Clower (1984) listed several problems with attributing the existence of money to some form of transaction 
cost reduction. Divisibility, durability and transportability are clearly beneficial features, but the existence 
of money itself cannot be derived from these.
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The mark minted on one side of the metal is used for determining its value. Graeber 
(2011) and Gierson (1977) both convincingly argued in support of this hypothesis. 
According to Graeber (2011), the metallist monetary systems using money with 
an inherent value and the chartalist monetary systems using money without an 
inherent value have alternated cyclically over the course of history. Money with an 
inherent value became widely used in periods characterised by widespread conflicts 
or wars, as trust in the weakening central authority was undermined.
The chartalist approach to money appears in the works of several well-known 
economists. For example in a book by Adam Smith: “A prince, who should enact 
that a certain proportion of his taxes should be paid in a paper money of a certain 
kind, might thereby give a certain value to this paper money, even though the 
term of its final discharge and redemption should depend altogether upon the 
will of the prince” (Smith 1952 [1776]: 160, quoted in Bell 2001:154). The general 
description of the chartalist theory of money was published by Knapp (1924). Bell 
(2001) summarises the gist of Knapp’s complex argumentation as follows: when 
the money used for paying taxes and for the services carried out in state offices 
is stipulated by law, no metal-related feature of the money plays a role in the 
decision; therefore, this theory basically refutes the metallist theory of money. 
Money becomes a generally accepted means of payment because it enables people 
to pay their obligations to the state. The “tokens”3 declared by the state to be 
accepted as a means of payment are the banknotes.
In economic settlements (bookkeeping), it is self-evident that every transaction 
is reflected as a mirror image on the side where an asset or liability concerned is 
recorded. When the state creates money, it incurs debt. When it pays wages or 
buys goods, it finances this expenditure by issuing debt. And it can only incur debt 
when there is someone who is willing to accept its debt securities (government 
bonds, paper money). This means that these must carry value, which is derived 
from the obligation to pay taxes in the given currency. Those tokens are regarded 
by individuals as money that can be used for paying the obligations toward the 
state. Such tokens can be used by anyone for this purpose, which also makes them 
a generally accepted means of payment. The private sector accepts the state’s 
debt certificate and treats it as an asset in its books that can be used to pay taxes 
(debt). In the books of the state, the same money is debt, as an obligation to take 
back the money that was issued, for example to accept it when people pay taxes.
The money created is the debt of the issuer, and the creation of money represents 
the creation of a means for income centralisation. In order to make the security 
embodying the issued debt widely acceptable as a means of payment with 
3  The word “chartalist” originates from the Latin “charta”, which basically means paper. Bell (2001:155) cites 
Knapp’s (1924:31) argument that the value of the token received in a cloakroom is derived from the fact 
that it embodies the promise that we will get our coats back.
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value, the state only has to proclaim that obligations toward the state need to 
be paid in the same currency. This basically means that the state accepts its own 
debt. Therefore, the value of money is not related to any kind of “coverage” or 
any inherent monetary value: it can be simply derived from the fact that it was 
officially proclaimed to be accepted for paying obligations vis-à-vis the state. It is an 
important feature of the chartalist theory of money that, in addition to the payment 
function, money can also fulfil an accounting function by appearing on both sides 
of the balance sheet. In this sense, money represents one party’s agreement to 
hold the debt of another party in their portfolio. My money is the state’s debt 
(Wray 1998).
The state may play a central role in money becoming money, but this is not an 
inevitable part of the process. Foley (1987) pointed out that anybody can create 
money by incurring debt, but this requires that recipients accept the money thus 
created in payment transactions as well. The debt issued by someone only qualifies 
as money creation only if the debt is accepted by others. When it issues stamps, the 
post office incurs debt, a liability to be met later, namely to deliver the packages 
bearing its stamps to the recipients. These stamps have a value from then on, as 
whoever has them can use them as a means of payment, albeit only for fulfilling 
their payment obligations for the postal services. The fact that stamps cannot be 
used for paying taxes is a crucial limitation, and that is why such stamps cannot 
become a widespread means of payment.
Banks also can create generally accepted money, since people can pay taxes from 
bank loans. We would note, however, that the banking system’s potential for money 
creation is limited by credit demand. Credit demand hinges on factors that may be 
influenced by the government’s decisions, but are driven by economic considerations. 
The money transferred to a bank account can be used for paying taxes. Therefore, 
banks also have a money creation function. This becomes especially clear when 
one examines the process of banks’ money creation itself. Whether banks act as 
intermediaries between savers and borrowers in transferring already existing money 
or they create money themselves during their operations is a question equally 
important from the perspective of macroeconomics, finance and banking as well. 
This has significant consequences for micro and macroprudential regulation and 
for the tasks of banking supervision.
2.1. Three theories of money creation: intermediation, money multiplier, 
endogenous money theory
There are three important and widely accepted theories discussing the 
macroeconomic role of banks and money.4 All three are in conflict with each other 
in explaining even the basic facts, and yet still they live in peaceful coexistence in 
textbooks. According to one of the theories, banks simply act as intermediaries in 
4  In this chapter we follow Werner’s (2015) arguments.
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channelling savings to borrowers, and play no part at all in money creation. Banks 
do not create money, they create liquidity by providing long-term loans from short-
term funds.5 This is called the theory of financial intermediation by the banking 
system. This approach can be considered to have been the most widely accepted in 
recent decades. Another set of theories maintains that individual banks are unable 
to create money, since they cannot print banknotes, but the banking system as 
a whole can create money in a manner governed by the central bank. This can 
be achieved through the money multiplier determined by the commercial bank’s 
reserve ratio, which in turn is controlled or at least influenced by the central bank. 
This is called the money multiplier theory. In textbooks on macroeconomics, this 
is still the most frequently cited theory.6 This is all the more surprising, since most 
central banks in developed economies ceased to rely on this theory and to shape 
their monetary policy through the required reserves a long time ago. According to 
the third theory, banks may create money independently from the central bank 
through lending,7 but lending conditions are influenced by the central bank’s 
monetary policy. In other words, the central bank and the commercial banking 
sector combines a complex system of money creation, in which the money flows 
observed in reality are shaped by the interactions and mutual adjustment of the 
parties. This is called the endogenous money theory. Due to some features of the 
period after the crisis, this approach has gained in popularity once again, and many 
researchers present their results in relation to this approach as fundamentally 
new realisations. However, the theory is so old that its origin can hardly be traced 
(Werner 2014a,b; 2015). It is not new in Hungary either: one need but cite Miklós 
Riesz’s works as an example (Riesz 1980). Száz (1989) gives a very good overview 
of this approach and the theory. Yet probably the most original proponent of this 
approach in Hungary was Mária Augusztinovics who believed it was self-evident that 
“money is created through lending, and it is eliminated when the loan is repaid”8 
(Augusztinovics 1965).
2.2. The financial intermediation theory
Banks and other financial enterprises perform financial intermediation between 
savers and borrowers. Investment funds, even if they typically do not grant 
loans, buy bonds issued by companies and thereby transfer investors’ money to 
5  Dewatripont, Rocher and Tirole (2010) provides an excellent analysis of the theory of banks as intermediaries.
6  For example in the textbooks following the neoclassical revolution that unfolded in the wake of Samuelson’s 
(1948) seminal work.
7  The fact that banks create money out of nothing is a widely accepted phrase in the literature. This radically 
distinguishes the approach from other theories – based on the required reserve ratio by the central bank 
(money multiplier) or the intermediation of savings – but it entails the risk of disregarding important 
elements. Such an important element for example is the fact that in the absence of credit demand, banks’ 
“ability” is limited. It is important to point out that money creation mostly entails purchasing power 
redistribution and the assumption of an obligation by an economic entity.
8  We will not discuss whether debt is negative money, i.e. whether the repayment of debt eliminates money. 
When money is taken to a bank to settle a debt, we do not think that the bank will shred the banknotes to 
eliminate the money. The interpretation of the cited expression, however, raises further questions that we 
will address when discussing balance sheet settlements.
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companies. Gurley and Shaw’s (1960) seminal book emphasises that banks and 
non-bank financial institutions basically perform the same function in financial 
intermediation. A simplified model of financial intermediation shows that out of 
100 units of savings, banks create the reserves necessary for safe functioning, e.g. 
using 1 unit for this purpose, which they deposit with the central bank, where they 
receive (normally low) interest on it. The remaining 99 units are then extended as 
loans. Investment funds also manage their liquidity, but they do not necessarily have 
to put aside reserves for day-to-day payments, since the liquidity can be obtained 
by selling securities.9 To put it simply, we can say that out of 100 units of savings 
they buy 100 units of shares, i.e. the whole amount may be used for investments 
(direct financing). From a financing perspective, this is the same “intermediation” 
as if it happened through a bank. The main distinctive feature is that the prudential 
regulation of banks and non-bank financial institutions is significantly different, and 
therefore “intermediation” by investment funds is outside the regulation of banks. 
The stricter regulatory provisions with respect to banks are attributed to the fact 
that banks should not gamble with depositors’ money by taking up investment risk, 
but in the case of investment funds, there is no repayment guaranty, the clients 
accept that the risk is borne by themselves.
According to the theory of financial intermediation, banks do not create money 
individually or collectively, i.e. at the level of the banking system. This theory can 
be used easily in several economic models, since it basically implies that the money 
created (or rather not created) by the banking system can be left out of these 
models,10 and therefore banks’ behaviour is not important. In the majority of such 
models, money is simply a unit of account used to record income flows, but the 
theory does not say anything about money creation or the role played by banks in 
it. This theory is more like a theory of banking than a theory of money. This theory, 
which disregards the behaviour of banks and its impact on money flows, was called 
into question during the global financial crisis, and recently many attempts have 
been made at integrating banks’ behaviour into macroeconomic models.
2.3. The money multiplier theory
The money multiplier theory is based on the assumption that commercial bank’s 
reserves held at the central bank are an important element of the financial 
intermediation process. The money multiplier theory goes one step further than 
the intermediation theory. Although it still describes individual banks only as 
financial intermediaries, at the macro level it acknowledges the money creating 
potential inherent as a whole in the banking system. Deposits may be multiplied 
9  It is no coincidence that in the case of such transactions some days pass between the order and the 
settlement.
10  The general shortcomings of representation of the role of banks in these models and the importance of 
changing this is portrayed in detail in Jakab–Kumhof (2015). 
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in the banking system, since spending a loan extended from a bank’s deposits may 
generate deposits at another bank, which may produce another loan and another 
deposit in the banking system. This deposit–loan multiplication can be influenced 
by adjusting the reserve requirement. This gives us a theory that provides monetary 
policy with a simple instrument for shaping money flows.
The multiplier theory is described in most macroeconomic and financial textbooks 
as a basic, self-evident principle. In practice, however, employing this principle 
for the analysis of money flows has advantages, but also serious drawbacks. We 
would emphasise the latter when judging the theory, but first we have to briefly 
present the principle of multiplication itself.11 In the following, we examine the 
credit multiplication process resulting from the expansion of deposits based on the 
example by Siklos (2001:322–328) (with minor changes).
Demand deposits (current account balance) of Company C1 increased by 
HUF 1 million because it performed a contract for the state. The company holds 
an account with Bank B1. Banks are required to hold in reserve 5 per cent of 
the demand deposits to be able to make current payments and transfers.12 The 
required13 reserve ratio (rr) is 5%. In excess of this, the bank still has additional funds 
(reserves) of HUF 950,000 from the HUF 1 million increase. Bank B1 deposits this 
temporarily at the central bank as an excess reserve.
Company C1 transfers HUF 1 million from its deposit to Company C2, which 
increases the current account balance of Company C2 with Bank B2, while overall 
the demand deposits and reserves of Bank B1 decrease by the same amount. The 
increase in its demand deposits is used the same way by Bank B2 as by B1, i.e. B2 
deposits it at the central bank as a reserve. Overall in the banking system (when 
viewing the two banks together), the transfer transaction does not entail any growth 
in deposits and the reserve requirements also remain the same. However, there 
is still a surplus of HUF 950,000 in reserves in the banking system. This should be 
used by the bank where it appears, for example by extending loans or investing in 
securities.
The excess reserve of Bank B2 should be used for accepting Company C3’s loan 
application and granting a loan of HUF 950,000 in bank money. From the loan, 
Company C3 repays its debt against Company C4. Company C4 also holds an account 
11  A more detailed and accessible description of the process supported by accounting relations can be found 
in the textbooks by Száz (1991) és Siklos (2001).
12  We present a simplified description of the reserve requirement process. We only highlight the liquidity 
necessary for ensuring that transfers are processed without interruption, and we do not discuss the other 
monetary policy goals the reserve requirement system may have.
13  It would be more appropriate to use the term “target reserves” instead of “required” by regulation, because 
what really matters in the money creation process is the level of reserves that the commercial banks would 
want to hold (target).
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at Bank B2, and therefore the bank records an increase of HUF 950,000 in deposits 
at the same time when the loan is extended, out of which 5 per cent is put in the 
required reserve, but this still leaves it with excess reserves of HUF 902,500.
This process increased the deposits in the banking system to HUF 1.95 million. But 
this increase continues, as there are still excess reserves in the banking system, 
which generates further lending or investments, provided that credit demand allows 
this expansion. The banking system seeks to reduce its reserves to the level of 
the reserve requirement and attempts to lend out the excess reserves. Therefore 
the process can continue. If all excess reserves in the banking system are used for 
lending, the lower the required (or targeted) reserve ratio, the more deposits are 
generated. In our example, the sum of the required and excess reserves generated in 
step (a) was HUF 1 million, which was produced by the initial increase in deposits. If 
all the HUF 1 million is distilled into required reserves and no excess reserve remains 
in the banking system that could be used for lending, bank lending generates 
a HUF 20 million increase in deposits in the context of a 5 per cent reserve ratio.
Money multiplier describes the additional deposits and loans generated by the 
increase in excess reserves in the banking system which can be used for lending. 
In order to show the relationship between this process and the amount of money, 
we start our analysis with the central bank’s balance sheet.
The amount of money in circulation (M1) that the private sector can use for 
payments is the sum of all the cash and demand deposits (Siklos 2001:326). The 
change in the amount of money in circulation is due to the change in the amount of 
cash and demand deposits. The process of money supply in the above example starts 
in step (a), at the level of individual banks, Company C1 deposited14 HUF 1 million in 
Bank B1. This reduced the amount of cash in circulation by HUF 1 million, while the 
stock of demand deposits increased by the same amount, i.e. the amount of money 
in circulation did not change. However, at the level of the banking system, the 
amount of money expanded by HUF 19 million due to the process of multiplication.
According to the theory, the central bank can influence the amount of money 
through several channels. It can increase the required reserve ratio and print money, 
which can be issued by purchasing foreign currencies or securities (government 
securities).15 Government securities purchases and the accumulation of foreign 
14  Above in step (a) we assumed that the increase of HUF 1 million in deposits does not originate from the cash 
in circulation but from the state budget. If the revenue of the company is from a direct budget expenditure, 
then the state has created so-called “outside” money with this step. From the perspective of the multiplier, 
however, the nature of the initial step that induced the growth in deposits is irrelevant.
15  For the purpose of distinguishing it from the creation of fiat money, the money created by the central 
bank (or the Treasury in the United States of America) is called outside money, while the money created 
by banks is called inside money. In practice, in the case of developed economies, 90 per cent of the money 
supply is created by banks (Goodhart 1998), but as a result of quantitative easing, today this figure is closer 
to 97–98 per cent.
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exchange reserves both boost the money supply, since the central bank pays for the 
foreign exchange and the government securities in forint. This process is referred to 
as controlling the money supply through changes in the monetary base (M0). The 
monetary base is the sum of the cash in circulation and the central bank reserves. 
All in all, it can be stated that the central bank can influence M1 money supply by 
changing the monetary base (M0) as follows:
 M1 = (cr+1) (1)M0 (cr+rr) 
where cr=CUR/DEP is the ratio of cash to deposits and rr=RES/DEP is the required 
(or targeted) reserve ratio.
This formula follows the textbook conventions and highlights the concept of 
monetary policy (and money creation) that the central bank controls the money 
supply by changing the required reserve ratio. This formula assumes that banks do 
not hold reserves in excess of the required reserves because it is too costly. This is 
precisely the assumption on which the theory that the money supply is controlled 
through the required reserve ratio is based. In reality, however, especially after 
the crisis, the monetary base also expanded through the bloating of banks’ excess 
reserves, but this did not lead to the multiplication of the money supply in the real 
economy.
The money multiplier model described above suggests that the central bank can 
easily influence the money supply by adjusting the items on the assets and liabilities 
sides of its balance sheet. This influence, however, cannot be exerted fully and 
perfectly on either side.16 The amount of cash in circulation is shaped by the cash-
use habits of the public and banks’ reserve decisions, and it does not depend solely 
on the size of the monetary base and the multiplier. As the monetary base is the 
sum of the cash and central bank reserves, it is difficult to control it, since banks’ 
excess reserves can substantially change their size. This means that the formula 
describing the key to the central bank’s control over the money supply is unstable. 
The parameters can be determined without difficulty at any time ex-post, but 
looking ahead they can usually change easily and unexpectedly. This is like pushing 
on a string. The central bank has several instruments at its disposal for influencing 
money flows. All in all, we may venture to claim that the central bank, should it 
wish to do so, could exert a relatively tight control over the monetary base even 
with considerable uncertainties,17 but the price for this control would be volatile 
fluctuations in interest rates. Nevertheless, the broad monetary aggregates could 
16  See Siklos (2001:478).
17  Recently “helicopter” money has become a hotly debated issue. If we take into account this instrument as 
well, the central bank has an even better chance to influence the monetary base. At what price it would 
be able to do so is another matter.
44 Studies
István Ábel – Kristóf Lehmann – Attila Tapaszti 
not be controlled, not even at this price, because it would also be influenced by 
the portfolio decisions of economic actors.
The other, even bigger problem with controlling the money supply through the 
required reserve ratio is that the size of the multiplier is also uncertain. In reality, 
the creation of (bank) money does seem like a sort of multiplication. Nonetheless, 
money creation in the form of bank money is determined by credit demand and 
not a multiplier. The process of bank money creation can be described by a cause 
and effect relationship, which is not a matter of a simple ratio. The theory of 
endogenous money supply assumes a relationship which is quite the opposite of 
the one suggested by the money multiplier theory: the monetary base itself is 
endogenous too, and it is the result of endogenous credit, since it is created by the 
central bank in response to the lending activity of commercial banks. The belief that 
the multiplier is determined by the required reserve ratio is based on very radical 
simplifications and assumptions which are out of touch with reality.18 We do not 
know anything about the potential pace of iteration among individual banks in the 
whole banking system, and therefore we cannot know how many members are 
aggregated, which makes the result of our calculations of the multiplication process 
uncertain. The textbook construction of the multiplier is convincing and, on account 
of the simplification, it may be a very effective presentation tool, but no practical 
analysis should be based on it. There are further problems with controlling money 
supply. The very concept of money itself is hard to measure. Based on liquidity and 
flow features, several categories of money can be distinguished. The series M0, 
M1, M2, M3 can be continued, and it may be useful to capture the categories of 
money in a continuum that enables an infinite number of divisions (Barnett 1980).
2.3.1. Money multiplier in reality
Figure 1 shows the development of the money multiplier over time, or more 
precisely the M1 money multiplier indicator of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
The chart clearly illustrates the instability of the multiplier in the past decades. 
The direct causes of the changes will not be discussed here. Nonetheless, the 
development of the indicator shows that the Fed’s interventions in the wake of 
the 2008 crisis considerably expanded the monetary base, which, however, was 
not reflected in lending, and therefore the multiplier dropped significantly.
Due to the uncertainties surrounding the money multiplier, by the late 1990s most 
central banks had abandoned the approach of controlling the money supply via the 
required reserve policy. In many cases this also meant that central banks abolished 
the reserve requirement, i.e. in the textbook model rr would be 0, which would 
mean the creation of an infinite amount of money. Instead of controlling the 
18  This has been asserted by many people. For a detailed discussion, see Keen (2011).
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money supply, central banks shifted to influencing interest rates, which is currently 
integrated into an inflation targeting framework in many places.
2.4. Endogenous money theory
The endogenous money theory states that money creation happens at the moment 
when banks extend a loan.19 This single step, however, has radical consequences. 
In this manner, banks can extend loans without collecting any kinds of deposits 
for funding, because lending instantly creates money.20 This is hard to accept, 
since we might believe that in order to provide someone with money that can be 
spent, banks need to acquire it first, as they cannot print money. While it is true 
that they cannot print money, they can keep accounts. The moment the loan is 
extended, it appears on the client’s account. This is a bookkeeping entry, and the 
money registered here was not transferred from another account or intermediated 
from the savings of another economic actor. In creating a credit debt, the bank 
19  In this sense, exogenous money is the money the emergence of which cannot be directly inferred from 
the credit demand of economic actors. An example for this is the central bank money created through 
quantitative easing or the money created by the central bank by purchasing the government securities 
issued in order to finance the general government.
20  This money creation is markedly different from the one involving the state, and the two are usually 
distinguished at the conceptual level as well. The money created by banks is called inside money, while 
the money created by the state is called outside money. In practice, however, when we pay in a shop, we 
do not know the way the cash we use was created, which, fortunately, is irrelevant to those who sit on the 
other side of the till as well.
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generates a client deposit with the amount credited to the borrower’s account, 
over which, from this moment on, the client may dispose. This deposit, however, 
was not brought into the bank by anyone, it was created by the bank by crediting 
it in their own books.
Superficially, the amount credited to the account of the borrower appears to be 
a deposit, but as the condition for increasing the balance on the current account,21 
the client undertook a future payment obligation to the bank as described in the 
documentation of the bank loan. At the macro level, credit growth entails an 
expansion of the money supply. This boosts the effective demand (consumption 
and investments), since it would make no sense to take out a loan at interest if 
people did not want to spend it on buying goods. If the loan is used to repay debts, 
we offset a potential loss in demand, which would occur if we repaid the debt from 
the savings accumulated by reducing our spending.
2.4.1. The accounting of loans
Any company can extend loans, but the accounting representation of the transaction 
is different in the case of banks and other companies. This difference is shown in Table 
1. Lending by a company (non-financial enterprise or non-bank financial enterprise) 
means the realignment of its assets. Among the company’s assets, a receivable 
against the borrower appears, and the balance of its bank account shrinks by 
the same amount. Banks usually only extend loans to their clients, and expect 
borrowers to keep their accounts at their institution. When a bank grants a loan, its 
assets increase by the amount of the loan, which is credited to the client’s account, 
and therefore on the assets side its client deposits increase by the same amount.
Table 1
Changes in the balance sheets of companies, non-bank financial intermediaries and 
banks after the accounting of loans
Company Non-bank financial 
intermediary
Bank
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Loan: +100 Loan: +100 Loan: +100 Client’s current 
account 
balance +100
Deposit: –100 Deposit: –100
Balance: 0 0 0 0 +100 +100
Source: Werner (2014:73)
21  Throughout the paper the terms current account balance, deposits or demand deposits of a company are 
used as synonyms.
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Banks create money through lending. The idea that lending is money creation is 
not new. There have been many people who believed in this concept. We could 
mention Hawtrey’s (1919) work, but Werner (2015) states that one of the earliest 
major books of the theory was the one written by Henry D. Macleod (1856) (Werner 
2015:6).22 Basil Moore’s (1988) book, which is still influential today, played a central 
role in the modern-day reinterpretation of the endogenous money theory.
In the next section, we detail several types of transactions that can be linked 
to money creation. Various types of transactions are examined, including ones 
involving commercial banks and ones involving the central bank. Using these 
examples, we illuminate the economic substance of money flows. The balance 
sheets used in accounting provide an accurate picture of financial processes, and 
therefore we present the process of the transactions through these balance sheets.
In Table 1, we showed that different types of companies record lending in their 
balance sheets differently. This is analysed in more detail below. If a loan is extended 
to Company “A”, the balance sheet of a commercial bank changes in the way shown 
in Figure 2. Lending affects the assets and the liabilities side of the bank’s balance 
sheet at the same time. On the assets side, the new loan is recorded, while on the 
liabilities side a deposit of the same amount is credited. In other words, the act of 
lending creates its own source, and the cornerstone of the whole process is credit 
and not savings in the traditional sense. Thus, the subject of both the loan and the 
deposit transaction is Client “A”. Other accounting items and consequences related 
to the operation of the bank such as the capital requirement, the required reserve 
ratio and other regulations and regulatory requirements may hamper the bank’s 
lending activity. These effects are analysed later.
22  Others also cite the works by Marx, Wicksell and Keynes.
Figure 2
The balance sheet of the commercial bank extending a loan to Company “A”
Reserves at the central bank (required reserve, 
other and excess reserve items) and cash
Previous Loans [1]
New Loan (’A’ company) [3]
Previous Deposit
New deposit (’A’ company)* [2]                           
Other liabilities (net) [4]
Assets Liabilities and equity
* Balance increase credited to the borrower’s account by the lending bank, [2]=[3]
Source: Authors’ compilation
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The promise of Client “A” to pay back the loan becomes a generally accepted 
means of payment through this transaction. In other words, the bank performs 
a transformation: the individual debt of Participant “A” becomes a generally 
accepted liability (with higher liquidity) against the bank. In fact, due to the 
state’s deposit insurance schemes, the amount that appears as the increase in the 
client’s current account balance and designated on Figure 2 as “new deposit” may 
potentially become a receivable against the state within the framework of deposit 
insurance. It is important to note that deposit insurance means a conditional and 
therefore limited obligation by the state, but in general the state’s intention to 
ensure the uninterrupted functioning of the whole banking system suggests a sort 
of unlimited implicit guarantee. When viewing bank lending as money creation, it is 
important to bear this in mind, since this fact also indicates the practical significance 
of money creation through lending by individual banks.
In parallel with lending (or rather after lending), commercial banks create reserves 
in line with the regulations. Central bank reserves mean the commercial bank assets 
(various deposits, required reserves) held on an account with the central bank. The 
increase in required reserves is settled by the bank by reallocating some of its excess 
central bank reserves to the required reserves. Should a bank not have enough 
reserves, the missing liquidity is offset by interbank borrowing or a central bank 
loan. The latter assumes money creation by the central bank: as we have pointed 
out earlier, in the complex system of money creation, the decisions of the central 
bank and commercial banks all play a role.
All in all, it can be stated that banks do not act as intermediaries with respect to 
savings, but basically allocate purchasing power among economic actors in line 
with certain market, business and economic considerations.
Here we have presented the first moment of the act of money creation, but it 
is worth examining some further steps in the transaction and the resulting 
consequences for the central bank.
Figure 3
Commercial banks’ balance sheet when using deposits while transferring funds to 
a client within the bank
Reserves at the central bank (required reserve, 
other and excess reserve items) and cash
 
Previous Loans [1]
(+) New Loan (Company ’A’)  [3]
Previous Deposits
(+) New deposit (Company ’A’)          [2]
(–) Deposit (Company ’A’)          [4]
(+) New deposit (’B’ vállalat)       [5]
Other liabilities (net)
Assets Liabilities and equity
Note: (+) Loan (Company “A”) = (+) Deposit (Company “A”), [3]=[2], [4]=[5].
Source: Authors’ compilation
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If, after the loan is extended, Company “A” buys a product from Company “B”, 
and settles the purchase with an intrabank transfer, then the transaction entails 
only a realignment on the liabilities side of the bank. At the end of the process, 
the increase in the account balance of Participant “B” finances the loan of “A”. It 
is important to underline that this is a result of the borrowing and the subsequent 
use of the loan by “A”, not a financing act or a reason enabling the loan.
If the initial loan is used for a transfer outside the bank, the situation is different 
(Figure 4). In this case, the transaction between two banks within the banking 
system can only be settled in central bank money, and through the bank accounts 
held with the central bank.23 This transfer affects the reserves of both banks held 
on their accounts with the central bank, reducing the account balance of the bank 
initiating the transfer and increasing it in the case of the recipient bank, as if it was 
a case of “reserve transfer”.
Due to the “transfer” of reserves, the liquidity of both banks changes. Banks’ 
liquidity management focuses on central bank money. Liquidity management seeks 
to ensure that the given commercial bank always has available funds with the central 
23  In theory, commercial banks can keep accounts for each other. In such a scenario, the transfer is settled 
as an intrabank transaction with the amount credited on the account of Bank “B” held with Bank “A”, and 
therefore the money does not leave the bank. For the sake of simplicity, in this paper we will assume that 
commercial banks interact with each other through their accounts held with the central bank. Transfers 
are thus settled in an interbank transaction.
Figure 4
using deposits in interbank transfers
Reserves at the central bank (–) reserves equal to 
deposit of company ’A’ (decreasing of reserves) 
[1]
Previous Loans [3]
Previous Loan (Company ’A’)  [5]
Previous Deposits [2]
Previous deposit (Company ’A’) [4]
(–) Deposit (Company ’A’) [6]
Other liabilities (net) [7]
Assets
Balance sheet of commercial bank no. 1
Liabilities and equity
Reserves at the central bank (+) reserves equal 
to deposit of company ’A’ [8]
Previous Loans [10]
Previous Deposits [9]
(+) New deposit (Company ’Z’) [11]
Other liabilities (net) [12]
Assets
Balance sheet of commercial bank no. 2
Liabilities and equity
Notes: [4]=[5], [1]=[6], [1]=[8], [8]=[11]Note: [4]=[5], [1]=[6], [1]=[8], [8]=[11].
Source: Authors’ compilation
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bank for making interbank transfers for their clients. Interbank settlements are 
carried out through banks’ accounts held with the central bank. Nothing prohibits 
banks from keeping accounts for each other and from settling their transactions 
through these accounts, but we do not deal with this in this paper. We assume that 
banks settle their transactions through the central bank. The endogenous money 
created by banks does not influence banks’ accounts held with the central bank 
at the moment of money creation, but when clients use the loan granted to them 
for buying something from the client of another bank or transferring a portion of 
it to someone else, that transaction does have an impact on the balance of banks’ 
accounts held with the central bank.
It is possible that banks’ clients only do business with intrabank clients. This does 
not change the liquidity of banks. In this case, liquidity management is limited to 
adjusting the composition of the required reserve and managing the potentially 
arising demand for cash. The other extreme is when, after the loan is extended, 
clients transfer the full amount to another bank without receiving any transfers to 
their own accounts. In this case, banks’ liquidity management has to acquire a stock 
of central bank money equivalent to the full amount of the client’s loan. Of course, 
the real cases are between these two extremes in most instances, and the netted 
interbank settlements further reduce demand for central bank money.
Central bank money can be acquired in several ways, for example by issuing bonds, 
interbank borrowing, a loan received from the central bank or a capital increase. 
Interbank lending is presented in Figure 5.
Figure 5
Commercial banks’ balance sheet during interbank lending
Reserves at the central bank (+) reserves equal 
to interbank loan [1]
Previous loans [4]
Previous deposits [2]
(+) interbank loan [3]
Other liabilities (net) [5]
Assets
Balance sheet of commercial bank no. 1
Liabilities and equity
Reserves at the central bank (–) reserves equal 
to interbank loan [7]
(+) interbank deposit [9]
Previous loans [10]
Notes: [1]=[3], [1]=[7], [7]=[9].
Previous deposits [8]
Other liabilities (net) [11]
Assets
Balance sheet of commercial bank no. 2
Liabilities and equity
Note: [1]=[3], [1]=[7], [7]=[9]. 
Source: Authors’ compilation
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In addition to interbank lending, central bank money can be included in bank 
financing through a capital increase, by issuing bank bonds,24 and of course the 
central bank money held at the bank may increase/decrease during the day-to-
day operations of the bank, depending on the decisions of the clients. In the case 
of a well-functioning interbank market, i.e. when the participants of the banking 
system completely trust each other, the amount of central bank money available 
at the given institution usually does not limit lending, as participants can smoothly 
manage their temporary shortfalls in central bank money on the interbank market. 
In the case of the potential interruptions on the interbank market, the financing 
loans extended by the central bank may provide a solution for ensuring liquidity. And 
in the case of a bankruptcy, the state deposit insurance ensures the convertibility 
to central bank money to a certain limit.
Thus, in practice, the amount of central bank money depends on both the decisions 
by the central bank and the banking system. The banking system influences the 
banking system’s liquidity through central bank operations. The commercial banking 
sector as a whole does not directly influence the aggregate balance of its accounts 
held with the central bank, i.e. it cannot create central bank money. At the level of 
the sector as a whole, banks’ decisions can only influence the realignment among 
the individual central bank instruments, i.e. they only determine the structure of 
O/N deposits, longer-term deposits and required reserves. This statement assumes 
that we disregard government security purchases on the market. Indirectly, however, 
the lending activity of commercial banks does have an impact on the level of central 
bank money. This is because the central bank adjusts to the central bank money 
demand of the commercial banking sector by actively monitoring it and intervening 
in the case of potential tensions. Therefore, central bank money demand can be 
derived from credit demand and endogenous money creation itself on the one 
hand, and from the structural characteristics of the commercial banking sector on 
the other hand (e.g. the intensity of interbank lending or the limits allocated by the 
banks to each other for these transactions).
A large government securities market would, of course, profoundly change this 
situation. Therefore, we discuss an illustration focusing on buying and selling 
government securities as follows.
In the case of buying government securities (on the primary market), the realignment 
occurs on the liabilities side of the central bank’s balance sheet (Figure 6), between 
the central bank deposits of commercial banks and the account of the state held 
with the central bank. In this sense, quantitative easing, which is currently used 
24  Except when it is bought by a client in the same bank, but in such a scenario the demand for central bank 
money diminishes due to the bond funds that have lower liquidity.
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extensively, only means a swap of assets on the assets side of the players other than 
the state: government securities with different yields and maturities are exchanged 
for central bank money, which, in the case of non-bank players, appears in the form 
of commercial bank deposits. If we assume that the government securities market 
is liquid and stable enough, the direct effect of quantitative easing on the banking 
system is not pronounced, since actually two assets with similar liquidity and the 
same issuer, the state, are exchanged. Of course, indirectly, by pushing down the 
yields on government securities, quantitative easing may boost the prices of risky 
assets.
If the central bank does not buy government securities but buys other, less liquid 
instruments that are difficult to sell, the situation is different. In this case, the 
intervention may improve lending, but not by expanding the central bank money 
supply, but rather owing to the cleansing of commercial banks’ balance sheets. In 
this manner, an expected loss of uncertain size is removed from banks’ balance 
sheets, which may boost lending.
The expansion of the central bank’s asset purchases could prompt higher monetary 
categories (M2, M3, etc.) to gravitate towards M0, which in turn may contribute to 
a drop in yields and changes to the liquidity of the individual asset categories, but 
we do not address these effects here.
The analysis of a direct capital injection by the central bank (helicopter money) 
discussed on several forums nowadays is also beyond the scope of the present 
paper. Normally, this would mean a realignment on the liability side of the central 
bank’s balance sheet from the central bank’s capital elements to the deposits 
of commercial banks held with the central bank. The assets side would remain 
intact, i.e. in the future the stock of central bank money would not be reduced 
automatically as it would in the case of a normal quantitative easing measure, in 
which, in the absence of a potential reinvestment by the central bank, happens 
eventually when the bonds mature.
In the case of quantitative easing, when the central bank buys government 
securities, the increase in the stock of central bank money can be considered as an 
exogenous factor from the perspective of the banking system, i.e. its developments 
cannot be directly derived from the demand for central bank money arising from 
endogenous money creation by banks. In this case, the expansion of the stock 
of central bank money is exogenously given for the banking sector. This fact also 
means that the widespread criticism that commercial banks keep the money with 
the central bank rather than lending it to the real economy is misguided. Central 
bank money, just like in other cases, cannot be considered a traditional liability that 
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can be lent out. It is rather an instrument at the disposal of commercial banks that 
can be used for meeting the transactions needs linked to lending and for ensuring 
liquidity. In other words, the lending activity of commercial banks does not influence 
the amount of central bank money created through quantitative easing, and it does 
not disappear from the balance sheet of the central bank even if lending in the real 
economy gains momentum.
The money created by commercial bank ceases to exist at the moment when the 
loan is repaid, i.e. the obligation assumed by the borrower and at the same time 
the obligation assumed by the bank (deposit) ends.
Figure 6
Changes to the balance sheets after government security purchases on the primary 
market
Government bonds (+) New government 
purchased on primary market [1]
Commercial bank deposit (–) Amount of money 




Balance sheet of the investment fund
Equity
Assets Liabilities and equity
Assets Liabilities and equity
Reserves and cash (–) Amount of money 
from purchasing government bonds [4]
Previous loans[6]
Note: [3]=[5]=[4]
Commercial bank reserves + cash (–) 
Amount of money from purchasing 
government bonds [9]
+ Government deposit: (+) Amount of 
money from purchasing government 
bonds [10]
Other liabilities (net) [11]
Assets (FX reserves etc.) [8]
Note: [4]=[9]=[10]
Previous deposits (–) Amount of money 
from purchasing government bonds [5]
Other liabilities (net) [7]
Central bank balance sheet
Balance sheet of the commercial bank
Source: Authors’ compilation
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2.4.2. The limits of money creation25
It does not follow from the endogenous money theory that money creation has 
no limits. The volume of credit changes constantly as a result of the complex 
correlations between economic actors’ decisions. The practical limits of money 
creation are determined by financial regulators, capital adequacy requirements, 
25  The work of McLeay, Radia and Thomas (2014a;b) gives a good account of endogenous money creation. 
In the following, we base our description on that.
Figure 7
Quantitative easing – Government securities purchases by the central bank
Government bonds (–) Government bonds sold [1]
Commercial bank deposit (+) Amount of money 
from selling government bonds [3]
Reserves and cash (+) Amount of money from 
selling government bonds [4]
Loans [6]
Assets (FX reserve etc.) [8]
(+) Government bonds sold [10]
Investment unit [2]
Deposits (+) Amount of money from selling 
government bonds [5]
Other liabilities (net) [7]
Commercial bank reserves + cash (+) Amount 
of money from selling government bonds [9]
+ Government deposits* [11]
Other liabilities (net) [12]
Assets
Balance sheet of the investment fund
Equity
Assets Liabilities and equity
Assets Liabilities and equity
Central bank balance sheet
Balance sheet of the commercial bank
Notes: [1]=[10], [1]=[3], [3]=[5]=[4]=[9]=[10]
* Also includes the amount raised from issuing government securities if it has not been used since then. 
If transactions were carried out with the private sector (e.g. paying the wages of public sector employe-
es), this portion is also recorded among the commercial bank deposits held with the central bank.
Source: Authors’ compilation
Figure 8
The cessation of commercial bank money
Reserves at the central bank (required reserve, 
other and excess reserve items) and cash [1]
Loans [3]
Loan (Company ’A’) – Deposit = 0   [5]
Deposits [2]
Deposit (Company ’A’) – Loan = 0 [4]
Other liabilities (net) [6]
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reserve requirement regulations, liquidity rules and lending risks. The central bank 
influences lending activity by adjusting the price of central bank money and using 
other monetary policy instruments.
Banks also need to manage the risks associated with new loans. One of the ways 
to manage liquidity risks may be to attract relatively “stable” deposits. This means 
deposits that depositors are unable or unwilling to withdraw in large amounts at the 
same time, i.e. in the case of which banks, during liquidity management, only need 
to plan for a negligible potential use outside the bank until maturity. This is because 
banks try to ensure that a portion of their deposits is kept in time deposits with 
a certain maturity in order to mitigate liquidity risk.26 Depositors, however, expect to 
be compensated for having deposits with longer maturities, which is costly for banks, 
and hampers lending. In the case of demand deposits, the higher liquidity risk is offset 
by the lower interest rate. Banks’ lending activity may also be limited by credit risk 
considerations. Banks can protect themselves against this by keeping an appropriate 
amount of capital. But loans always pose some risk to banks, and therefore, when 
setting the price of loans, credit institutions also take into account the costs of loan 
loss provisioning. If banks expand their loan portfolio, the anticipated average loss 
is expected to rise, which, from a profitability perspective, also limits banks’ lending 
activity and the money creation potential. In addition, losses beyond a certain limit 
may also affect compliance with capital adequacy rules.
The behaviour of households and companies may also limit the banking system’s 
ability to create money. The behaviour of the non-bank private sector influences 
the ultimate effect exerted by the lending activity of the banking system on money 
supply. In the absence of credit demand, the framework provided by the central bank 
and the commercial banking sector is only necessary, but not sufficient conditions 
for money creation. Therefore, the economic actors that obtain the newly created 
money may decide to eliminate it at once, for example by repaying previous loans. 
The behaviour of economic actors has a significant influence on the amount of money 
in the economy, which in turn has inflationary implications. If the new loan is not 
eliminated at once, but increases spending by economic actors, the process may create 
inflationary pressures. The improving capital adequacy of commercial banks indirectly 
boosts lending capacity, but this is not a sufficient condition to jump start lending.
Central bank monetary policy may also limit the money creation potential of 
the banking sector. By influencing interest rates, central banks’ monetary policy 
influences demand for loans. In simple terms, if the price the banking system pays 
for accessing central bank money increases, it raises the costs of lending as well as 
the cost of deposits created by commercial banks. This also increases the costs of 
banking services. The central bank acts as one of the most important “production 
26  Banks can also mitigate liquidity risks by holding assets in their balance sheet that are liquid or that can 
be liquidated easily.
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and service” input for commercial banks, and provides them with central bank 
money The costs of this process are passed on to the customers. Therefore, the 
base rate has a direct impact on the lending rates and indirectly, via other channels, 
it affects banks’ lending opportunities.
3. Summary
When generating loans to their clients, commercial banks create money. The 
disbursement of the loan does not require the prior collection of additional funds, 
since as the loan is approved, the amount is credited to the account of the client 
kept by the bank. This act also creates the source of the loan. Lending is not the 
financial intermediation of savings in the sense that banks do not need to directly 
collect savings for lending or to reallocate them from somewhere else.
In using the loan, the client may transfer the obtained funds to another bank. 
The bank maintaining the account provides liquidity for completing the transfer. 
Liquidity management ensures the availability of an adequate amount of central 
bank money on the accounts of commercial banks held with the central bank, so 
that the bank can fulfil the payment orders initiated by their clients. The funds for 
this can be obtained by collecting deposits, taking out interbank loans from other 
banks or the central bank, or by other means. The costs of acquiring funds may 
influence banks’ lending activity through this channel. However, the real limit to 
lending is determined by credit demand.
The credit demand of companies and households can be influenced by many factors. 
The interest rate policy of the central bank affects lending costs via several indirect 
channels, and the cost of loans obviously influences credit demand as well. Credit 
demand, however, also depends on the performance of the economy, the general 
conditions of supply and demand as well as business prospects and expectations.
The active management of the amount of central bank money does not directly 
determine the endogenous money creation in the economy, although it does exert 
an impact on it through the effect on its costs.
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The paper examines the extent to which the sectors and regions of Hungary benefited 
from the EU grants of the 2007–2013 programming period, the degree to which they 
managed to absorb the allocation available for them and the amount Hungary can 
still expect to receive after 2015 in relation to the previous programming period. In 
addition, the paper also reviews the shaping of payments related to each operational 
programme. In respect of the new programming period, the authors review the 
changes in the allocations available to the member states and the funds that can be 
used for specific purposes, and also present the challenges of the 2016 drawdown 
plans based on the experiences of the previous period. In addition to the quantitative 
analysis of the Hungarian figures, the available data are also analysed in a regional 
comparison thereby making the priorities of the individual countries comparable 
in terms of development purposes. As a result, the authors establish that in the 
new programming period – in line with the shrinking size of the EU budget – the 
cohesion funds for Hungary will slightly decrease; however, the amount is expected 
to be distributed among the various economic policy objectives more evenly and 
the structure of the grants may be more favourable in terms of economic growth.
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1. introduction
Funds from the European Union play an important role in the development of the 
external balance position via transfers financing the investments and the increase 
in the disposable income of the economy. In addition, a considerable part of 
the funds are capital transfers supporting investment, and thus monitoring and 
evaluating them is also important when analysing the dynamics of investments 
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(Keresztély 2013). Accordingly, in this paper we primarily try to identify the projects 
for which Hungary used the EU grants from the 2007–2013 programming period, 
the degree of utilising the available total allocation and the amount Hungary can 
expect to receive in connection with the previous cycle after 2015. As regards the 
new cycle, we review the changes in the total allocation available for the Member 
States and the funds that can be used for the various objectives; in addition, based 
on the experiences of the previous cycle, we present the challenges of the plans 
related to the drawdown of funds in 2016. In addition to analysing the Hungarian 
figures, we also analyse the available data in a regional comparison. On the other 
hand, it should be emphasised that this paper essentially uses a volume-based 
approach and does not intend to present the impact of the EU funds on the various 
macroeconomic variables and the efficiency thereof.1
In terms of their economic content, the transfers are classified as current and capital 
transfers. The current and capital accounts in the balance of payments reflect the 
absorption of transfers; this is the amount that increases the disposable income 
of the individual sectors and, ceteris paribus, net lending.2 Accordingly, the EU 
transfers work toward reducing the economy’s external indebtedness. Current 
transfers are consumption-related grants increasing the disposable income (e.g. 
direct agricultural subsidies), which are stated in the balance of payments among 
the secondary or other primary incomes. By contrast, capital transfers are typically 
investment-financing grants, stated in the capital account. The size of the received 
grant may also be examined in two ways: the gross transfer is the amount that the 
country receives from the EU as grants, while the net transfer also considers, in 
addition to the grants received from the EU (revenue), payments made to the EU 
(expenditure).
The transfers received by Hungary are provided by a variety of funds. A large 
part of these funds originates from the Cohesion Fund and the Structural Funds 
(European Regional Development Fund, European Social Fund),3 the key objectives 
of which is to achieve convergence, improve regional competitiveness and expand 
employment. In addition, the EU provides separate funds for the support of 
1  This paper was prepared by the staff of the Macro Finance and External Balance Department, which is 
in charge of the central bank’s Report on the Balance of Payments. The authors relied on the experience 
gained in the preparation of the Report, but the paper presents the topic of EU transfers in much more detail 
than allowed for by the narrow bounds of the Report, which discusses past processes, and also includes an 
analysis related to the new cycle.
2  It is also important to note that this reflects the accrual-based value of the transfers. By contrast, the 
financial account reflects the disbursed EU transfers in the change in foreign exchange reserves, since the 
state converts the transfers received in euro to forint at the central bank, thereby increasing the central 
bank’s reserves and the economy’s external assets. Thus, the funds that increase net lending via the current 
and capital accounts may be interpreted in the financial account, through the increase in foreign exchange 
reserves, as an outflow of foreign funds (i.e. by receiving and absorbing the EU transfers, ceteris paribus, 
the economy’s dependency on external finance decreases).
3  Since 2013 European Structural and Investment Funds.
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agricultural and rural development through the European Agricultural Guarantee 
Fund and the European Agricultural and Rural Development Fund. In addition to 
these grants of substantial volume, grants in smaller amounts are also available 
for cultural and youth programmes, consumer protection and other objectives.4
The amount and allocation of the EU financing funds is coordinated by the European 
Commission. After determining the total allocation available for grants, the funds 
are allocated among the objectives (convergence, regional competitiveness, 
European regional cooperation, employment) and the Member States. When 
determining the financial allocation of the individual Member States the “population 
eligible for grants, national and regional prosperity and the unemployment rate” 
are considered, followed by the decision on the acceptance of the operative 
programmes defined by the Member States (European Commission 2007).
The allocation and absorption of the funds is the result of a long process; the fiscal 
commitments are implemented by funds and objective at annual level. On the other 
hand, the funds available for absorption are not lost automatically at the end of the 
programming period. The grant allocation may be drawn down until the end of the 
second year after the closure of cycle (n+2 rule);5 thus the European Commission 
only withdraws those funds in respect of which no payment request was received 
until that date. As a result of this, it was possible for the absorption of the grants 
from the 2007–2013 programming period to continue in 2014 and 2015 (European 
Commission 2007).
2. Absorption of Eu transfers in the past
Based on the commitment made by the EU in the 2007–2013 programming period, 
Hungary was entitled to a grant of EUR 35.3 billion (almost HUF 9,900 billion 
calculated at EUR/HUF 280, the average exchange rate of the period), accounting for 
roughly 35 per cent of the country’s annual GDP. The largest part of the allocation 
came from the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund; these funds amounted to 
EUR 24.9 billion (HUF 7,000 billion) (hereafter we shall refer to these two Funds 
as cohesion policy funds). In addition, the inflow of direct agricultural subsidies in 
the amount of EUR 6 billion (HUF 1,700 billion) and the rural development grants 
in the amount of EUR 3.9 billion (HUF 1,000 billion) also accounted for a major part 
of the allocation. A smaller part of the absorbed funds, i.e. roughly EUR 0.3 billion 
(HUF 100 billion) was used as part of the cross-border cooperation. Due to the 
4  For more information on the financial assets allocated to the EU’s community policies see: the 
website of the EU Communications Service and its publication “Cohesion policy 2007–2013”:  
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/regulation/pdf/2007/publications/guide2007_
hu.pdf.
5  An n+3 rule, based on similar principle, applied to Portugal, Greece and the Member States that acceded 
to the EU in 2004 (including Hungary) until 2010.
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principle of additionality, the grants received from the EU were supplemented with 
the necessary own contribution, provided by the Hungarian budget in the amount 
of roughly EUR 7.2 billion (HUF 2,000 billion) (MNB 2016).
The financial allocation provided by the EU is determined in foreign currency, and 
thus the amount of EU grants to Hungary is also influenced by the development of 
the forint exchange rate. Since parties eligible for grants always submit the invoices 
in forint, upon the depreciation of the forint less foreign currency is sufficient for 
the settlement thereof. The programming period was planned at an exchange rate 
of EUR/HUF of 280, and thus in parallel with the depreciation of the forint the value 
of the EU grants expressed in forint increased considerably during the period. As 
a result of this, the anticipated HUF 9,900 billion value of the funds available for 
absorption may be exceeded by roughly HUF 380–400 billion, as a result of which 
a higher number of projects may be implemented from the grants allocable to the 
2007–2013 period (State Audit Office of Hungary 2015). On the other hand, the 
depreciation of the exchange rate – through the import content of the investments – 
also generates higher costs than planned, which curbs the increase in the number 
of projects. As long as the currency effect on the expenditure side falls short of the 
increase in the forint value of the grants, depreciation of the exchange rate may 
result in the implementation of more investments.
Figure 1
Eu commitment for Hungary in the 2007–2013 programming period 
(EUR billion)
Single Area Payment Scheme
Agricultural and rural development
Cross-border cooperation
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2.1. General trends in Eu transfers
Between 2007 and 2015, domestic agents absorbed transfers in a net amount of 
EUR 33.4 billion. The amount of absorbed EU grants peaked in 2015, after the end of 
the 2007–2013 programming period, which was rendered possible by the n+2 rule. 
The absorption of the transfers originating from the previous cycle, which appeared 
in the balance of payments, accelerated after 2009; at that time, the net transfer 
absorption was already around 3 per cent of GDP, compared to the previous level of 
1 per cent. ”Unused funds from the Cohesion and Structural Funds can still be drawn 
down within the next two years following the individual EU programming periods. 
This occurred in the 2004–2006 programming period, when almost 30 per cent of 
the allocation was absorbed in 2008 and 2009. In the 2007–2013 programming 
period, the EU grant allocation – which increased considerably, i.e. by 24 per cent of 
GDP compared to the previous period – was implemented with gradually increasing 
absorption.6 In the two years after 2013 the inflow of EU funds was around 6–7 per 
cent of GDP, which was rendered possible by the n+2 rule.” (MNB 2016, p 24) It 
6  The substantial absorption of the funds of the 2007–2013 programming period only started from 2009; in 
2007 and 2008 the funds of the previous programming period were typically still being absorbed.
Figure 2
distribution of the gross inflow of the Eu transfers by programming periods 
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should be noted that the fluctuations in the EU grants are essentially attributable 
to the drawdown of the Cohesion and Structural Funds, while the agricultural 
subsidies, amounting to roughly 1 per cent of GDP (which to a lesser degree also 
contain the subsidies from the Rural Development Fund) are distributed relatively 
evenly between the years (MNB 2016).
Capital transfers supporting investments accounted for an increasing part of the 
absorbed grants, while by 2015 – contrary to the former trends – the transfers 
received by the state exceeded those of the private sector. In recent years, the 
absorption of capital transfers increased from 1–2 per cent of GDP close to 5 per 
cent. These funds typically support the implementation of some sort of investment, 
and hence this sharp increase also had a substantial effect on the dynamics of 
investments. By contrast, net current transfers increased only moderately after 
2009, amounting to only 1.5–2 per cent of GDP annually at the end of the period. 
The largest part of these current items are agricultural subsidies determined on 
the basis of area, independently of projects, and thus the absorption of those is 
more stable than that of capital transfers. The Member State payments are also 
included in the current items. The funds necessary for the EU budget are provided 
by the payments of the Member States, where the largest revenue is generated by 
Figure 3
Current/capital and sectoral breakdown of the net Eu transfers* 



































































































* In addition to the grants received from the EU, this also considers payments to the EU. Payments to the 
EU reduce current transfers.
Source: MNB
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the GNI-based contribution paid at a standard rate and by the VAT-based payments. 
During the programming period, Hungary’s payments to the EU predominantly 
appeared among the general government expenditures and steadily accounted for 
around 1 per cent of GDP (for more details on payments made by Hungary, see the 
Annex). Up until 2013, the EU grants absorbed by the private sector substantially 
exceeded the absorption by the state. However, since then – presumably with 
a view to ensuring a faster drawdown of funds due to the end of the 2007–2013 
programming period – the transfers received by the general government started 
rising quickly and by 2015 the state had already absorbed more transfers than the 
private sector.
The role of capital transfers increases both within public and the private investments. 
Public investments implemented from EU funds and public capital transfer 
absorption sharply increased after 2008. In 2011, the ratio of EU transfers within 
public investments already exceeded 50 per cent and it was also at a similar level in 
2013–2014.7 Within private sector investments, the ratio of investments financed 
from EU funds remained at a lower level, but gradually increased, and hence after 
2011 it accounted for 5–8 per cent. One interesting question is to what extent 
7  The large public enterprises developing and operating infrastructure also form part of the general 
government sector (e.g. Nemzeti Infrastruktúra Fejlesztő Zrt., Magyar Közút Nonprofit Zrt.).
Figure 4
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the principle of additionality was enforced under the high ratio of investments 
implemented from the transfers: in addition to the own contribution related to 
the grants, the EU also prescribes the type of investments that the beneficiary 
country should implement to avoid that the grants finance the budget deficit (this 
paper essentially analyses the direct data of the sources, and hence the issue of 
additionality could rather be the topic of research focusing on the impacts of the 
EU funds).
2.2. Cohesion policy funds
In the 2007–2013 programming period, via the tools of cohesion policy, the EU 
used a significant part of its budget to strengthen economic, social and regional 
cohesion in the EU. Within this, the EU set the objective of promoting convergence 
(by supporting the poorest regions, which fell 75 per cent below the Community 
average), as well as regional competitiveness and employment. The financial funds 
for the objectives are provided by the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF). The objective 
of the ERDF is to reduce inequalities between regions, the ESF focuses primarily 
on employment and education developments, while the CF supports the countries 
where gross national income (GNI) per capita is below 90 per cent of the EU average 
– the latter mostly finances large-scale developments in the area of environmental 
protection and transport.
In the 2007–2013 programming period, funds in the amount of EUR 24.9 billion were 
allocated to Hungary via the structural funds (ERDF, ESF, CF), supplemented by the 
national contribution in the amount of almost EUR 4.4 billion (a little more than 15 
per cent). A significant part of the funds granted to Hungary was allocated to the 
convergence objective, while the largest part of the projects were financed by the 
European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund (Lehmann–Nyers 
2009). The framework for the drawdown of the amounts allocated to Hungary 
is provided by the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF). Within that 
framework, Hungary defined a total of 15 operational programmes: seven sectoral, 
seven regional and one implementation operational programmes. During the 
programming period, the largest grants were received by the Transport (TOP), the 
Environment and Energy (EEOP) and the Regional (ROP) Operational Programmes 
(NDA 2012). The table below summarises the key features of the operational 
programmes in the 2007–2013 programming period:
The time profile of payments under the individual operational programmes was 
rather heterogeneous; nevertheless, by the end of 2015 the Hungarian state paid 
the total allocation of all operational programmes, while there was overspending 
in most of the programmes. Of the operational programmes, the run-up of the 
regional operational programmes (ROP) was one of the most even. Within that 
group, it is worth highlighting the Central Hungary Operational Programme, 
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Table 1
Convergence of disadvantaged areas
EuR bn Fund Aims
Sectoral Operational Programmes
Economic Development OP 
(GOP)
2.9 ERDF Stable economic growth, improving 
productivity
Transport OP (KÖZOP) 5.7 ERDF/CF Development of transport
Environment and Energy OP 
(KEOP)
4.5 ERDF/CF Increase labour productivity, reduce 
social differences (training, education, 
healthcare)
Social Renewal OP (TÁMOP) 3.5 ESF Development of education, healthcare, 
labour market and social service 
infrastructure
Social Infrastructure OP (TIOP) 1.8 ERDF Reducing environmental issues
Electronic Administration OP 
(EKOP)
0.3 ERDF Development of IT in public 
administration
State Reform OP (ÁROP) 0.1 ESF Increase the level of administrative 
system's performance and services 
Regional Operational Programmes (ROP)
Central Hungary OP (KMOP) 1.5
ERDF
Improve the quality of life, increase 
employment rate, create new jobs, 
convergence of disadvantaged areas
South TransDanubia OP (DDOP) 0.7
Central TransDanubia OP (KDOP) 0.5
West Pannon OP (NYDOP) 0.5
South Great Plain OP (DAOP) 0.7
North Great Plain OP (ÉAOP) 1.0
North Hungary OP (ÉMOP) 0.9
Operational Programme for the implementation of European Cohesion Policy
Implementation OP (VOP) 0.3 CF Technical support
Sum 24.9
Source: State Audit Office of Hungary (2015)
in which the payments were made the fastest. In addition, the payments of 
the West Transdanubia and the South Transdanubia, and the South Great Plain 
regions were executed better than the average. On the other hand, the projects 
implemented in the North Great Plain, North Hungary and Central Transdanubia 
regions confirmed completion of the projects by invoices more slowly than the 
average. The rest of the operational programmes can be regarded as “tail-heavy”, 
i.e. they were characterised by the acceleration of payments in the final years. One 
possible exception to this is the implementation operational programme (IOP): due 
to the objective of the programme (technical assistance) these funds were drawn 
down relatively evenly. Partially due to the substantial size of the projects, the 
Environment and Energy operational programme (EEOP) paid almost 80 per cent 
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of the grants very slowly, only after 2012. Sinсe the total allocation of the latter 
programme is extremely high, it can be stated that a considerable portion of the 
EU grants in recent years was paid for environmental purposes.
“Overspending” also occurred in the case of the operational programmes, which 
were not steady though. Overspending means that the Hungarian state typically 
paid EU tender funds in higher amounts than the allocation provided by the EU. 
This is necessary to ensure that no funds are lost should the Commission have any 
objection. The excess invoice portfolio can be used as a “cover” for the potential 
problems that may arise subsequently in the case of items already settled with 
the Commission, instead of the potentially unsuitable invoices submitted or to 
be submitted, or in the case of suspended payments for financial adjustment.8 
Among the operational programmes, the largest overspending in nominal terms 
can be observed in the case of the transport (TOP) and economic development 
(EDOP) programmes. Both of these are amongst the operational programmes with 
higher allocation, and thus the overspending is presumably also attributable to the 
intention to be able to submit new invoices for the purpose of financial adjustment 
or to replace invoices potentially disputed by the EU. In addition, overspending 
8  If the Commission and the Hungarian authorities are able to agree on the degree of the financial adjustment, 
the grant deducted from the disputed investments may be reallocated to new projects. In this case, the 
amount deducted from the disputed investments most probably has to be covered from the national budget.
Figure 5
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may also signal the popularity of the programmes, the objectives of economic 
policy, as well as the strengthening of the economy’s growth potential. It should 
be noted that the “popularity” of EDOP may also be supported by the fact that 
in the new programming period, despite the decrease in the total allocation, the 
funds planned to be allocated here are substantially higher than in the 2007–2013 
programming period. On the other hand, the social infrastructure (SIOP) projects, 
and the overspending of the EEOP and StROP programmes are negligible. The 
overspending in respect of the rest of the programmes is around 5–20 per cent.
Based on the data available until the end of December 2015, it is unlikely that 
any loss of funds from the 2007–2013 programming period will be suffered, i.e. 
the Hungarian State has paid the available total allocation of EUR 24.9 billion in 
full. Based on the information available at the end of 2015, it can be stated that 
the European Union has already paid a substantial part of the allocation for 15 
operational programmes (around EUR 22 billion) and, based on existing invoices, 
Hungary may receive further grants from the EU in the amount of EUR 2.9 billion 
in relation to the 2007–2013 programming period (Figure 6):
i.  Up to December 2015, the Hungarian state submitted invoices in the amount of 
EUR 0.2 billion, the payment of which can be expected in 2016.
ii.  Suspended amounts or amounts not submitted due to suspension account 
for a large part of the allocation not paid by the European Commission (EUR 
1.4 billion). It is the transport programme (TOP) that is most affected by the 
suspensions; at present TOP payments of EUR 573 million are suspended. The 
Commission interrupted the payments of TOP back in December 2013 due to 
the so-called asphalt mixer case,9 and it was suspended in summer 2015 as no 
agreement could be reached on the degree of financial adjustment. In addition, 
there are also some disputed items in the case of the Social Renewal (SoROP) 
and Social Infrastructure (SIOP) programmes.
iii.  According to the rules, the EU does not transfer the last 5 per cent of the 
grants, around EUR 1.2 billion to the Member State until completion of the full 
review of the grant given (in relation to the 2007–2013 programming period the 
Commission is expected to make the payment in 2017–2018).
According to the available data, Hungary has over-secured itself by EUR 1.9 billion, 
i.e. by almost 8 per cent of the total allocation. Taking all operational programmes 
into account, overspending ran to roughly EU 1.9 billion, i.e. the EU tender funds 
paid by the Hungarian state exceeded the allocation provided by the EU by this 
amount; accordingly, irrespectively of the pending disputed items, a loss of funds 
9  According to the EU, the Hungarian rules were discriminative, as they permitted the delivery of asphalt 
for the road construction only for suppliers with business seat located within a distance of 50 kilometres.
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is unlikely due to the substantial overspending. On the other hand, it should be also 
noted that although Hungary performs extremely well in terms of absorption, it 
does not necessarily mean that the impact of the projects on economic convergence 
was also the greatest in Hungary. For example, Heil–Nagy (2013) found that due to 
focusing on absorption the projects implemented from the cohesion funds were 
predominantly short and less complex, while a major impact on the economy can 
be rendered probable typically in the case of more complex, innovative and hence 
longer projects. More efficient absorption of the funds would be facilitated by the 
application of supplementary policies that increase the fund absorption potential 
of the less-developed regions (e.g. by establishing a background structure related 
to research and development), which would be an extremely time-consuming 
measure. A further consequence of the full allocation of funds is that although, 
thanks to the last two years, Hungary was able to draw down the grants of the 
2007–2013 financial cycle in full, due to the administrative burdens of the previous 
cycle the issue of tender notices and the conclusion of the contracts related to the 
new, 2014–2020 programming period was only able to start later.
Figure 6
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As regards the regional absorption of transfers received by Hungary, the largest 
volume of funds was received by Central Hungary, but support for the less-developed 
regions was also considerable. In Central Hungary, GDP per capita substantially 
exceeds the average of the rest of the county and is slightly above the EU average. 
There was a substantial increase in the region’s GDP per capita between 2006 and 
2013, which was also supported by the transport and infrastructure investments 
(underground line 4, extension of M0 ring) implemented during the period. In terms 
of GDP per capita, the two most developed regions, after Central Hungary, are 
West and the Central Transdanubia regions. These regions received less EU grants 
in proportion to their GDP compared to the less-developed regions, but in spite of 
this convergence to the EU average was more significant in these two regions. In 
the less-developed regions of the county, GDP per capita compared to the EU28 
countries was around 40 per cent both in 2006 and 2013. This shortfalls in these 
areas remained substantial despite the significant inflow of EU funds – reaching 30 
per cent of GDP on average in 2013 – which suggests that the rate of convergence 
is also influenced by the geographical location of the regions. Nevertheless, it is 
probable that without the absorption of the EU funds the negative consequences 
of the crisis would have resulted in an even more severe lag in the growth of these 
regions.
Figure 7
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2.3. Agricultural and rural development subsidies
One type of agricultural and rural development subsidies are the direct producer 
and agricultural market subsidies, while the second pillar is the rural development 
grants. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the European Union’s agricultural 
subsidy scheme, from which Hungary receives agricultural grants from two sources. 
A significant part of the EU funding provides direct subsidies to producers and the 
agricultural market from the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF). The 
second pillar of the agricultural subsidy scheme is the European Agricultural Fund 
for Rural Development (EAFRD), which provides the rural development grants. From 
the date of accession until 2013 Hungary received funding from these two sources 
in the total amount of EUR 12.5 billion.
The level of agricultural and rural development subsidies received from the EU 
was already high in Hungary in 2008 and increased further in the 2007–2013 
programming period (Figure 8). As a result of the gradually increasing direct 
subsidies, by 2013 the agricultural grant per hectare increased by more than one 
and a half times; with this, among the countries that joined the EU in 2004 it is 
Hungary that receives the highest amount.
Figure 8































































































































Source: State Audit Office of Hungary (2015)
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Since EU accession, access to subsidies from EAGF, as the first pillar of the common 
agricultural policy, has gradually expanded for Hungary; the different financing 
rule also contributed to the gradual increase in the absorption of the grants. For 
the newly acceded countries in 2004 the amount available for drawdown was 25 
per cent of the EU15 average, and this ratio gradually increased year by year, to 
reach the subsidy level of the EU15 countries by 2013. A substantial part of the 
EAGF funds (95 per cent) was used for direct area aid, while the remaining part 
(5 per cent) was used for other grants. The direct producer grants can be drawn 
down in respect of land where agricultural activity is pursued primarily. The system 
of absorbing direct subsidies differs from those customary for funds originating 
from other organisations of the European Union. The payment to beneficiaries is 
executed in the given fiscal year, the full amount of the subsidy allocable to the 
period is absorbed, and thus there is no need for the n+2 years rule. Accordingly, 
the data related to the absorption of direct subsidies can be quantified already after 
the closing of the respective year. The available allocation has gradually increased 
since accession, which was also reflected in the higher absorption of the grants: the 
direct producer grants received by Hungary increased more than threefold from the 
level of EUR 0.5 billion in 2007, to approximate EUR 1.6 billion by 2014 (Figure 9).
Figure 9
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The second pillar of the European Common Agricultural Policy is the rural 
development subsidy scheme, provided to the Member States by EAFRD. The 
purpose of these subsidies is (i) to improve the competitiveness of the agricultural 
and forestry sector; (ii) support environmental protection; (iii) improve the quality of 
life in rural areas; and (iv) encourage the diversification of economic activity in rural 
areas. The rural development subsidies, in contrast to direct producer subsidies, are 
not transferred automatically to the users of the funds, but are allocated through 
tenders similarly to development funds. Similarly to the cohesion policy funds, the 
projects must be implemented within n+2 years after the assessment of the tenders, 
i.e. after the closing of the programming period the grants can be drawn down for 
another two years. As a result of this, the rural development subsidy allocation was 
drawn down in almost full.
3. international experiences
The Cohesion and Structural Funds essentially finance investments to reduce 
and eliminate the regional difference within the European Union. The purpose 
of these funds is to enable the Member States to reduce their handicap and 
underdevelopment compared to the core countries of the EU. For this reason, it is 
important to ensure that the countries that joined in 2004 use the grants for the 
realisation of these objectives. Accordingly, in Section 3 we present the international 
comparison prepared on the absorption of EU funds.
3.1. Absorption ratios
Most countries have already drawn down the bulk of the cohesion policy funds; 
nevertheless, the absorption of funds by the Hungarian economy may be deemed 
outstanding by international comparison. By the end of 2015, Hungary had 
drawn down almost 90 per cent of the available funds, which is a favourable ratio 
compared to the countries in the region and the Member States as well. In the 
Visegrád countries, the absorption of cohesion policy funds is similar; however, the 
Hungarian absorption rate is exceeded only by Poland, where the rate was above 
90 per cent.10 The high drawdown of funds by Poland was supported by the very 
efficient institutional system performing the distribution of the grants, as well as by 
the high ratio of infrastructure investments (State Audit Office of Hungary 2015). In 
the region, Slovenia’s absorption of funds exceeds that of Hungary, while Slovakia 
lags behind the level of the countries in the region, which may be partly attributable 
to the fact that the EU stopped several large public investments and payments due 
to suspected fraud and corruption (State Audit Office of Hungary 2015).
10  The absorption rates show the amount transferred by the European Commission from the available 
allocation to the given Member State rather than the effective use of the EU transfers. The EU does not 
transfer the last 5 per cent of the grants to the Member State until the completion of the full review of 
the grant given (in relation to the 2007–2013 programming period the Commission is expected to make 
the payment in 2017–2018).
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3.2. Sectoral breakdown
Although the drawdown of cohesion policy funds evolved similarly in the countries 
of the region, the absorption of funds as a per cent of GDP significantly outstrips 
the regional level in Hungary. In addition to the absorption rate, it is also worth 
comparing the extra funds provided for the implementation of the investments as 
a per cent of GDP in the individual countries. Based on the absorption of the EU 
funds as a per cent of GDP, Hungary’s performance was outstanding among the 
countries of the region, and despite the fact that the grant drawdown rate was 
higher in Poland, the absorption exceeded the Polish level as well. The inflow of 
transfers during the period was the most uneven in Hungary among the countries 
in the region: it started slowly in the first years of the programming period (KPMG 
2013), but after a gradual increase in 2014 it already amounted to more than 6 
per cent of GDP. The outstanding absorption of EU transfers supported the general 
government to larger degree, and the private sector to a lesser degree.
Examining the EU funds absorbed in the countries in the region, it can be seen that 
the role of the public sector increased during the period, and the capital transfers 
increased at an accelerating pace, exceeding the inflow of current transfers by 2013. 
Similarly to the absorption of funds by Hungary, in the Czech Republic a large part 
Figure 10
Trends in the drawdown of cohesion policy funds 
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of the grants – around 50 per cent – was received by the state and 20 per cent by 
the private sector, while the remaining part of the transfers was drawn down in 
the form of direct aid (e.g. area aid). In Poland, the ratio of the funds flowing to the 
private sector is higher, i.e. around 25 per cent, while public absorption reached 
a lower level, around 45 per cent. The structure of the EU grants flowing into the 
Polish economy has changed over the years: the ratio of absorption by the private 
sector increased to almost one-third of the funds in 2013–2014. While a large part 
of the transfers is often used by the public sector through the implementation 
of high-value investments, in Poland an increasingly large part of the grants was 
absorbed by the private sector, but this did not entail a decrease in the funds. This 
is related to the fact that in Poland investments increased significantly in the period 
under review, while in the new programming period it may face similar challenges 
as Hungary in terms of investment financing.
3.3. Role of transfers in investments
Among the countries in the region, capital transfers played the strongest role in 
Hungary both in the public and private sector investments. Between 2007 and 2014, 
Hungarian public investments amounted to around 4 per cent of GDP, 40–50 per 
cent of which was financed from capital transfers received from the EU; thus, the 
Figure 11
Breakdown of absorbed transfers by sectors and type 
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implementation of these projects did not increase the budget deficit. On the other 
hand, private sector investments significantly exceed those of the state: on average 
they amount to 17 per cent of GDP. The received capital transfers play much smaller 
role in the financing of private investments; nevertheless, the ratio thereof is higher 
than the regional level. The weight of EU grants is also more significant in public 
investments than in the countries in the region, where less than 40 per cent of all 
public investments are implemented with the use of EU funds. Among the countries 
in the region, the structure of the financing of public investments has changed 
to the largest degree in recent years in Slovenia, since the ratio of EU funds – as 
a result of the strict fiscal policy of Slovenia – has increased from a low level at an 
accelerating pace. On the whole, due to the significant role of capital transfers, the 
financing of the investments may represent the largest challenge for the participants 
of the Hungarian economy after the change of the programming period.
4. The new programming period
4.1. Change in the transfer allocation to the individual countries
As regards the budget of EU grants, Hungary belonged to the winner countries 
in both programming periods compared to its maturity. The budget of the aids 
granted by the cohesion policy essentially depends on the relative development; the 
Figure 12
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more developed a country is, the less aid it can expect (Figure 13). Accordingly, the 
developed Western countries received only negligible aid from the cohesion policy 
funds in both programming periods. In the 2007–2013 programming period within 
the group of supported countries, the Central and Eastern European countries 
received significantly higher aid than the South European states, compared to both 
their development and GDP. Among the preferred countries, support for Hungary 
in the previous period was particularly high. The preferred status of the Central 
and Eastern European countries is preserved in the 2014–2020 programming 
period as well. Compared to the relative development, Hungary remained among 
the front-runners; moreover, compared to 2013 GDP it received the highest grant 
allocation. Nevertheless, it is obvious that at the EU level the total grant budget has 
decreased substantially for the 2014–2020 period, as the relative development has 
also improved significantly in the vast majority of the supported countries.
4.2. Trends in funds available for individual objectives
Although in the new programming period the budget allocated by the cohesion 
policy decreased slightly in nominal terms, the structure of the grants may be 
more favourable for economic growth. In the new programming period, within 
the framework of the Partnership Agreement, Hungary may absorb – in addition 
Figure 13
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to the annual agricultural aids – grants of EUR 25 billion (EUR 22 billion from the 
cohesion policy funds, EUR 3 billion for rural development grants), which slightly 
falls short of the allocation in the previous programming period. In the 2007–2013 
programming period, the transport infrastructure had the highest weight among the 
supported objectives, but social convergence also received considerable support. 
The areas important in terms of the economy’s competitiveness, such as support 
for small and medium-sized enterprises, education and research and development, 
benefited from relatively less support. In the new, 2014–2020 programming period, 
the support funds are distributed more evenly among the various objectives, while 
the funds usable for environmental protection11 and employment increase. On the 
whole, the amounts available for the development of the economy – according to 
the communication by the government – may significantly exceed the values of the 
previous period.12 The major part of the funds allocated to economic development 
is provided by the Economic Development and Innovation Operational Programme 
(EDIOP): this includes funds to be used for growth in tourism, the expansion of 
11  It should be noted that although at the level of the operational programmes the ratio of funds usable for 
environmental protection has decreased, it increased when taking all funds together, since grants from 
the other operational programmes may also be used for this purpose.
12  According to the intentions of the government, the economic development goals will be served, in addition 
to the Economic Development and Innovation Operational Programme (EDIOP, EUR 7.7 billion), primarily 
by the allocations of the Territorial Development Operational Programmes (TDOP, EUR 3.4 billion) and the 
Competitive Central Hungary Operational Programme (CCHOP, EUR 0.5 billion).
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the production capacity of small and medium-sized enterprises, for research and 
development and for the improvement of competitiveness, while – instead of the 
separated operational programmes of the previous period – several funds aimed 
at promoting higher and more efficient employment also appear here. The “Road 
to Labour Market” programme and the programmes supporting flexible work and 
the employment of low-qualified workers permit the more efficient utilisation 
of human resources, which is especially important, because the development of 
human resources, in addition to infrastructure, may result in the more efficient 
absorption of the EU funds, as these factors may strengthen the potential growth 
of the economy in the longer run as well (Allard–Annett 2008).
The processes with regard to the utilisation ratio in supported areas are similar in the 
Visegrád countries: the ratio of public road and railway infrastructure investments is 
decreasing, while that of environmental investments is increasing. In the previous 
programming period, the largest portion of the grants in the Visegrád countries 
was used for transportation and energy infrastructure investments; e.g. in Poland 
these accounted for more than 40 per cent of the total allocation (Figure 15), 
which may have been attributable to the relative underdevelopment of the public 
road network. However, in the new programming period the ratio of the grants 
related to social infrastructure and activity will decrease in all four countries. On the 
Figure 15
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other hand, the volume of EU resources available for environmental protection will 
increase everywhere; in the new programming period, in Hungary it may exceed the 
ratio of the infrastructural investments. It should be noted that the EU resources 
for the development of employment are increasing to an outstanding degree, 
and – compared to the other countries – support for the SME sector may remain 
significant, while in the case of grants used for research and development Hungary’s 
lag compared to the region will decrease.
4.3. Acceleration of payment of Eu funds in 2016
According to the baseline forecast of the Inflation Report of March 2016, the amount 
of EU transfers that may be absorbed by Hungary may fall by roughly EUR 3 billion 
in 2016 compared to the previous year. At the beginning of the new programming 
period, the payment of EU funds according to (Hungarian and international) 
experiences will fall substantially short of the values measured in the last years 
of the programming period (Babos–Kiss 2016). In addition, payments in the first 
years of the new period were also complicated by the fact that the determination 
of the allocations to the individual countries for the new period, the breakdown of 
the amounts to operational programmes and priorities, and the conclusion of the 
cooperation agreement proved to be such a time-consuming exercise that it was 
only possible to announce tenders for the absorption of the funds belonging to the 
2014–2020 programming period from the end of 2015.
The government took several measures to ensure the drawdown of the EU funds 
faster and in a large amount, to prevent economic growth in 2016 from being curbed 
by the deceleration in transfers and to minimise the risk of loss of funds in the 
new programming period. The government already recognised the risk of a decline 
in EU funds last year, and thus from mid-2015 it continuously took measures to 
avoid a larger-scale decrease in payments of EU transfers and a more significant 
deceleration of the economy. The most important measures are as follows:
i.  In August 2015, the government decided that – in order to avoid losing EU funds 
– it will announce all Hungarian tenders by mid-2017 for the 2014–2020 period.
ii.  In November 2015,13 a government resolution decided that the winning bidders 
would get higher supplier advance (50 per cent instead of 30 per cent) –in 
addition to the faster payment of EU funds, this measure may significantly 
improve the liquidity of the corporate sector, which may also boost the sector’s 
investment activity by reducing the chain debts.
iii.  In addition, grants received for reducing energy expenditures will be allocated 
to larger institution facility managers (public institutions, churches, civil 
13  Hungarian Official Journal, 24 November 2015
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organisations) instead of households, which will contribute to the faster 
absorption of funds by increasing the concentration of expenditures.
iv.  In the new programming period, the ratio of repayable funds is significantly 
higher: as part of the package of policies, the government – as a general rule – 
also allocates non-repayable EU funds to most repayable funds.
v.  It may also accelerate payments that in the case of numerous projects the 
preparation costs may be advanced by the central budget.
vi.  In January 2016,14 the heads of certain ministries were ordered to prepare 
a terms of reference containing the quarterly breakdown of the budget figures, 
which – due to the rather short deadline, but generous incentive system – may 
generate higher interest in the drawdown of funds.
vii.  By increasing the expert capacity efforts are made to reduce the time of 
assessing the bids.
According to the government’s expectations, as a result of these measures the 
Hungarian absorption of EU transfers from the Cohesion and Structural Funds may 
reach HUF 2,048 billion in 2016 – on the other hand, based on the historic figures 
the payment of the said amount appears to be rather ambitious. Accordingly, the 
objective of the Hungarian government is – calculating using a budget exchange rate 
of EUR/HUF 310.80 and an own contribution of 15 per cent – to pay EU funds this 
year roughly in the equivalent of EUR 5.7 billion from the seven-year allocation of 
almost EUR 25 billion, which would represent the absorption of 23 per cent of the 
total allocation. In order to demonstrate the weight of the task burdening the public 
institutional system, it make sense to examine this amount from several respects.
i.  On the one hand, in the previous programming period, the execution of payments 
of similar magnitude required more than two years.
ii.  On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that while, in respect of the appropriated 
funds, over-appropriation of the EU funds (utilisation over 100 per cent) already 
materialised at the end of 2013, in the area of payments this was realised 
only two years later, by the end of 2015. Since the public institutional system 
presumably dealt with the tenders of the previous period even at the end of 2015, 
to avoid the loss of EU funds, the appropriation of the EU funds to a larger degree 
by accepting bids may commence only at the beginning of 2016, followed by 
payments with a delay – this delay may be offset by the higher advance payment.
iii.  Finally, in comparison with the previous period, the government’s objectives with 
regard to payments to be made in 2016 in respect of the individual operational 
14  Hungarian Official Journal, 22 January 2016
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programmes may also be regarded as ambitious: in the previous period, only 
10–15 per cent of the allocations could be paid within three years, while this 
year’s objective typically accounts for 20–25 per cent of the allocations. On the 
other hand, the success of this may be significantly supported by the fact that 
in the new programming period it is typically the operational programmes that 
performed well in the previous period which have higher allocations– i.e. the 
government focused not only on economic policy objectives and strengthening 
the growth potential of the economy, but also considered the popularity of the 
programmes and the speed of the drawdowns from the programmes.
Table 2
Comparison with the payments of the previous period
Operational Programmes Budget (EuR 
bn)
Payment 









GINOP Development and 
Innovation Operation 
Programme 
7.7 1.6 21 16
TOP Territorial Operational 
Programme
3.4 0.8 22 13
VEKOP Competitive Central 
Hungary Operational 
Programme
0.5 0.2 37 18
EFOP Human Resources 
Development 
Operational Programme
2.6 0.6 22 11




KEHOP Environment and 
Energy Efficiency 
Operational Programme
3.2 0.7 23 14
IKOP Integrated Transport 
Development 
Operational Programme
3.3 0.8 23 11
KÖFOP Public Administration 
and Services 
Operational Programme
0.8 0.2 23 16
Rural Development 
Programme (EMVA), 
Hungarian Fisheries OP 
(HOP)
3.5 0.8 23 17
Sum 25.1 5.6 22 14
Source: Authors’ work, Hungarian Official Journal, SMIS
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5. Summary
The grants received from the European Union have a significant impact on the 
Hungarian economy: in addition to the positive impact on external balance, it 
is also worth emphasising their role in supporting investment. Towards the end 
of the 2007–2013 programming period, the absorption of EU transfers gradually 
increased; net grants – reduced by contributions – reached 5–6 per cent of the 
GDP. Current transfers remained relatively stable, and hence the increase can be 
primarily attributed to the investment-supporting capital transfers. As a result of 
the accelerating payments, it is unlikely that there will be any loss of funds from the 
2007–2013 programming period, i.e. the Hungarian State has paid the available total 
allocation of EUR 24.9 billion in full. In excess of the total allocation, overspending 
of roughly EUR 1.9 billion also occurred, which may help avoid the loss of funds 
as a result of pending disputes. On the other hand, in addition to the absorption 
approach, it also makes sense to examine the impacts the received grants may 
have exerted on the Hungarian economy. This paper did not intend to quantify 
all impacts, but it is worth emphasising that the transfer from the EU supported 
public investments to a substantial degree, i.e. over 50 per cent – on the other 
hand, in the case of the private sector, this ratio is substantially lower, i.e. around 
5–10 per cent. As regards the regional absorption of the transfers received by 
Hungary, Central Hungary received the highest volume of funds, but support for 
the less-developed regions was also substantial, which may have contributed to 
the fact that they managed to reduce their shortfall compared to the EU average to 
a slight degree. In terms of a regional comparison, it is worth noting that although 
the drawdown of cohesion policy funds was similar in the Visegrád countries, as 
a per cent of GDP the highest grant was received by Hungary, which is primarily 
attributable to the fact that – similarly to the new, 2014–2020 programming period 
– Hungary received a favourable total allocation compared to the country’s maturity. 
The support resources are allocated more evenly among the various objectives in 
the new programming period in respect of Hungary, and thus the amounts available 
for economic development – as stated by the government – may significantly 
increase compared to the lower values of the previous period. On the other hand, 
in 2016 the absorption of EU transfers is expected to fall significantly, despite the 
government’s measures, which can be explained by the gradual pick-up in payments 
in the new period.
Annex: Budget revenues of the Eu and Hungary’s contribution
The resources of the European Union predominantly originate from the Member 
States’ contributions. The European Union’s own sources of revenue can be broken 
down into three main categories:
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i.  GNI-based contributions: The Member States pay a certain defined percentage of 
their gross national income to the budget. These funds account for a substantial 
part of the EU’s budgetary revenue (in 2014 more than two thirds). The GNI-
based contribution is a so-called “balancing resource”, meaning that the rate 
of the contribution to be paid is determined in such a way that helps avoid 
a budget deficit.
ii.  Traditional own resources: The customs duties imposed on non-EU countries 
and the sugar levies originating from the common organisation of the sugar 
industry constitute the traditional source of the EU’s revenues since 1970. The 
Member States are obliged to pay 80 per cent of the levies and duties collected 
by them to the EU budget, while they may retain the remaining 20 per cent to 
finance their collection costs.
iii.  Value added tax-based contributions: The basis of the Member States’ 
contribution is the estimated value added tax revenue; a certain percentage of 
this must be paid to the budget.
The largest part of fiscal expenditures are financed from the own resources 
contributed by the Member States; however, the EU also earns other revenues of 
Figure 16
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lesser significance. Such revenues may include the tax on the income of employees 
of EU institutions, penalties imposed on enterprises violating competition law or 
other rules, or the retained earnings from previous years. The own resources 
are supplemented by the compensation of the budgetary imbalances between 
the contributions of the Member States. The “UK rebate” of 1984 reduces the 
contribution of the United Kingdom, which in 2007 was adjusted by the impact of 
the contributions of the newly joined Member States.
Hungary’s Member State contribution was around EUR 0.8–1.0 billion annually, the 
major part of which comes from GNI-based resources. The ratio of the traditional 
own resources from customs duties and sugar levies, and the VAT-based contribution 
is roughly the same, representing a burden of around HUF 100 million for the 
Hungarian budget. The amount of contributions under other titles – the largest part 
of which is the UK rebate – was around HUF 50–70 million in recent years. Hungary’s 
annual budget contribution amounts to almost 1 per cent of GDP – with this, among 
the newly joined 12 countries, the contribution as a percentage of GDP was the 
lowest in Hungary (albeit the difference between the countries is negligible).
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Key features of the Chinese bond market*
Zsanett Sütő – Tamás Tóth 
In the 21st century, China ranks among the global leaders based on quantitative 
factors, not only from a real economy perspective but also from a financial one. It 
is the largest exporter and one of the biggest economies in the world. Based on the 
IMF’s decision, the Chinese currency will be included in the SDR basket containing 
the major currencies of the world. Currently, the world’s third largest bond market 
is found in China. It is huge both in real economy and financial terms, and foreign 
investors are gradually being granted access to this market, at the pace and to 
the extent determined by Chinese regulators. The onshore bond market that has 
been opening up at an increasing pace recently and the offshore bond market that 
will mark its 10th anniversary next year may be uncharted territory for financial 
institutions. Entry to the market may be facilitated by gaining information about the 
characteristics of the market. This article presents the key features of the Chinese 
bond markets from both the issuer and the investor side, examining the individual 
market segments as well, and pointing out the opportunities and expected paths of 
development on the markets. In addition, we demonstrate how the Chinese bond 
markets fit into the political efforts targeting the achievement of global currency 
status for RMB.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Classification: F65, G15, O16
Keywords: China, bond market, dim sum, onshore market, renminbi
1. introduction
Over the past 15 years, the Chinese bond market has expanded from practically 
nothing to the third largest market in the world. Despite this, the country’s debt-to-
GDP ratio can still be considered relatively low, as the growing indebtedness can be 
mostly seen in the mounting debt of the private sector. China had several reasons 
to consciously strive for the establishment and continuous development of its bond 
market. First, as most Chinese corporations still acquire funding by issuing shares 
and taking out bank loans, guiding companies to the bond market would foster the 
diversification of the credit risk that has accumulated in the banking system. Second, 
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the investments in infrastructure and construction which have (until now) been the 
engines of economic growth require further sources of finance (Goldman 2015).
The role of the Chinese renminbi in world market transactions has expanded drastically 
in the past 5 years. The Chinese currency has become the second most widespread 
currency in trade finance, and with respect to payment transactions it ranks among 
the top 5 (Horváth–Teremi 2015). The renminbi plays an increasingly important role 
in the foreign exchange reserves of central banks, which may be boosted further by 
the November 2015 decision of the IMF, pursuant to which the Chinese renminbi will 
be included in the SDR basket1 from October 2016. Hungary received RQFII quotas of 
RMB 50 billion in June 2015, which enabled Hungarian financial institutions to access 
Chinese onshore market investments (MNB press release, 27 June 2015).
Due to the lack of the full convertibility of the Chinese currency and Chinese capital 
controls, two types of bond markets have emerged: the onshore and the offshore 
markets. Bonds denominated in onshore renminbi (CNY) and issued by foreign 
players on the onshore bond market are called panda bonds, while those issued 
on the Hong Kong offshore market by foreign participants and denominated in 
offshore renminbi (CNH) are called dim sum bonds. Access to the former market is 
restricted, although the Chinese authorities are seeking to loosen the constraints, 
while the latter is readily accessible for investors.
2. dim sum bond market
The offshore renminbi (CNH) bond market, or dim sum market, was established 
in the second half of 2007, but the number of issues only jumped in late 2010. 
The establishment and development of the market was primarily supported by 
the increasing role of the renminbi in external trade, the accumulation of renminbi 
deposits in Hong Kong, the growing renminbi financing and lending need of financial 
and non-financial institutions, as well as the efforts of the Chinese government 
aimed at promoting the renminbi. Investors generally agreed that the Chinese 
currency would continue to strengthen, and thus non-residents showed increasing 
interest in renminbi investments. As access to the onshore bond market was 
highly restricted due to Chinese capital controls – although these restrictions later 
started to be relaxed – initially the alternative available for foreign investors was the 
offshore renminbi market. On both the issuer and the investor side, the popularity 
of the dim sum market was also enhanced by the quite loose regulation. In Hong 
Kong, basically any issuer can freely issue bonds denominated in offshore renminbi, 
and obtaining permission from the Chinese regulators is only necessary when the 
funds thus acquired are used on the onshore market.
1  The SDR (Special Drawing Rights) is a settlement and reserve currency used by the IMF. The value of the 
SDR is determined based on the value of the currencies included in the SDR basket. The SDR basket includes 
the following currencies: the US dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen and the British pound, and, pursuant to 
the IMF’s decision on 30 November 2015, from 1 October 2016 it will also include the Chinese renminbi.
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Until 2014, yields on the offshore market were well below those on the onshore 
market, and thus obtaining funds was much cheaper on the offshore market. This 
was exploited by both Chinese and international issuers in order to cut their interest 
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expenses. The substantial difference in yields was principally attributable to the 
restricted access to the onshore market: despite the lower yields, investors who 
did not have access to the onshore market were willing to buy offshore bonds in 
order to profit from the expected strengthening of the Chinese currency.
In 2015, the pace of offshore market issues seemed to have stalled, which may have 
been due to various factors. The Chinese central bank took significant monetary 
easing measures, which may have contributed to the reduction of onshore interest 
rates, as a result of which the yield spread which was previously in favour of the 
offshore market vanished, and since the second half of 2015 yields have been lower 
on the onshore markets. This change may have also been influenced by the fact that 
due to the monetary policy of the Fed and expectations about the US interest rate 
trajectory, emerging markets, i.e. also China, showed signs of capital flight. Capital 
outflows from China were mainly observed on the offshore markets, which may 
have contributed to the reduction in offshore issues through the increasing yields. 
While rising yields exerted a negative effect on the issuer side, expectations about 
the renminbi’s exchange rate developments may have done so on the investor side 
of the Chinese offshore bond market. Market expectations increasingly pointed 
towards depreciation of the renminbi. The sudden depreciation of the onshore 
yuan in August 2015, which could also be seen as a step towards determining 
the exchange rates on the basis of market developments, may have exacerbated 
investors’ worries about an exchange rate weakening on the offshore market as 
well. Furthermore, additional regulatory measures may have also influenced the 
drop in the volume of offshore market issues. The Chinese authorities implemented 
several measures in 2015 and in early 2016 to open up the onshore bond markets 
even more to foreign participants. The expanding opportunities offered by the 
onshore market may have also influenced the dynamics of offshore market issues.
2.1. Characteristics of the market
As of March 2016, the size of the offshore renminbi bond market is RMB 785 billion 
(approximately USD 120 billion). Globally, this does not make it an exceptionally 
large market, and it is in the same league with the Hungarian bond market. The real 
significance of the market is reflected by the fact that in the past 8 years more than 
500 different issuers from 35 countries acquired funds on the dim sum market in the 
form of CDs (certificates of deposit) or traditional bonds.2 In the early days of the 
market, CDs issued by financial institutions were the more frequent instruments, 
but the balance has increasingly shifted towards bonds. Since 2007 approximately 
half of all issues overall have been CDs and half have been bonds, while around 
75 per cent of the products currently available on the market are bonds and 25 per 
cent are CDs.
2  CDs (certificates of deposit) are debt instruments typically issued for short maturities by banks and other 
financial institutions. Bonds are debt instruments with maturities of over a year, issued by public sector 
issuers, financial and non-financial institutions and companies.
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Since the establishment of the market in 2007, more than 5,000 issues have 
occurred, with a total value of RMB 1.9 trillion (USD 290 billion). The average issue 
size amounts to RMB 360 million, which falls short of the average on mature bond 
markets. Around 80 per cent of the CD and bond issuers have been rated by at 
least one of the three major agencies (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch). The vast majority 
of the issues were investment grade, although there were issuers that received 
a speculative grade rating (mainly Chinese real estate development companies).
The offshore renminbi bond market is primarily concerned with shorter maturities. 
The maturity of the overwhelming majority of the bonds is 3 years or less at the 
time of issue, while CDs are typically issued with maturities of 1 year or less. In the 
case of bonds, the most frequent and most popular tenor, the so-called “sweet 
spot”, is 3 years, which is mainly due to demand factors.
2.2. issuers
As the market matured, dim sum bond issuers became increasingly heterogeneous, 
both in terms of the type of issuers and their regional location. We can find 
everything from financial institutions through corporate issuers and government 
agencies to provinces, in fact, in 2014 even sovereign issuers entered the market 
(United Kingdom, Mongolia). Issuers may be motivated to enter the offshore 
renminbi bond market by several factors, depending on whether they are Chinese 
issuers or whether they are based elsewhere (Fung et al. 2014).
One of the important motivating factors may be considered a political goal: the 
Chinese government announced the policy of internationalising the renminbi in 
2009. One of the largest issuers on the dim sum market is the Chinese state itself, 
Figure 3 
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Source: Based on data from Bloomberg (2016)
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which appears on the offshore market at regular intervals to contribute to the 
development of the market and satisfy the needs of investors who are looking for 
a safe instrument denominated in offshore renminbi. The largest state-owned policy 
banks are present on the market as issuers for similar reasons. Such banks include 
the China Development Bank and the Agricultural Development Bank.
The multinational corporations that operate in China can hedge against their 
renminbi exposure by issuing bonds. The offshore bond market is primarily enticing 
for those who would have more difficulty accessing funds on the onshore market.
Foreign banks may also be motivated to issue dim sum bonds in order to meet 
client needs. The acquired funds can be lent to primarily those corporate clients 
that operate in China but do not issue bonds themselves.
Although an increasing number of issuers are not Chinese-based, international or 
supranational actors, Chinese and Hong Kong issuers still dominate the market, 
with a combined share of almost 80 per cent. In addition to them, German, French, 
South Korean and Australian issuers and supranational institutions are represented 
on the market with relatively higher weight. Broken down by sectors, financial 
institutions dominate the market with their share of 55 per cent, even if CDs are 
left out of the analysis.
Table 1
CNH bonds by sector (with the exception of Cds), RMB billion, March 2016
Country Public sector Financial sector Non-financial 
companies
Sum
China 103 167 72 342
Hong Kong 0 43 15 58
South-Korean 10 9 2 21
Germany 0 17 6 23
France 3 11 6 20
Australia 0 17 0 17
Supranationals 15 0 0 15
Other 10 48 14 72
Sum 141 312 115 568
Source: Based on data from Bloomberg (2016)
2.3. investors
The demand side of the dim sum market is somewhat harder to analyse due to 
the limited access to data. Similar to issuers, investors also appear on the market 
for several reasons (Wang et al. 2013). First, there are not many alternatives for 
investing in offshore renminbi. There is practically no equity market, most of the 
94 Studies
Zsanett Sütő – Tamás Tóth 
savings are in bank deposits, and therefore investors looking for somewhat higher 
yields can only turn to the bond market. Second, this is the market where foreign 
investors expecting the strengthening of the Chinese currency can most easily gain 
renminbi exposure. Some central banks and other public institutions regard the 
dim sum market as the “anteroom” to the onshore market which offers relatively 
easier and more rapid access. Although they already enjoy unrestricted access 
to the onshore market, the operative procedures and preparing the necessary 
documentation may take a long time.
The investor base of short-term CDs is primarily made up of private bank and retail 
clients who hold the securities until maturity. Investors in longer-term, mostly 
fixed-rate bonds not only include private banks but also insurance corporations, 
commercial banks, fund managers and foreign public institutions (Wang et al. 2013). 
It can be stated that the so-called end-investors, i.e. institutional investors (real 
money) prefer bonds from issuers that have a rating from at least one international 
rating agency, and that are not new players on the capital market. Bonds issued by 
relatively new issuers without a rating are more likely to end up at private banks 
and commercial banks.
With respect to the geographical distribution of investors, it is perhaps not surprising 
that Asia and especially Hong Kong is the most dominant, with a share of about 
70–80 per cent. The spread of international renminbi settlement centres or “hubs”, 
however, is expected to bring about increased geographical diversification among 
investors. Yet investors were somewhat unnerved by the previously unprecedented 
volatility observed in 2015 (both in terms of the currency and the yields), and 
therefore some of them exited the market.
2.4. Liquidity
Taking into account the relatively small size of the market, the liquidity of the 
offshore renminbi bond market could be considered particularly favourable until 
mid-2015. The bid–offer yield spread of government bonds and corporate or bank 
bonds in the investment grade category was approximately 5–10 basis points, 
while in the speculative grade category it was 20–40 basis points. The average 
size of the transactions was RMB 5–10 million, which was slightly lower than the 
average for other currencies. However, the rising yields and the increased volatility 
in 2015 undermined the liquidity of the market and widened the bid–offer yield 
spread.
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3. Sovereign, agency, provincial and supranational issues on the dim 
sum and panda markets
The largest sovereign issuer in the dim sum market is China. The country appears at 
regular intervals on the offshore market too in order to promote and internationalise 
the renminbi, and to establish a benchmark yield curve made up of liquid bonds.
Apart from China, only three sovereign issuers have exploited the opportunities 
present in offshore renminbi financing since the establishment of the dim sum 
market in 2007. In cooperation with the Bank of China, HSBC and Standard 
Chartered Bank, the United Kingdom was the first to issue bonds in the amount 
of RMB 3 billion with a 3-year maturity and 2.7 per cent yield (Tessa 2014). The 
issue generated even stronger interest than expected: bids from the 85 investors, 
mostly private banks, amounted to RMB 5.8 billion, which enabled the issue of 
RMB 3 billion instead of the originally planned 2 billion and the acquisition of 
funds with yields approximately 20 basis points lower than anticipated. The amount 
received from the issue was included in the foreign exchange reserves of the United 
Kingdom, thereby making a sort of gesture towards China, signalling that the 
country regards the renminbi as a reserve currency.
In June 2015, Mongolia issued 3-year bonds denominated in offshore renminbi 
in the amount of RMB 1 billion with a 7.5 per cent yield (Borsuk, 2015). The high 
yield was warranted by the relatively low, speculative grade credit rating (B2/B+/
B+) of the country, since investors expected a much higher premium in return 
for the higher credit risk. Although the issue was not as successful as the United 
Kingdom’s, bids with a combined value of RMB 1.5 billion were received from 44 
investors. More than 90 per cent of the bonds were bought by Asian investors, 
primarily fund managers and banks. Mongolia’s primary objective with the issue 
was to diversify its investor base.
The IFC (International Finance Corporation), a member of the World Bank Group, is 
a trailblazer on the panda market: although it has had only two issues, it entered 
the onshore market as early as 2005 with a 10-year bond, which was followed by 
a 7-year bond in 2006 (IFC 2005). On the offshore renminbi market, however, it is 
a regular issuer offering both fixed-coupon bonds and short-term discount bonds. 
The corporation mainly finances the fight against climate change and investments 
supporting rural development. In addition, the IFC is committed to bolstering and 
developing China’s financial sector and the local capital market.
South Korea was the first sovereign issuer on the onshore renminbi, i.e. panda 
market. In mid-December 2015, the country issued bonds in the amount of 
RMB 3 billion with a 3 per cent yield. There was huge demand for the bonds, and 
the transactions were concluded with a fivefold oversubscription. The issue was an 
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important milestone in the history of both the panda market and Korean issuers: 
the primary objective of the sovereign issue was to gauge the appetite of investors, 
and since it was a resounding success, it paved the way for other Korean issuers as 
well which had previously acquired renminbi funds on the dim sum market.
British Columbia entered the panda bond market on 21 January 2016. The western 
Canadian province issued 3-year bonds with a combined value of RMB 3 billion at 
2.95%. Prior to the onshore issue, the Canadian province issued RMB bonds on the 
offshore market, first in 2013 – making British Columbia the first to issue sovereign 
bonds on the offshore market – and then a second time in 2014. The first offshore 
bonds issued by British Columbia had a maturity of 1 year, and their value amounted 
to RMB 2.5 billion at 2.25%. In 2014, offshore RMB funds were acquired at 2.85% 
with a value of RMB 3 billion and a maturity of 2 years. The province shifted from 
issues on the offshore market to the onshore market after China designated Canada 
as the first North American renminbi centre in November 2014.3
Hungary entered the offshore bond market on 14 April 2016 by issuing bonds with 
a face value of 1 billion yuan and a maturity of 3 years. Investors showed keen 
interest in the Hungarian issue, which was attested by the 2.5-fold oversubscription. 
This contributed to the fact that the bonds were subscribed to at a coupon of 6.25%, 
25 basis points lower than the original yield indication. The main organiser of the 
bond issue was the Bank of China (ÁKK 2016). The volume of the bond issue can 
be considered symbolic, but it signals the opening up towards new, Asian investors.
4. Onshore bond market
The onshore bond market has developed for a long time in seclusion from 
international investors. The first government bond was issued in 1950, and then 
there were no such issues between 1958 and 1981. The bond market was revitalised 
in 1981, and at that time only the primary market existed. Government bonds 
were distributed in an administrative process, and bonds were not tradable. In 
1988, trading with bonds was permitted in certain cities, then in 1990 trading 
on the secondary market was restarted countrywide when stock exchange bond 
trading was authorised on the stock exchanges of Shanghai and Shenzhen. Thus, 
the secondary market first took off at the stock exchange, and then in 1997 the 
interbank bond market was established. The market maker system was introduced 
in 2001. The interbank bond market started to develop rapidly and took over the 
role of the leading bond market (Bai et al. 2013).
3  Information on the bond issues by British Columbia was found on the website of British Columbia’s provincial 
government.
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Foreign players could first access stock market bond trading from 2002, after an 
appropriate authorisation procedure. The scope of bond market instruments 
started to be expanded around this time: first central bank bonds and then bonds 
issued by financial and non-financial corporations appeared on the market, and 
in 2005 the first panda bonds were issued. In 2010, in the spirit of the gradual 
opening up, access to the interbank bond market was granted to central banks, 
supranational institutions and sovereign wealth funds. The RMB clearing banks 
based in Hong Kong and Macau and banks engaged in offshore RMB settlements 
linked to trading activities were also allowed to enter the market at this time. From 
2011 a predetermined group of foreign institutional investors were allowed to enter 
the onshore bond market using renminbi funds, in a quantitative quota system.
4.1. issuers and traded instruments
A wide range of instruments are available on the Chinese onshore market. Most 
of the bond portfolio is comprised of government bonds, which also include 
bonds issued by local governments. In addition, a substantial segment of the bond 
market consists of bonds issued by the three state-owned development banks 
(so-called policy banks). Up until 2013, the bonds issued by the Chinese central 
bank comprised a major portion of the existing bond portfolio and the trading on 
the secondary market, but they have lost their market share, possibly because 
there have been no issues since 2013 (IMF 2015). Commercial bank bonds consist 
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of a large variety of instruments, including hybrid bonds. In addition to the issues 
by the public and financial sectors, the onshore market also offers bonds from the 
non-financial sector. Both state-owned enterprises and private sector companies are 
permitted to issue bonds. Currently, asset-backed securities and the panda bonds 
issued by foreign institutions only comprise an infinitesimal part of the market. The 
modest share of panda bonds may be mostly attributable to regulatory factors. In 
2015, foreign financial institutions were also permitted to issue panda bonds, which 
– in addition to the inclusion of the renminbi in the SDR basket – may provide new 
momentum to the market.
From the perspective of the bond market’s development, having an appropriate 
amount of securities at all investment horizons and having available instruments 
in as many maturity segments as possible are key aspects. Examining the onshore 
market from this angle, it can be stated that the issued amount can be typically 
considered even over the 1–10-year horizon, while in the segment with maturities of 
more than 10 years most of the issuers are sovereign players, and over the horizon 
shorter than 1 year the supply on the primary market is also lower.
Figure 5
Portfolio of onshore bond market instruments (RMB billion), december 2015
Corporate bonds**
Non-bank financial institution bonds
Commercial bank bonds*













* Also includes bonds marked as Tier 2 instruments in the CCDC statistics
** Also includes bonds marked as MTN and SME bonds in the CCDC statistics
Source: Based on data from CCDC (2016)
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The Chinese state and the development banks play a dominant role in developing 
the bond market. These issuers are represented at all maturities with considerable 
issues. Examining the individual bond market instruments based on their typical 
maturities, the following can be stated. ABSs and MBSs are typically short-term 
bonds (mainly with maturities of up to 3 years). The majority of corporate bonds 
offer a medium-term investment (5–7 years), while commercial banks and other 
financial institutions typically issue longer-term bonds (with maturities over 
7 years).
Figure 6
Onshore market bond issues by maturities (RMB billion), 2015
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Examining the opportunities offered by the secondary market, it can be stated 
that the dominant segment comprises bonds with maturities of 1–3 years, while 
a substantial amount of bonds is available in the 5–7-year and the 3–5-year 
segments as well. The largest amount of securities available at these maturities 
are government securities and bonds issued by state-owned development banks. 
In the case of the private sector, the largest supply is in the 1–3-year segment. For 
investors looking for a long-term investment it must be pointed out that in the 
segment with maturities over 7 years, bonds issued by commercial banks may offer 
the best investment alternative to public sector issues. For investors looking for 
a short-term investment (e.g. money market funds) it should be noted that in the 
segment of the secondary market with maturities shorter than 1 year the largest 
supply is in the bonds issued by state-owned development banks.
Figure 7
Typical maturities of the different bond types, onshore bond issues in 2015
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4.1.1. Corporate bond market
Developing the Chinese corporate bond market is a priority for the Chinese 
authorities. Currently, bank financing plays a central role in corporate finance, but 
the acquisition of funds from the bond market may provide a sort of protection in 
the case of potential banking system problems (e.g. system-wide increase in lending 
risks, rise in the NPL ratio).
The two major segments on the corporate bond market are bonds issued by state-
owned enterprises and medium-term notes (MTN) offered by non-state-owned 
corporations. Most of the corporate bonds were issued on the offshore market 
and denominated in USD (BIS 2014). Onshore corporate bond issues have recently 
gained renewed momentum, which may have been due to the decreasing onshore 
interest rates, and this means a cheaper source of finance for companies when 
compared to offshore financing. One of the notable characteristics of onshore 
corporate issues is that issuers must be rated by Chinese credit rating agencies. 
The rating practice of these agencies is peculiar insofar as it includes a grade (AAA+) 
above the AAA rating – which is usually the best one on other markets – awarded 
to a handful of larger Chinese corporations. It should be noted that the local rating 
Figure 8
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agencies gave an AAA rating to 77% of the issuers on the corporate bond market 
(BNP 2015a).
4.2. investors
Non-Chinese residents currently have restricted access to the onshore bond market. 
This is also reflected by the investor side of the bond market. The proportion of 
foreign investors is at present negligible, hovering around 1.5–2%. Most of Chinese 
onshore bonds are held by commercial banks. The major holders of the existing 
bond portfolio include Chinese fund managers and insurance corporations as well. 
Of the former, the role of money market funds has increased in the past 10 years, as 
by 2015, 35% of all the assets managed by investment funds were in money market 
funds. The internationalisation of the renminbi is expected to attract the interest of 
international fund managers as well, and for them, similar to their Chinese peers, 
the bonds issued by development banks may be the most alluring (BNP 2015).
Examining the segments of the onshore bond market it can be stated that banks, 
although they are among the major holders in the case of all instruments, mainly 
hold substantial shares of over 50% in government securities and bonds issued by 
state-owned development banks. The holdings of commercial banks on the market 
for government securities is so substantial that they almost crowd out the other 
participants from the world’s seventh largest government bond market.
Figure 9






















Source: Based on data from CCDC (2016)
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However, in the case of private sector issues, the largest investors are Chinese 
fund managers, as they hold the bulk of corporate bonds. In addition, they are 
present on the market for commercial bank bonds as investors with a weight 
similar to commercial banks. Brokerage firms principally appear as investors on the 
corporate bond market. The share of foreign investors is the largest on the market 
for government securities, but it is still negligible relative to the size of the market.
4.3. Liquidity
By virtue of being larger and offering more issues, the onshore market is more 
liquid than the offshore market. Nevertheless, the markets for the different types 
of bonds have different liquidities, and in the case of certain bond types increasing 
secondary market liquidity may represent the next step in market development.
Almost three quarters of the trading volume on the secondary bond market can be 
linked to commercial banks, and in addition to these institutions, the trading activity 
of fund managers and brokerage firms can be considered significant.
Examining the instruments traded, it can be stated that the bonds issued by 
development banks are the most liquid: transactions in these securities comprise 
more than 50% of bond market trading. In addition to these, government bonds 
and corporate bonds are among the most liquid instruments.
Figure 10
investors of the major onshore bond types, december 2015
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The study by Ma and Yao (2016) identifies several factors behind the higher 
secondary market liquidity of development bank bonds as compared to government 
securities. Development bank bonds are quasi-sovereign issues, and issuers also 
attest greater significance to capital market needs. In the case of the bonds issued 
by development banks, issues are more frequent, which increases the availability 
of so-called on-the-run issues which can be considered more liquid in general. 
Furthermore, a larger share of development bank issues is concentrated on the 
short end of the yield curve, which also points towards higher liquidity. Additionally, 
development bank bond issues include more bond types than government bonds. 
Finally, the authors also cite taxation as a factor in the lower liquidity of government 
bonds: the interest income from government bonds is exempt from taxation, 
while price appreciation gains are taxed, which encourages bondholders to hold 
government bonds until maturity.
In their study, the economists of the New York Fed (Bai et al. 2013) examine 
the secondary market liquidity of government securities and find that although 
bonds are traded on a daily basis, trading activity is not yet as intense as to enable 
price developments to reflect the most up-to-date information in line with the 
efficient market hypothesis. Examining the relationship between the individual 
characteristics of bonds and their secondary market liquidity, the authors find that 
issues with higher coupon rates, larger issue sizes, longer maturities and more 
recent issuance can be characterised by higher secondary market liquidity. 
The typical transaction size on the market for government securities and 
development bank bonds is between RMB 10 and 100 million, while the typical 
bid–offer spread is between 1 and 10 basis points. The average daily volume of 
secondary market trading on the market for government securities with maturities 
Figure 1















Source: Based on data from CCDC (2016)
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of less than a year is RMB 10–20 billion, while on the market for government bonds 
and development bank bonds it is RMB 20–30 billion (Liu–Pihlman 2015).
In relation to the Chinese onshore market for government securities, it should 
be noted that although in terms of its size it is the seventh largest market 
globally, it lags behind the world’s leading bond markets in some respects. First, 
secondary market activity is substantially more subdued, which is probably due 
to the dominance of buy-and-hold investors (Income Partners 2014). Second, the 
proportion of international investors is low. However, the Chinese efforts aimed 
at the internationalisation of the renminbi are expected to bring about changes 
in this. The appearance of foreign institutional investors on the Chinese onshore 
market may also be supported by the fact that in early 2016 the Chinese authorities 
considerably loosened the rules regulating their entry to the market. This may offer 
further opportunities to Hungarian institutional investors as well.
4.4. Market infrastructure and regulation
The onshore bond market can be accessed without restrictions by Chinese residents, 
while among foreign investors access has only been granted to central banks, 
sovereign wealth funds and supranational institutions. Other participants wishing 
to enter the onshore bond market are faced with various quantitative restrictions. 
Therefore, foreign investors are relatively new on the onshore market, and in view 
of the administrative requirements still in place despite the gradual elimination 
of restrictions, it can be often easier for them to enter the market by cooperating 
with a domestic institution.
Figure 12














* Also includes bonds classified as Tier 2 instruments in the CCDC statistics
** Also includes bonds classified as MTN and SME bonds in the CCDC statistics
Source: Based on data from CCDC (2016)
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On the primary market, Chinese bonds are sold within the framework of an auction 
or book building. Government securities, central bank bonds and development 
bank bonds are issued at auctions, while in the case of the rest of the bonds book 
building is undertaken (Liao 2011).
The secondary market trading of Chinese bonds happens on the stock exchange 
and on the off-exchange market. The latter can be divided into two segments: 
the interbank and the OTC markets. (While the OTC market is sometimes used 
as a synonym for the interbank market, in Chinese bond market parlance the 
OTC market means the segment of the off-exchange market where non-financial 
institutions participate (secondary OTC market), and the interbank market is the 
segment of the off-exchange market that can only be accessed by banks (primary 
OTC market).) Trading on the onshore market is carried out on the stock exchanges 
of Shanghai and Shenzhen.
A major portion of the trading in Chinese bonds (more than 90%) is carried 
out on the interbank market, to which, for a long time, only Chinese banks had 
access. Thus, financial institutions with access only to stock exchange trading 
were at a disadvantage compared to those financial institutions that accessed the 
interbank market as well. The fact that access is provided to the interbank market 
demonstrates the relaxation of bond market regulations, and the partial opening-up 
of the bond market (and thus the capital account as well). This may also support the 
efforts aimed at the internationalisation of the RMB, as it enables access to a wider 
range of RMB-denominated bonds for a wider range of investors.
In addition to the Chinese investors, access to the interbank market was first granted 
to central banks, sovereign wealth funds and supranational institutions. For other 
foreign financial institutions, access to the Chinese bond market is possible by 
acquiring the QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor) or RQFII (Renminbi 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor) status and the relevant quotas (see Section 
4.6.2 for more on QFII and RQFII status).
Bond market trading was launched on the Shanghai stock exchange in 1990, and 
then in 1997 the interbank bond market was established by banning commercial 
banks from trading bonds on the stock exchange. In a similar fashion, foreign 
participants with QFII status were initially allowed to trade bonds on the stock 
exchange, and then in 2012 they were permitted to invest on the interbank market. 
Investors with RQFII status gained access to the interbank bond market in 2013 
(FTSE 2015).
On the interbank market, banks and institutional investors are allowed to trade 
(including central banks, the institutions holding QFII and RQFII quotas, sovereign 
wealth funds and supranational institutions), and in addition to bonds, repo and 
forward transactions are also available. On the non-interbank segment of the off-
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exchange market, commercial banks act as market makers in government bonds 
for private individuals and non-financial institutions (companies). On the stock 
exchange, banks and private individuals are allowed to trade, and in addition to 
government securities and corporate bonds, repo and bond futures transactions 
are available (Li 2015).
The regulation and oversight of the onshore bond market’s interbank segment is 
performed by the People’s Bank of China (PBC). Bond trading is carried out through 
the CFETS system, while the settlement of the bond transactions is implemented 
by the China Central Depository and Clearing Co. (CCDC) or the Shanghai Clearing 
House (SCH) (Li 2015). Stock exchange bond trading is overseen by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). All four regulatory bodies take part in 
the regulation and oversight of the panda bond market. Panda bonds are only 
available on the interbank market.
4.5. Role of the Chinese onshore bond market in the internationalisation of the 
renminbi
The internationalisation of the renminbi is fostered by its use as a settlement 
currency in international commercial relations as well as its inclusion in the SDR 
basket. The internationalisation of the Chinese currency assumes the widespread use 
of the renminbi. This goal can be achieved if as many international participants as 
possible hold renminbi instruments, including renminbi-denominated bonds. These 
may be either offshore or onshore instruments. Therefore, the 2007 establishment 
of the offshore bond market was a step towards the internationalisation of the 
renminbi. Opening up a larger a segment of the onshore bond market for more and 
more non-Chinese investors may also strengthen the global role of the renminbi. 
Steps to this effect have already been taken, but not all market segments are 
accessible for non-Chinese investors. In addition, there are quantitative restrictions 
that limit the bond market share of non-Chinese investors. The gradual elimination 
of the restrictions and gradual opening-up of the market may help the renminbi in 
becoming a global currency.
According to Ma and Yao (2016), in addition to the regulation, monetary policy may 
also foster the Chinese bond market’s support for the internationalisation of the 
renminbi. Currently, more than 60 per cent of onshore market bonds are held by 
commercial banks. Banks’ bond market share and demand for bonds is explained 
by the RRR rate. In order to meet the reserve requirements, Chinese banks create 
permanent, substantial demand for Chinese onshore bonds. With the reduction 
of the RRR4 rate, a considerable portion of the bond market supply would become 
freely available, as in the context of a lower RRR rate the bond market demand of 
4  RRR = reserve requirement ratio, the reserve ratio of commercial banks required by central banks. Through 
the RRR rate, the central bank can influence the amount of free liquidity available in the banking system 
(among other things).
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commercial banks would be weaker, which would allow non-Chinese investors to 
gain ground.
The extent to which Chinese bond markets can support the internationalisation of 
the renminbi depends not only on the Chinese regulations but also on other factors 
influencing the demand generated by international investors. Three key factors are 
mentioned (Luk–Chen 2015) which may boost the demand of foreign investors on 
the Chinese onshore bond market: China’s credit rating has improved significantly 
in recent years (according to the S&P’s rating, it is currently in the AA- category), 
Chinese bonds offer higher yields than other large, mature bond markets, and the 
low correlation of the renminbi instruments with the bond markets of developed 
countries provides a diversification advantage for international portfolio managers. 
According to JP Morgan’s analysis, between 2005 and 2015 the correlation 
coefficients of the US, Japanese and German bond markets calculated on the basis 
of the yields offered by the 10-year government bonds were extremely high, ranging 
above 80%. By contrast, yields on the Chinese and US long-term bonds showed 
a correlation of only 12%, while Chinese and German 10-year government securities 
showed 8%, and the correlation with the Japanese market was negative (–9%).
The study by the Finnish central bank (Ma–Yao 2016) examines the conditions for 
the internationalisation of the Chinese bond market, especially the government 
securities market. The study also points out the role of the exchange rate. The 
authors attempt to determine the conditions that would enable the currently 
seventh largest government securities market in the world to become the third 
largest globally. The study concludes that in terms of size, convergence with the US 
government securities market until 2020 is not a realistic scenario. However, it may 
be a realistic goal to catch up with the bond markets of Japan, the United Kingdom 
or the European Union. Assuming a 5 per cent average annual growth rate for the 
10 largest government bond markets (except for the Chinese) and a 10 per cent 
annual growth rate for the Chinese government securities market, and assuming 
that the renminbi will appreciate 1.5 per cent against the USD annually, the size of 
the Chinese government securities market may double by 2020 compared to its size 
in 2015. This would make the government securities market the third largest in the 
world, but according to the projections, the existing bond portfolio would amount 
to a third of the Japanese market and 16 per cent of the US market. Based on the 
claims of the study, one might ask how these figures would change if the renminbi 
weakened. Since the end of 2015 the renminbi’s exchange rate has been volatile 
and it has depreciated considerably against the USD, although it remained relatively 
stable compared to the newly introduced CFETS index.5 The exchange rate may be 
5  An index introduced by the Chinese authorities in December 2015. Its value reflects the exchange rate of the 
onshore renminbi based on the trade figures for China’s 13 largest trading partners. The index is published 
by the China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS) at intervals not previously determined.
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a risk factor that could materially influence the interest of international investors 
in the Chinese bond market, and thus it may also impact the role of the Chinese 
currency in international financial transactions.
Yet the study is not pessimistic with regard to the chances of the Chinese bond 
market. Examining the volume of trading on the bond market in an international 
context, the authors find that development bank bonds, the volume of trading of 
which on the secondary market is double that of the government securities, may 
contribute to the strengthening of the renminbi’s international role. Nonetheless, 
the authors also point out that the development of the secondary market for 
government bonds and increasing market liquidity should be key aspects, since 
a liquid secondary government securities market is necessary for the establishment 
of reliable bond market benchmarks that may facilitate the appropriate pricing of 
other instruments and thus boost the demand for them.
4.6. Opportunities for foreign investors on the onshore market
4.6.1. Central banks
Central banks enjoy a special status with Chinese authorities, and they are 
considered key investors on the onshore market. This is because one of the goals of 
the government to promote the Chinese currency is to make the renminbi a global 
reserve currency in central bank reserves.
If foreign central banks wish to invest on the onshore market, they have two options 
to do so. They can either enter the market directly after submitting a registration 
form to the Chinese central bank, or they can gain exposure in onshore Chinese 
bonds indirectly, through the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which is 
similar to an open-end investment fund created for central banks. Until July 2015, 
foreign central banks were also required to hold the pre-authorised quotas if they 
wanted to enter the onshore market, but this was abolished by the Chinese central 
bank, which simplified the investment process. Central banks can choose whether 
they wish the Chinese central bank or a commercial bank active on the Chinese 
interbank bond market to act as a trading and settlement agent for them. The task 
of the trading agent is to conclude and record the transaction in the trading system 
(CFETS), which is then transferred to the clearing system (CCDC/SCH). The task of 
the settlement agent is to compare the details of the transactions concluded with 
the data in the trading system, to record them in the clearing system and to perform 
the money and securities transfers. The central banks investing in the investment 
fund of the BIS actually invest on the Chinese onshore market at the expense of 
the quota allocated to the BIS. The fund invests the collected capital in line with 
predetermined policies, and charges a fee for its services. This option is primarily 
used central banks which are only beginning to familiarise themselves with the 
Chinese bond market, but wish to gain exposure in their reserves.
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4.6.2. Foreign institutional investors
Financial institutions can enter the Chinese onshore bond market under two 
different programmes. In both cases they can gain access to securities on the stock 
exchange and on the interbank market as well (and may trade shares in addition 
to bonds).
Access can be gained by securing QFII or RQFII status. The basic difference between 
the two options is that while QFII status can be requested by any foreign bank or 
institutional investor (insurance corporations, brokerage firms, fund managers), 
only offshore renminbi centres (typically countries) receive quotas from the Chinese 
central bank within the framework of the RQFII programme. Institutions that wish 
to enter the market as investors can indicate their intention to invest at the expense 
of this quota. Entering the onshore bond market at the expense of the RQFII quota 
has been possible since 2011. In view of the fact that Hungary has RQFII quotas for 
Hungarian financial institutions, RQFII status may present a new opportunity for 
entering the Chinese securities market.
The QFII quotas are set in USD, while the RQFII quotas are set in RMB. Investors 
with QFII status transfer USD to the onshore market, then convert it to renminbi 
and carry out investments with that. Investors with RQFII status gain exposure on 
the onshore market by utilising their offshore renminbi. The latter programme 
basically helps to channel back to the onshore market the renminbi accumulated on 
the offshore market. Meanwhile, the goal of the former scheme is also to generate 
capital inflows, but in foreign currency that is converted to renminbi on the onshore 
market. The heightened fears at the turn of 2015 and 2016 due to the capital flight 
from China and the efforts to enhance the likelihood of the inclusion of the Chinese 
bond market in the benchmark index followed by large international fund managers 
may have contributed to the fact that in early 2016 several measures were taken 
to relax the rules regulating the entry to the onshore bond market. As a first step, 
the maximum amount of investment permitted to investors with QFII status was 
raised from USD 1 billion to 5 billion, after which the PBC enabled a larger group of 
financial institutional investors to enter the interbank bond market through Chinese 
commercial banks. At this time not only the scope of investors was expanded, the 
administrative conditions were also relaxed (PBC 2016).
Investors can enter the Chinese onshore securities market through a custodian bank 
(which is also authorised for clearing in the case of bond market investment). The 
bank obtains the necessary permissions and performs the required registration at 
the competent Chinese authorities on behalf of the foreign institutional investors. 
In order to gain access to the onshore bond market, institutional investors must 
fulfil several conditions, for example that in the three years prior to the investment 
on the onshore market, the competent regulatory authority should not impose 
a penalty on them for infringing on the laws governing bond market activity or 
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other regulations (PBC 2016). For those applying for QFII or RQFII and quotas and 
fulfilling the criteria, the central bank had previously set a fixed quota, but since 
early 2016 fund managers can enter the Chinese market based not on a fixed quota 
but on a percentage of the wealth managed by them. This requires authorisation 
from not only the central bank but also from the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE). In addition, stock exchange trading is only permitted with an 
authorisation from the China Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC). When 
the necessary permits are obtained, an account is opened, then transactions can 
start through commercial banks authorised for trading on the bond market and 
through brokerage firms on the stock exchange. Although the process may seem 
complicated at first, investors can basically enter the market in a one-stop-shop 
system, through the appropriate commercial banks.
5. Summary
The article presented the onshore and offshore segments of the Chinese bond 
market, analysing in detail both the supply and the demand side, the scope of 
available instruments, the bond market regulations and the basic characteristics 
of the markets. Examining the bond market in the context of the Chinese policy 
focusing on the internationalisation of the RMB, it can be stated that this political 
effort may point towards a higher proportion of foreign investors on the Chinese 
bond market.
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Dániel Homolya
Relying on the database of the European Banking Authority (EBA), the article 
analyses the relationship between firm size and the selected risk methodology 
(credit, market and operational risk). Based on the analysis, larger institutions are 
more inclined to apply more advanced approaches.1 While this is a favourable trend 
from a systemic risk perspective, according to statistical tests (Wilcoxon test), there 
is no evidence that the shift toward more advanced approaches was more intensive 
in the period between 2008 and 2010 than between 2010 and 2013, even if banks’ 
attention presumably turned to other tasks in an effort to mitigate the consequences 
of the economic and financial crisis and in consideration of the significant regulatory 
changes.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Classification: G21, G32
Keywords: risk management, banking sector, capital requirement calculation 
methods
1. introduction
Modern bank regulations and internal considerations have led financial institutions 
to increasingly focus their attention on risk management. While credit and market 
risks took centre stage in the 1990s, in the early/mid 2000s operational risk also 
came into the limelight. It is, therefore, worth exploring the common features of 
the institutions that apply more advanced risk measurement approaches. Under 
the Basel II / CRD regulation effective from 1 January 2008 (currently the Basel 
III / CRR regulation and directive), all financial institutions across the European 
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Union are required to hold capital to guard against various key risks they face. 
The primary focus of this analysis is on Pillar 1 capital requirements, i.e. the 
minimum capital requirements for credit risk, market risk and operational risk. 
Obviously, Pillar 2 capital requirements also address these key risks, but for the 
purposes of this analysis the term “Pillar 1” is used – in accordance with the 
database of the European Banking Authority (EBA) on which this paper is based 
(EBA 2015), because Pillar 1 minimum capital requirements concentrate exclusively 
on these three key risks (market risk, credit risk and operational risk).
Capital formation is intended to guard against losses faced by deposit holders 
or the creditors of banks, as all three key risks imply the possibility of incurring 
certain losses. The literature on risk management defines credit risk as the risk 
of loss stemming from a borrower’s failure to repay a loan, while market risk is 
understood as the risk of losses arising from movements in the market prices 
of financial instruments. Operational risk, in turn, is defined as the risk of losses 
incurred for inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems, or from 
external events.
With respect to all three key risks, the regulator expects the application of 
adequate capital allocation methods, which may range from fairly simple methods 
to advanced, model-based approaches. More specifically, the advanced approach 
is the Internal Model Approach (IMA) for market risk and the Internal Ratings 
Based Approach (IRB) for credit risk. As regards operational risk, simple methods 
imply the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) or The Standardised Approach (TSA), 
while the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) represents the advanced 
approach. The method selection of credit institutions can be influenced by several 
factors: the expected reduction of the capital to risk-weighted assets ratio and 
the commensurate increase in the potential profitability of credit institutions may 
encourage them to select more advanced approaches. However, the costliness 
and time-consuming nature of the implementation of more advanced methods, 
the difficulties involved in obtaining supervisory approval and the possible cycle 
amplification effect of the chosen approach may deter institutions from the 
application of more advanced methods. This paper provides an overview of the 
methods selected at the European level2 and examines the extent to which firm 
size may influence risk methods. After a review of the relevant literature, the article 
presents the method selection for the three key risks, before analysing the trends 
observed during changeovers to the advanced approaches in 2008–2010 and in 
2010–2013.
2  Based on the EBA database.
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2. Review of the relevant literature
Only a few papers address the relationship between institution size and risk 
management practice in the relevant literature. Although there are a number of 
analyses (e.g. BIS 2009a; BIS 2009b) outlining general best practices, they do not 
offer an explanation of the underlying motives. In an early phase of operational risk 
management (1998–2001), Helbok and Wagner (2006) found that less profitable 
institutions chose a higher level of disclosure in their operational risk profile and 
operational risk management practices. According to the authors, the rationale 
behind this is that highly profitable institutions are less “dependent” on higher 
transparency, whereas lower capitalised banks expect to improve outsiders’ 
perception of the institution by more advanced risk management practices and by 
a higher level of voluntary disclosure. Although OpRisk & Compliance (2008 and 
2009) presents a database that includes the operational risk management practices 
and approaches of the largest 100 banks, these articles do not offer a detailed 
statistical analysis. Earlier research highlighted the positive correlation between the 
exposure to operational risk loss and firm size (see, for example, Dahen and Dionne 
[2010] or Na et al. [2005]). Homolya (2013) drew the same conclusion regarding 
operational risk loss on a Hungarian sample, also adding that institution size and 
the level of advancement of the applied operational risk approaches correlated 
positively both on the international and the Hungarian sample.
3. data and methodology
This study relies on data included in the database of the European Banking Authority 
(EBA 2015).3 The database includes separate spreadsheets for individual years 
(currently for the period of 2007–2013), for the following data types: core statistical 
data, credit risk, operational risk, market risk data, and supervisory actions and 
measures. The main descriptive data of the database are presented in Table 1 below. 
Data for 2007 cannot be evaluated yet as the changeover to Basel II regulations 
was optional at the time. The topic could be investigated more easily with access to 
more detailed databases (credit institution level data), but the relevant databases 
(e.g. SNL, S&P Capital IQ) do not contain information which would lend itself to 
systematic analysis for the method selection. Consequently, future research should 
be based on an independently compiled database derived from annual reports. 
For lack of more detailed data, this study concentrates on systemic-level trends.
3  The database covers 31 European countries (member states of the European Economic Area (EEA), which 
is in the scope of the CRD/CRR regulation), of which 28 are EU Member States, and the remaining three 
comprise: Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein. 
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Table 1
descriptive statistics of the supervisory disclosure database of EBA
descriptive statistics 2008 2010 2013
Total assets (mn €) 45 309 818 42 444 016 42 074 134
Total GDP (mn €) 11 502 644 12 706 891 13 019 818
Number of institutions 7 134 6900 6 580
Total capital requirements (mn €) 1 428 664 1 291 324 1 159 049
Total capital (mn €) 3 836 448 3 930 917 4 038 221
Tier 1 capital (mn €) 2 943 868 3 325 189 3 597 567
Tier 2 capital (mn €) 1 122 282 750 888 442 136
CAR (%) 21.50% 24.40% 27.90%
Total asset/ GDP (%) 394% 334% 323%
Source: EBA (own calculation)
As shown in Table 1, banks’ balance sheets contracted significantly between 
2008 and 2013 as a result of the institutions’ deleveraging efforts, which was 
accompanied by an improvement both in capital adequacy and in the quality of 
capital (i.e. a shift to Tier 1 capital) across the European banking sector.
Although data are also disclosed by investment firms, since they represent a lesser 
weight compared to financial intermediation as a whole, this analysis focuses on 
the data supplied by credit institutions. In the coming chapters simple descriptive 
statistics and visual inspections are used to analyse the methodological changeovers 
observed in 2008–2010 and 2010–2013. This is followed by the presentation of 
a number of statistical tests (sign test, Wilcoxon signed-rank test of the relevant 
samples). Finally, it is important to note that the quality of the EBA data falls short of 
expectations. The database required a great deal of data cleansing4 before a dataset 
suitable for adequate analysis was produced.
4. Results
The aggregate result demonstrates that the dominant part of the total capital 
requirement is the portion earmarked for credit risks. This is consistent with the 
primary objective of the banking sector, which is to mediate between savings and 
borrowings (Table 2). At the same time, in terms of general trends, the capital 
allocation for market risk has increased somewhat since 2008. On the one hand, 
this trend may be related to active market and investment services activity, which 
4  In the context of data cleansing, firstly, discrepancies in magnitude we corrected (e.g. where 20 was shown 
instead of 20 per cent). Secondly, we checked outliers in the time series and thirdly, where ratios did not add 
up to 100 per cent when they should have, we scaled the figures up to 100 per cent to ensure consistency.
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picked up once again following a trough during the 2008 crisis; on the other hand, 
it may also reflect increased market volatility.
Table 2
distribution of own fund requirements under Pillar 1 – European average 
(unweighted)
2008 2010 2013
Market risk part 3.00% 3.20% 3.30%
Operational risk part 7.60% 8.70% 9.50%
Credit risk part 89.50% 88.10% 87.20%
Source: EBA (own calculation)
As shown by Table 3, the internal model-based approach cannot be considered 
dominant for any of the three key risk types, neither in terms of institution 
number nor solvency capital requirements. However, its share based on own funds 
requirements is higher than its share based by number for all three risk types, which 
suggests that larger institutions are more inclined to apply more advanced methods. 
As regards market risk, the higher share of the more advanced approach can be 
attributed to the duration of its application, which is longer than in the case of credit 
risk and operational risk as the advanced method was available as early as Basel 
I in the case of market risk. This, however, should not be considered the primary 
reason in itself. The real appeal of market risk approaches may lay in the fact that in 
the case of this risk type, model calculations are supported by high-quality, publicly 
available market time series and a standardised pricing approach and hence they 
are associated with distributions that can be adequately estimated by Value at Risk 
(VaR) models. Application of the advanced Internal Model Approach (IMA) for market 
risk declined between 2008 and 2010, presumably in response to the crisis-related 
default or restructuring of certain institutions which had previously applied advanced 
measurement approaches (e.g. Lehman Brothers, Dexia, Fortis). Headline numbers 
indicate that the switch to more advanced methods was far more pronounced 
between 2008 and 2010 than between 2010 and 2013 (change in own funds 
requirement percentage share: +5.9 percentage points vs. +3.1 percentage points for 
credit risk; +9.5 percentage points vs. +4.2 percentage points for operational risk). At 
the same time, it should be noted that a more detailed, country-level analysis would 
be needed for testing the relationship on a more robust statistical basis. The sub-
chapters below include a more detailed analysis of these relationships for each risk 
type, in certain cases, broken down by country. Importantly, the analysis is essentially 
based on the assumption that a higher own funds requirements percentage share of 
a given approach points to a larger size proportion as well, although this assumption 
might be weakened by the fact that the capital requirement share may also be 
distorted by special factors (e.g. the special nature of the activity or the higher 
exposure of special institutions to certain risk categories).
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Table 3
distribution of the selected capital requirement calculation approach by number 
and by level of own funds requirements (unweighted averages)
Method choice 2008 2010 2013
Market risk IMA By number 31% 23% 19%
By own fund req. 34% 27% 32%
Credit risk IRB By number 13% 12% 13%
By own fund req. 30% 35% 39%
Operational Risk AMA By number 5% 6% 6%
By own fund req. 8% 18% 22%
Source: EBA (own calculation)
4.1. Market risk
As mentioned above, based on unweighted average, the share of capital allocation 
for market risk was 3 per cent in 2008 and 3.3 per cent in 2013. Higher percentages 
were only observed in certain countries. In the United Kingdom, for example, the 
larger share can be explained by the depth of financial markets and banks’ strong 
presence in such markets, while the relatively high share recorded in Lithuania 
Figure 1
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appears to contradict our assumption and the outlier might merely stem from the 
data quality of the EBA database. In the Hungarian banking sector, the percentage 
of capital requirements for market risk exceeded the average recorded for the 
31 European countries (EEA Member states, which are in the scope of CRD/CRR 
regulation) of the EBA database in all three years (at 4.1 per cent in 2013).
As shown in Figure 2, most banks applied the standardised approach in capital 
allocation for market risk. In many countries, the standardised approach was applied 
exclusively in 2013: in addition to Hungary, this was the case in Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and Slovenia, for example. Based 
on own funds requirements, the share of banks using the standardised approach 
falls short of the number-based percentage, which suggests that banks relying on the 
Internal Model Approach (IMA) are larger in size (with larger exposures to market 
risk). Starting from 2008, a diverging movement can be observed: application of the 
standardised approach increased in certain countries and declined in others. With 
respect to the exclusive use of the standardised approach in Hungary, it should be 
mentioned that in its recent presentation for bank risk managers, the MNB indicated, 
as a lesson learnt from the SREP reviews, that a more broad-based application of 
the Pillar 1 advanced market risk measurement approach would be desirable.5
4.2. Credit risk
As indicated above, credit risk represents a dominant share in the capital 
requirement. Its unweighted average share was 89.5 per cent in 2008, 88.1 per 
cent in 2010 and 87.2 per cent in 2013. Individual countries do not exhibit significant 
5  PRMIA presentation – Old and new supervisory instruments of the central bank – SREP findings, expected 
methodological changes and the new instruments of the central bank, Budapest, 23 April 2015.
Figure 2
distribution of banks applying the standardised approach for market risk based on 
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dispersion in this regard (Figure 3). In the Hungarian banking sector, the percentage 
share of own funds requirements for credit risk fell short of the European average 
of the EBA database in the review period.
Most banks apply the standardised STA approach for credit risk, both in terms of 
number and size (capital requirement). Between 2008 and 2013, application of the 
Internal Ratings Based Approach (IRB) increased: (percentage by number: –12.7% 
in 2008, –11.5% in 2010, –12.7% in 2013; percentage by own funds requirement: 
–30% in 2008, –35% in 2010, –39% in 2013): diverging (up and down) movements 
could be observed during the period, and it appears that changeover to the IRB 
approach decelerated somewhat between 2010 and 2013. Based on own funds 
requirements, the ratio of banks applying the IRB approach is higher than based 
on number, which points to the larger size of more advanced IRB banks. Similarly, 
in the Hungarian banking sector the own funds based share of banks using the 
IRB approach exceeds the number based share; at the same time, however, in the 
Hungarian banking sector the percentage of banks applying the IRB approach rose 
continuously in the review period of 2008–2013 (percentage by number: 1% in 2008 
and 4% in 2013; percentage by own funds requirement: 2008: 14%, 2013: 38%). 
Obviously, these proportions can be also influenced by other factors. For instance, 
countries with a more extensive lending history may have a stronger background 
for more advanced credit risk approaches.
Figure 3
























































































Based on the unweighted average, the share of operational risk in capital 
requirements amounted to 7.6 per cent in 2008 and 9.5 per cent in 2013. The 
dispersion in the ratio of capital requirements for operational risk to total capital 
requirements is smaller than observed in the case of market risk. The higher ratio 
observed in Central European countries (including Hungary) can be attributed to the 
need to prepare for higher risk with higher income, which, in turn, has an impact 
on capital requirements as the basis of capital requirements is gross income in 
the case of more basic methods (which can be roughly defined as income before 
impairments and amortisation). Moreover, for operational risk the calculation is 
based on the average gross income of the last three years; therefore, any decline 
in gross income only materialises gradually. By contrast, in the case of credit risk, 
actual exposure is considered and thus changes materialise immediately.
Application of the Advanced Measurement Approach increased only gradually in the 
review period. The expansion, however, was more subdued in the 2010–2013 period 
than between 2008 and 2010. According to 2013 data, in terms of the number of 
institutions, the majority of banks apply BIA, i.e. the simplest approach (BIA: 72%, 
TSA: 23%, AMA: 7%), while in terms of capital requirements, most banks rely on 
the standardised approach (BIA: 28%, TSA: 50%, AMA: 23%). There was a clear 
shift towards the more advanced AMA approach (percentage share based on the 
number of institutions: 2008: 4.8%, 2010: 5.8%, 2013: 6.4%; percentage share based 
on capital requirements: 2008: 8.1%, 2010: 17.7%, 2013: 21.9%). Moreover, as 
the ratio of banks applying the advanced AMA approach is higher on the basis of 
capital requirements than based on number, we may conclude that banks relying 
Figure 4
distribution of banks applying the internal Ratings Based Approach for credit risk 
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on the advanced AMA approach are larger. Between 2010 and 2013, changeover 
to the AMA approach slowed. Similarly, in the Hungarian banking sector, the own 
funds based share of banks using the AMA approach exceeds the number based 
share. However, in line with the average EU trend, the percentage of banks applying 
the AMA approach also rose continuously in the Hungarian banking sector until it 
exceeded the level of the EU average (percentage by number: 2008: 1%, 2013: 6%; 
percentage by own funds requirement: 2008: 0%, 2013: 38%) (Figure 6). Obviously, 
these proportions can also be influenced by other factors. For instance, countries 
with more extensive operational risk databases may have a stronger background 
for more advanced operational risk approaches.
As mentioned above in Part 2, during the review of the literature, Dahen and 
Dionne (2010), Na et al. (2005) and Homolya (2013) provide an overview of the 
positive correlation between bank size and operational risks (larger institutions face 
higher operational risk loss exposures, which is essentially driven by frequency). 
In consideration of the potentially higher operational risk loss exposure of larger 
institutions, it is particularly relevant to determine whether or not larger institutions 
select more advanced approaches.
Figure 5
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4.4. Statistical testing of the methodological changeover between 2008 and 
2013 and testing of the deceleration in changeover by comparing the periods of 
2008–2010 and 2010–2013
This sub-chapter tests the hypothesis according to which the higher share of 
institutions applying the advanced method in 2013 compared to 2008 was statistically 
significant. In addition, the analysis is also intended to investigate whether or not the 
switch to the advanced approach decelerated after 2010. For the purposes of statistical 
testing, in addition to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, the sign tests of the related 
samples – as included in the SPSS statistical programme package – are also applied. 
The null hypothesis used in these tests is that the median of the differences is 0.
Nearly the entire EU sample was suitable for testing (a total of 24 countries after 
having discarded those with inadequate/insufficient time series: DK, FI, NL, LI, IC, 
NO, HR), and a separate sample was compiled from Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries (10 countries). The Pillar 1 application of the advanced market risk 
approach is less widespread in CEE countries compared to the European average, but 
the difference is only marginal in the case of credit risk and operational risk (Table 4).
In the case of credit risk and market risk, there was a clear difference between 
2013 and 2008 with respect to the share of credit institutions using the advanced 
method (with a statistically significant rise observed in 2013); by contrast, there 
was no significant difference for market risk (Table 5). However, testing the change 
in the percentage of users of the advanced approach between 2008 and 2010 
and between 2010 and 2013 reveals that the difference is statistically negligible. 
As demonstrated by Table 6, there was no evidence that the switchover to more 
advanced approaches slowed down significantly after 2010.
Figure 6
distribution of banks applying the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) for 
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Table 4




by type MarkRisk iMA average CreRisk iRB average OpRisk AMA 
average
2013 By number 2.80% 13.11% 9.10%
By own fund req. 3.95% 33.94% 26.53%
2010 By number 3.60% 11.13% 7.73%
By own fund req. 1.60% 25.69% 16.79%
2008 By number 4.11% 7.60% 4.92%
By own fund req. 4.59% 12.36% 5.24%
Source: EBA (own calculation)
Table 5
Statistical test for the equivalence of the share of advanced approaches in 2008 and 
2013
Shares 2008 vs. 2013 
(significance)















MR STA Number based 2008 
vs. 2013
0.607 0.363 0.625 0.273
MR STA Own fund requirement 
based 2008 vs. 2013
0.143 0.022 1.000 0.686
CR IRB Number based 2008 vs. 
2013
0.027 0.122 0.039 0.066
CR IRB Own fund requirement 
based 2008 vs. 2013
0.093 0.024 0.021 0.007
OR AMA Number based 2008 
vs. 2013
0.017 0.101 0.021 0.022
OR AMA Own fund 
requirement based 2008 vs. 
2013
0.004 0.000 0.002 0.005
OR AMA Own fund 
requirement based 2008 vs. 
2013
24 24 10 10
Note: Grey background colour indicates a significance level above 95%. 




Statistical test for the match between the differences in changes in the share of 
advanced approaches in the periods of 2008–2010 and 2010–2013 (significance)
Share difference of  
2008–2010 vs. 2010–2013 
(significance)















MR STA Number based  
2008–2010 vs. 2010–2013
1.000 0.820 0.625 0.715
MR STA Own fund requirement 
based 2008–2010 vs.  
2010–2013
0.002 0.006 0.375 0.138
CR IRB Number based  
2008–2010 vs. 2010–2013
0.832 0.592 0.754 0.721
CR IRB Own fund requirement 
based 2008–2010 vs.  
2010–2013
1.000 0.784 0.754 0.959
OR AMA Number based  
2008–2010 vs. 2010–2013
0.286 0.445 0.344 0.878
OR AMA Own fund 
requirement based 2008–2010 
vs. 2010–2013
0.523 0.263 1.000 0.878
N = sample size 24 24 10 10
Note: Grey background colour indicates a significance level above 95%. 
Source: EBA (own calculation)
5. Conclusions
The most important finding of this paper is the conclusion that institution size has 
a significant impact on the selection of the risk method. Indeed, larger institutions 
facing potentially greater loss exposure tend to be more motivated to apply more 
advanced approaches, presumably also in consideration of the fixed costs of risk 
management. From a systemic risk perspective, this is a positive conclusion, as 
institutions with heightened systemic risk effects should pursue a more thoughtful 
risk management practice.6 The changeover to more advanced risk measurement 
approaches between 2008 and 2010 and between 2010 and 2013 did not exhibit 
a statistically significant difference in growth rate, even though a substantial 
deceleration could be intuited from market circumstances and other, significant 
regulatory changes. Interestingly, until recently regulatory authorities had made 
6  This conclusion, however, could be explored further in view of different other factors that may have an 
impact on the exposure to systemic risk besides firm size (e.g. in the case of diverging market concentration), 
such as substitutability and interconnectedness (see, for example, FSB [2015]).
127
Risk Management Approaches and Bank Size
great efforts to encourage the use of more sophisticated methods, but apparently, 
this enthusiasm was smothered by the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, as 
also expressed in a recent speech by Stefan Ingves (2015), Chairman of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision: “When it comes to addressing the weaknesses 
in the RWAs framework, we can distinguish between three broad areas. The first of 
these is policy measures that directly limit the degree of RWA variability. This could 
be done by placing greater emphasis on standardised measurement approaches. 
Another way is by limiting the flexibility banks have in determining internal model-
based estimates of RWAs”. The author of this paper believes that advanced methods 
have both benefits and weaknesses. While thoroughly considered changes should 
be welcome, hopefully the advantages of advanced approaches will not be discarded 
during the process of rethinking the Basel regulatory framework after Basel III.7
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Macroeconomic effects of the increase 
of electronic retail payments – A general 
equilibrium approach using Hungarian data*
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In our study, we assess the possible impacts on the performance of the Hungarian 
economy if various proportions of retail cash payments were substituted with debit 
card payments. We conducted our analysis in the framework of a general equilibrium 
model, which also takes into account the costs of payment transactions in a detailed 
manner. The results indicate that substitution of cash payments with debit card 
transactions has a favourable impact on the performance and competitiveness of 
the economy, increases real income, real consumption, the level of GDP and the 
tax income of the state as well. The favourable effects increase exponentially with 
the degree of substitution, but are also manifest even in the case of a low level 
substitution, which is attainable in just a few years. According to our calculations, 
the favourable macroeconomic impact derives, to a smaller extent, from the transfer 
of resources released in the field of payment services to other sectors. A more 
significant impact derives from the fact that, on the one hand, substitution also 
improves the efficiency of resources already available in the real economy, and, 
on the other hand, the characteristics of the pricing of debit card services typically 
causes a smaller deadweight loss than the level we could register concerning the 
more complex cross-pricing of cash payment services. Based on our findings, on 
the whole we can formulate the conclusion that by supporting and accelerating 
the constant efficiency improvement of retail payments, economic policy is able to 
improve the performance and competitiveness of the entire economy, both directly 
and indirectly.
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1. introduction
In the economic literature, it is a commonly held opinion that a higher ratio of 
electronic payment transactions indicates a more developed, more efficient 
payment system, i.e. contributes to the development of the economy and the 
increase in competitiveness. Two types of methodology are commonly used for 
assessing this matter. The first group contains the econometric analyses performed 
on cross-sectional macroeconomic data, which explore the relationship between 
the level of development of the payment systems of the countries and their level 
of general economic development. The other approach is from a micro aspect; it is 
based on the survey and aggregation of the individual costs, which makes the social 
cost of the methods of payment quantifiable. As a result, the amount of savings 
available through the replacement of methods of payment incurring higher social 
cost with methods incurring lower costs can be determined. Social cost is a concept 
based on net settlement, which screens out the flows of charges between actors of 
the payment supply chain and only takes into account the sum of own, private costs.
Research taking the cross-sectional, econometric approach demonstrates with 
compelling results that a more developed, more efficient system of retail payments 
has a positive impact on the performance of the economy. Hasan et al. (2012) 
assessed the correlation between the choice of payment method by residents and 
economic development in 27 European countries for the period between 1995 
and 2009. In their panel model, they explained the logarithm of the per capita by 
macroeconomic variables and variables that measure the penetration of electronic 
means of payment (number of payment cards, bank transfer orders, direct debits, 
checks, use of cash). Their findings indicate that the penetration of electronic means 
of payment has a significantly favourable impact on GDP growth. The most powerful 
effect can be seen in relation to the use of payment cards. Hasan et al. (2009) used 
data in the panel of EU member states to analyse the relationship between the level 
of development of the system of retail payments and the profitability of the banking 
sector. Following this method, Hasan et al. (2013) presented a general analysis 
of the correlation of retail payments and the performance of the real economy. 
Based on panel data, they demonstrated that the ratio of electronic payments 
positively correlates with per capita GDP in the EU. According to their calculations, 
a 1.2% increase in card coverage increases the level of GDP by 0.07%. The most 
comprehensive international results on this topic are presented by Zandi et al. 
(2013) in an analysis of the panel data of 57 developed and emerging countries 
between 2008 and 2012. Their results show a very strong relationship between 
the penetration of purchases by bank cards and economic growth practically in 
each country under consideration. According to their calculations, in developed 
countries the increasing use of electronic payments in the period under review 
raised the GDP of these countries by 0.3%, and in the emerging countries this value 
is even higher, i.e. 0.8%. The aggregate average annual GDP growth rate of the 57 
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countries under consideration was 1.8% between 2008 and 2012, which would 
have been only 1.6% without a rise in the use of electronic payments. Therefore, 
the increasing penetration of electronic payments registered in recent years raised 
the global growth rate of GDP by almost 0.2 percentage points annually on average.
In the area of retail payments, the assessment of social costs started as early as the 
2000s. The study of Humphrey et al. (2003) demonstrated that in the United States 
the decrease in the ratio of cash-based means of payment resulted in a significant 
saving of resources, estimated at 0.5% of GDP. This study also demonstrated that 
the high penetration of electronic means of payment in 12 European countries led 
to a significant decrease of banking costs (USD 32 billion, 0.38% of GDP).
This research was followed by several similar social cost surveys, typically performed 
on the basis of a harmonised methodology in Europe, which were collected and 
compared in the study of Schmiedel et al. (2012). It is the main conclusion of that 
study that in North European countries, where the ratio of electronic payments 
is higher, the social cost of retail payments constitutes a lower part of the gross 
domestic product than in countries which use cash and paper-based payments more 
intensively. It can also be observed based on the data that in countries characterised 
by a higher ratio of cash use, cash payment transactions typically incur lower unit 
costs than in countries which use electronic means of payment more intensively, 
as these methods of payment do have a cost advantage. This can be explained by 
pointing out that, to a significant degree, retail payments incur fixed costs – typically 
related to the installation and maintenance of the necessary infrastructure – and 
therefore the volume of the various means of payment significantly affects their 
average unit costs. However, owing to the different ratios of fixed and variable 
costs, an economy that uses electronic means of payment in a higher ratio is more 
efficient than one that is cash-oriented.
Based on the methodology of the European Central Bank, Turján et al. (2010) 
performed this assessment for Hungary as well at an outstanding level of details, 
and the robust results led them to conclude that in Hungary the current cost 
structure and consumer habits still lead to the cost advantage of cash both on the 
household and the merchant side. On the other hand, in the case of a powerful 
shift of payment habits towards electronic means of payment, significant savings 
can be achieved.
In summary, it is safe to say that in the literature we can find compelling results, on 
the one hand concerning the contention that savings can be realised in total social 
costs with a higher ratio of more efficient means of payment, and, on the other 
hand, that the penetration of more efficient means of payment has a favourable 
impact on the general performance of the economy. However, so far no one has 
explored the impact mechanism of how exactly and through what channels the 
decline in the social costs of the system of retail payments impacts the development 
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of the macroeconomy. Consequently, it cannot be specified exactly for any country 
what would be the type and the extent of the changes caused in the individual 
macroeconomic variables by substitution of different degrees in the methods 
of payment of various efficiency. The reason is that, although the relationships 
between the real economy and the system of retail payments has already been 
assessed by several studies from an econometric point of view, no comprehensive 
methodology has yet been created for the placement of retail payments into the 
framework of equilibrium theory. Starr (2003) presented how transactional costs 
can be interpreted in the Arrow-Debreu model framework. However, only a few 
examples can be found for its practical application. Griffith-Jones (2012) prepared 
a report for the European Commission based on the results of the QUEST III 
model on the impact of the financial transaction tax, while Escudé (2007) inserted 
transactional costs into his DSGE model calibrated for the economy of Argentina. 
However, these approaches do not involve retail payments in a detailed enough 
manner to enable the analysis of the impacts of structural changes.
In addition to looking for evidence in the case of the Hungarian economy as well 
for the favourable macro-economic impact of more efficient retail payments, in 
our article we also explore its impact mechanism. Therefore, in our research we 
integrate the individual technological and behavioural relationships based on 
micro data with the fundamental structure of the macroeconomy. In this manner, 
in our study we go one step beyond the issues assessed in the literature so far and 
look for the answer to the question of who are those actors of the economy that 
would realise the cost savings arising from choosing more efficient methods of 
payment in a higher ratio, what would be the type and volume of the impact on 
the major macroeconomic variables, and furthermore how this would affect the 
competitiveness of the country. On the one hand, a more efficient system of retail 
payments can manage payments with fewer resources; therefore these resources 
can be utilised in other sectors. In parallel with that, the remaining resources can 
generate higher added value. In our study, we intend to quantify these impacts.
In our analysis, we narrow down the subject of the research to the macroeconomic 
impact of substitution of retail cash payment transactions with debit card payments. 
We justify our choice by pointing out that in the ratio of card payments, Hungary 
is still significantly behind the average of the European Union, but the number 
and value of these payments is growing dynamically, and therefore the structure 
of payment habits in this area may improve significantly even in the foreseeable 
future. When switching between these two methods of payment, we only assess 
retail payments made by households (which comprise the overwhelming majority 
numerically anyway).
In the following part, as the first step, we present the methodology of our research. 
We describe the baseline scenario providing the start point of the analysis in the 
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third section of the article, i.e. the current usage ratios and cost structures of 
the payment methods applied in retail payments and our various assumptions 
applied to the substitution between the methods of payment. The fourth section 
contains the results of our calculations on the changes occurring in total social costs 
and the fifth section is on the macroeconomic impacts concerning the individual 
assumptions of substitution. We end the article by formulating our conclusions.
2. Methodology
In accordance with our research question, we assess the economic impacts of 
substitution between methods of payment (to be totally precise, between retail cash 
and debit card payments). The first step in this is the estimation of the attainable 
social cost savings. However, the decrease in the social costs of the payment system 
is not the ultimate economic impact. The calculation based on the changes in the 
social costs of methods of payment does not answer the question of what will 
happen to the released resources, how will the pricing practices of the actors in 
the supply chain of retail payments change, with special regard to cross-pricing 
between methods of payment, and furthermore to what extent the savings will 
ultimately improve the competitiveness of the economy and increase the ultimate 
consumption options.
In order to answer these questions, however, we must screen out several impacts 
which could influence the final result, but which are not directly related to the 
choice between methods of payment, the first being the impact of the increase of 
turnover. In recent years, both the cash stock in the economy and electronic means 
of payment have been growing dynamically. Even though the increasing volume 
reduces unit costs, to an extent that varies according to the method of payment, 
the cost of the entire system increases when more payment transactions need to 
be managed. This does not mean a deterioration in the competitiveness of the 
economy, a payment system expanding to a larger extent than the growth rate of 
the economy is a natural process in countries catching up in financial culture. To 
screen out this effect, in our study in each case we performed our calculations using 
the existing volume and value data of retail payments (observed in 2015) and only 
change the ratio between cash and debit card transactions within retail payments. 
Owing to this, the demonstrated macroeconomic and competitiveness impact can 
be considered entirely a result of substitution between methods of payment.
In addition, we disregard any impacts which are not directly manifest in the cost or 
fee structure of the actors under assessment. For example, an increase in the ratio 
of electronic retail payments is usually accompanied by a decrease in the ratio of the 
shadow economy, which could further strengthen the favourable macroeconomic 
impacts of substitution between methods of payment. However, quantifying this 
is very difficult and is not the topic of our study.
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By contrast, we include in our analysis those pricing methods which are not 
based on prime cost, such as cross-pricing, oligopolistic pricing, and a change in 
the structure of the economy, i.e. a rearrangement of resources among different 
technologies of production, in order to provide a more accurate picture of the 
channels and impact mechanisms through which changes in payment habits may 
contribute to improving the performance and competitiveness of the economy.
Based on the above considerations, using the data on the number and value of 
current retail payment transactions and assuming different cash and debit card 
payment ratios, we first quantify the social cost savings attainable given the 
individual assumptions. Subsequently, using a general equilibrium model which also 
takes into account the costs of payment transactions, we estimate the anticipated 
impacts of these social cost savings on the macroeconomy and competitiveness, and 
furthermore, we present those channels and impact mechanisms through which 
these impacts are realised. For these latter assessments, we use the static general 
equilibrium HUPS model presented by Ilyés–Varga (2015a) and calibrated for the 
Hungarian system of retail payments and economy, with minor adjustments.
3. Assessment of the current situation and our assumptions applied 
for substitution between methods of payment
In a European comparison, the Hungarian economy is fundamentally cash-oriented. 
Based on Ilyés–Varga (2015b), at present the ratio of purchases with payment cards 
is currently relatively low in terms of volume and value (Figure 1), even though 
payment account and debit card coverage is relatively high, at 75 and 71 per cent, 
respectively. Owing to this, from the aspect of the entire society, there is still room 
for development in the use of more efficient methods of payment. However, in 
recent years card usage has grown strongly, in a double-digit rate, even in years 
when the number of accounts decreased.
Figure 1 
distribution of households’ monthly payment transactions by method of payment












Macroeconomic effects of the increase of electronic retail payments
Based on the study of Turján et al., as a result of the intensity of use, cash has 
a significant average cost advantage compared to payment by debit card (Table 
1). In fact, our estimations based on data of 2009 show that, in terms of volume, 
the Hungarian household sector made its payments in cash to an extent exceeding 
90% in retail transactions. As a result, the average cost of payments by debit card 
is almost 3 times as high as that of cash transactions. Concerning purchases by 
credit card, this difference is more than tenfold. However, the ratio of variable costs 
is much lower in the case of electronic payments. For this reason, if the ratio of 
payments by payment cards significantly increased compared to cash transactions, 
substantial savings could be accomplished in the costs of the entire society.
Table 1
Cost structure in Hungary in 2009
Cash debit card Electronic 
transfer








Fixed (%) 33.50 62.30 52.50 63.20 17.00 8.60 73.90
Variable (%) 66.50 37.70 47.50 36.80 83.00 91.40 26.10
Total (billion HUF) 208.82 30.22 40.07 7.73 38.96 35.01 19.56
Volume (million 
units)
2,835 150 230 77 271 47 25
Specific cost (HUF) 73.66 201.13 174.22 100.39 143.76 744.89 796.09
Source: Turján et al. (2010)
In our article, we assess the economic impacts of substitution between methods 
of payment compared to the above initial situation. Therefore, as the baseline 
scenario, we use the cash-to-card ratio characteristic of retail payments, calculated 
according to the retail transaction figures for the year 2015. According to the 
available data and our estimations, in these categories at present and on average, 
in the retail sector 89% of turnover is paid for in cash and 11% by bank cards. Based 
on the values, the ratio of cash is somewhat lower, since in the case of transactions 
with higher values the customers use bank cards for payment in a ratio higher than 
the average. Naturally, in retail purchases and especially in other retail payments, 
such as the payment of invoices, we also register other methods of payment with 
lower turnover, such as bank transfer or direct debit. When we discuss in this article 
the turnover of retail payments, this excludes the turnover handled by these other 
methods of payment, since we include these with the same quantity and with the 
same value in our model in the case of every assumption of substitution. In other 
words, these are also included in our calculations, but we only assume substitution 
between transactions made in cash on the one hand and by debit cards on the 
other hand.
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Table 2
Our assumptions on the substitution of methods of payment
description Ratio of card usage 
within retail payments
(by volume)
Baseline scenario The ratio of payments made by debit cards 
within retail payments registered in 2015
11%
Low level of substitution The ratio expected to be accomplished in 
Hungary according to the forecasts
25%
Medium level of 
substitution
Average ratio registered in the European Union 
in 2015
50%
Significant level of 
substitution
The reverse of the existing situation, which 
means an outstanding level of card use
89%
Compared to the baseline scenario, in our analysis we assess the macroeconomic 
impacts of three substitutions of different levels (Table 2). First, we assume 
a payment structure that seems attainable even in the relatively short term: we 
selected this as the expected ratio by 2020 of retail debit card payments, based 
on the projection of the current trends. As a result of the dynamic, double-digit 
annual growth in the number and value of purchases by payment cards, a significant 
shift is expected even over this short time horizon, although payments in cash also 
show an increasing trend. According to our estimation based on the projection of 
the trends, in 2020 the ratio of the number of retail card payments could reach 25 
per cent. Therefore, our first assumption is that compared to the current situation 
we substitute cash payments, constituting 14 per cent of all retail payments, with 
debit card payments. In accordance with the methodological considerations, we 
emphasise that the projection applies to the ratios expected in 2020, with the 
volumes and turnover values registered in 2015.
In our second assumption, we presume the substitution of cash payments at 
a medium level in total. In this assumption, as a point of reference we define the 
accomplishment of the ratio of card payments that is currently registered on average 
in the retail sector in the European Union. Since we have no statistics that would 
enable us to determine this ratio clearly, we have made the estimation using the 
data of EU countries on average cash stock to GDP and the number of per capita 
transactions paid with payment cards. Based on these, concerning Hungarian retail 
turnover, retail payments reaching the EU level of efficiency would mean electronic 
payments reaching an extent of almost 50 per cent, and in terms of value as much 
as two-third of all purchases would be paid for by card.
In the third case, we expect the highest level of substitution, which could even be 
considered extreme, assuming that the current usage ratios of methods of retail 
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payments are reversed, i.e. the ratio of payments with cards would be close to 90 
per cent. Currently, this ratio only exists in the most developed countries with the 
highest level of electronic retail payments, e.g. the Netherlands and Sweden.
4. impacts of substitution between methods of payment on social 
costs
The assessment of the impacts of switches between methods of payment is based 
on the calculation of social costs. By social cost, we mean the entire costs of the 
supply chain of retail payments, excluding the fees paid by actors of the supply chain 
to each other. According to the calculations of Turján et al. (2010), based on data 
from 2009, the size of the system of retail payments can be estimated at 1.09% of 
GDP, based on the social costs spent on it. This method of calculation contains the 
costs incurred by all the actors themselves, e.g. the household sector, businesses 
and payment providers, and the costs of the resources necessary for operation 
of the system. It is important to emphasise at this point already that owing to 
its nature, the calculation of social costs is a partial analysis: for example, it does 
not further break down intermediate consumption or the part assigned to retail 
payments from the tax burdens of the affected actors.
As the first step, we supplemented the basic ideas of the survey underlying the 
cited study with the trends seen in the last five years. The data of the study, which 
can be considered as preliminary to our research, apply to the year 2009, and 
therefore they need a certain degree of adjustment to enable the analysis to be 
conducted. We adjusted the costs of the actors by inflation for 2015, modified 
the payment of fees according to the data registered in the meantime relating to 
the fees applied by payment providers, and thus they already reflect the situation 
following the introduction of the transaction tax and free cash withdrawal. By 
contrast, we disregarded certain cost factors surveyed in the cited study, according 
to the methodology of Ilyés–Varga (2015a), for example, the different time needs 
of the use of the various methods of payment.
Based on the partial analysis, it can be stated that the average unit cost of payment 
by debit card can be reduced to the level of cash even with a lower level of 
substitution of methods of payment (Figure 2). In the case of a medium level of 
substitution, payment by debit card already enjoys a significant cost advantage 
compared to payment in cash, and with a significant level of substitution this 
difference increases drastically.
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However, the turning point in the full social average costs of methods of payment 
does not necessarily equal the level of substitution at which the costs perceived by 
the actors are reversed. If we break down the costs to merchants and residents, it 
can be seen that from the total social costs (which already show a decrease in the 
case of a significant level of substitution) the ratio of the part assigned to residents 
Figure 2























Source: authors’ own calculations and the supplemented, adjusted data of Turján et al. (2010)
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rises gradually (Figure 2). The reason is that in the case of payments by debit card 
residents directly bear the costs in a higher ratio. On the other hand, the costs of 
cash payments are incurred indirectly among the costs of merchants and payment 
providers.
If we consider the unit costs, a difference is registered among the actors of the 
economy (Figure 3). While on the side of merchants accepting card payments the 
sequence is reversed even in the case of a low level of substitution of methods of 
payment, the cost advantage of cash only disappears if there is a significant level of 
Figure 3






























Baseline Small Medium Significant
Cash
Debit card
Source: authors’ own calculations and the supplemented, adjusted data of Turján et al. (2010)
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substitution. The main reason for that is free cash withdrawal and the transaction tax. 
However, both of these are individual effects and do not appear among social costs.
In summary, it can be determined from the analysis that in the case of a major 
structural change in retail payment habits, compared to the current state, the costs 
of the supply chain of payment services can be reduced by HUF 20–25 billion annually, 
while among methods of payment it grows slightly simultaneously with low and 
medium levels of substitution (Figure 2). However, it can also be observed that the 
changes in social costs are manifest at the level of the individual actors in different 
measures and on different courses. In addition, as mentioned, the calculation of social 
cost savings is a partial analysis, which considers the external actors as static and also 
disregards the flow of charges between actors. By contrast, experience shows that 
various actors incorporate payment charges into their decisions in different ways, 
and intermediary service providers apply a significant degree of cross-pricing and 
oligopolistic pricing. External actors are not static either, and from the aspect of the 
central budget the tax implications of the various payment methods differ significantly, 
and it is not necessarily simple for the resource markets to convert the costs. The 
costs of tied-up capital constitute a significant portion of the costs of electronic means 
of payment, such as purchases by debit card, while in respect of cash payments the 
labour costs of manual processing are more significant. In addition, the efficiency 
of the resources tied up in retail payments may be different than observed in other 
sectors of the economy. These impacts are not independent of each other and in 
several cases they may even be opposing, and because of this a partial analysis based 
on the changes in social costs may lead to inaccurate results.
Owing to these reasons, we extended our analysis into a general equilibrium theory 
framework, where we were able to include all the characteristics of the system of 
retail payments which are significant for the purposes of the analysis, and using a logic 
of equilibrium theory based on the balance of the usual relations between branches, 
we also present the bases of the decisions of the real sector and the household sector.
5. Macroeconomic impacts of substitution between methods of payment
In this study, we apply the HUPS model presented by Ilyés–Varga (2015a), calibrated 
to the Hungarian system of retail payments and the economy, and slightly adjusted 
to the question raised by the research. HUPS is a static quantified general model 
of equilibrium theory, in which the various actors take into account the costs of 
the completion of the transactions when making their decisions concerning the 
real economy. The model contains two groups of the corporate sector, these are 
branches of the real economy and actors of the supply chain of payment services. 
Owing to space limitations, we only present the most important behavioural 
equations and relations of the HUPS model. The cited study contains a detailed 
description of the structure, activations and variables of the model as well as the 
data sources and the modes of calibration.
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Of the 15 branches distinguished by the model, each is represented by 
a representative agent. The representative actor maximises its profit, while taking 
into account that the acquisition of intermediate consumption and resources also 
has implications in terms of retail payments. The target function of the company 
is the following:
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where p is the price, Y is the level of production, L is the amount of labour force, K 
is the amount of capital, X is interim use, M is import, PSD and PSDv are the volume 
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∑ −NTXi is the fee of payment services and NTX 
is the net tax burden.
Companies need to deal with the following constraints:
The tax burden of the company is the sum of the value added tax (VAT), the taxes 
on capital (TXK), on labour (TXL) and on production (TXY):
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The technology of the representative company is the composition of CES functions 
and the Leontief production functions:











The actors use m different payment methods for the purpose of performing their 
activities in the real economy. Companies may also use several methods of payment 
(e.g. bank transfer, payment in cash, etc.) for their activities in the real economy 
(e.g. sale of goods, payment of suppliers, payment of wages, payment of taxes, 
etc.). The fm parameter shows the ratio of the individual methods of payment in 
the value and number of payments related to various activities in the real economy:
fYim ⋅pi ⋅Yi + fxjim ⋅pj ⋅Xij
j
J
∑ + fLim ⋅w ⋅LiD + fKim ⋅r ⋅KiD + fMim ⋅pm ⋅Mi + fTim ⋅NTXi +PSFIXvim = PMmiv  (4)
fYim ⋅θYim ⋅Yi + fxjim ⋅θXjim ⋅Xij + fLim ⋅θLim ⋅LiD + fKim ⋅θKim ⋅KiD + fMim ⋅θMim ⋅Mi
j
J
∑ +PSFIX im = PMmi  (5)
Where PMm and PMmv  are the number of items and total value necessary of the 
individual methods of payment for the given company, PSFIX is the volume of retail 
transaction not explained by the model, and qm is a parameter of projection, which 
shows how many payment transactions of the given method of payment belong to 
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the real value of the individual transactions in the real economy. The solution of the 
pricing problem, if λg4 is the shadow price of payment services, λg5  is the shadow 































































+λ 8 ⋅TXY ⋅pi
 (6)
When making an optimal decision, the actor of the branch will supplement the 
usual pricing formula with the marginal cost of transaction completion, by which 
it can translate all interim uses and primary resources into the full price. That way, 
the cost decrease or increase is directly incorporated in the price of the product, 
and the price of primary resources reflects their entire marginal profit.
The payment service providers (PSP) produce services related to retail payments 
using the products of the same branches, the primary resources and the services 
of other service providers. Their decision function is basically the oligopolistic and 
cross-pricing of their full prime costs received based on profit maximisation.
The profit function of payment providers is the following:
π psp = ϕm ⋅PSmSt +ϕmv ⋅PSmSv( )
m∈psp
M
∑ −w ⋅LpspD − r ⋅KpspD −NTXpsp − pi ⋅Xipsp
j
J




where PSSt and PSSv mean the volume and value of the supply of payment services. 
Based on their pricing functions, payment service providers allocate their fixed 
costs to their direct cost (DC), to obtain the final price using an oligopolistic mark-
up profit rate and a cross-pricing rate:
 ϕmg = 1+markuppsp + crossmpspg( )⋅ DCm
g +ω pspmfg ⋅ rpspT ⋅KpspmDfg +wpspT ⋅LpspmDfg( )( )
PSmSg
 (8)
where w is the rate of distribution of indirect costs. The oligopolistic mark-up adjusts 
the profit expectations that are different than the full profitability of the actors by 
product. The cross-pricing rate has been estimated based on empirical experiences, 
the revenues of the bank and pricing practices. Fundamentally, it consists of three 
parts: increasing factors for the purpose of maintaining the entire profitability 
of the bank, direct reallocations between services, primarily between volume 
and value, or even the inclusion of the costs of purchases made with payment 
cards in the annual card fee, and finally, the direct passing on of the individual tax 
impacts.
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In several cases, the calculated price differs from prime costs significantly, and 
therefore concerning the entire economy the rest of the actors making rational 
decisions will make suboptimal decisions. The resultant deterioration of efficiency 
can be directly measured in deadweight loss.
The state actor operates on the basis of the pay-as-you-go logic, its expenses (GE) 
follow the revenues (GR):
 GR =GE  (9)
Its revenues are the profit of state-owned companies, net prices and the deficit 
of the budget, its expenses are community consumption, social transfers and the 
costs of the payment services used:
 GR =NTXG +DG +π G  (10)
 GE =CGD +TRG +DPG  (11)
For the state operator, the completion of payments is exogenous for the decision.
The household representative actor is an entity that maximises its profit, in which 
it takes into account the costs of the completion of payments.
 U Ci( )= A1 ⋅C1−βh +!+ Aj ⋅CJ−βh( )−
1
βh  (12)
Its budgetary constraint is the identical amount of consumption, costs of payment 
services, and net taxes, along with capital income, labour income and transfers.
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The supply of resources of the various sectors is fixed. The model distinguishes 
three primary resources, capital, labour and import:








 MS =M0S  (17)
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In order to present the impacts accurately, HUPS also has an income distribution 
module based on the system of integrated national accounts and following the 
logic of the social settlement matrices. Accordingly, some of the capital incomes 
go abroad, the state actor creates social transfers from taxes, and we also take into 
account the income transferred home from abroad. Social settlement is static, it 
operates calibrated to the ratios of the year 2014.
In our research, we calibrated the model applied to the macroeconomic data for the 
year 2014. The reason is that the detailed national account data for 2015 were not 
yet fully available at the time the article was written, and therefore estimations would 
have been necessary in many respects. The retail transaction data used for calibration 
are taken from 2015. The model slightly differs from the one presented by Ilyés–Varga 
(2015a), in that we primarily changed the structure of methods of payment. We 
detached the credit card function costs from the costs of transactions with payment 
cards taken into account in the study. The reason is that in accordance with the 
question raised in our article we considered the debit card as the primary electronic 
substitute of cash use in retail turnover. For this reason, the payment cards included 
in the model only mean cards with debit function, the costs of the credit function are 
represented among other methods of payment in the model in this article.
In the model calculations, we modified the ratio between cash and card transactions 
by the household sector according to the assumptions presented in Section 3 of the 
article, leaving everything else unchanged in the model. The results thus obtained 
were more accurate than the partial analysis in Section 4 of the article, since the 
level of detail of the applied model makes it possible to distinguish the transactions 
performed by the individual sectors on the one hand, and, on the other hand, we 
can also assess the indirect economic impacts of changes in retail payments, thanks 
to the general equilibrium approach.
Figure 4 contains the aggregate results of the calculations. Since the HUPS model 
is quasi-price-homogeneous, the price level is fixed. The selected benchmark is 
the implicit GDP deflator; therefore, each change in GDP corresponds to a volume 
change in the statistical sense. The available resources are fixed, which means that 
GDP is an aggregate unit of measurement of the entire productivity of the system. 
It is clear from the chart that the impact predicted by the model is positive even at 
a low level ratio of substitution, even though based on the partial results of Section 
4 the social costs of retail payments still increase slightly in this case.
The cause of the difference is that the HUPS model framework is capable of 
quantifying significantly more impacts than the calculation of social cost savings. 
As a general efficiency indicator, the incremental real GDP summarises every 
such element. The U form still exists, but the incremental turning point is shifted 
forwards. In order to accurately understand the macroeconomic impacts, we can 
trace back the effects step by step to the original assumptions.
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The surplus production deriving from substitution between methods of payment 
is registered in two places; first, in the increase in consumption of the household 
sector (Figure 5). Since the system adjusts the price level, the incremental 
consumption derives from incremental income. The increment is nominally lower 
than the entire GDP increment, since other sectors also receive their share of the 
increased efficiency.
Figure 4
impact of the various scenarios on real GdP




















Source: calculations using the adjusted HUPS model
Figure 5
development of household real consumption in the various scenarios























Source: calculations using the adjusted HUPS model
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The scenario of real income is significantly different than the scenario of the 
consumption of the household sector (Figure 6). There are two reasons for this. On the 
one hand, the model analyses the relationships between the various income categories 
and social transfers following the practice of the Social Accounting Matrices (SAM). 
Accordingly, a significant portion of capital incomes go abroad, while the income of 
the household sector is increased by benefits paid by the state. The other cause is the 
different scenarios of the three different primary resources. The course of labour and 
capital is led by the usual U form, while imports are significantly affected by the fact that 
the ratio of activities involving different import ratios changes in the various scenarios.
The increase in real income is caused, on the one hand, by the indirect efficiency 
improvement of the resources. Businesses are able to pay higher wages and 
dividends, because production becomes more efficient in general. Since after 
the substitution payments can be managed at lower per-unit costs, businesses 
achieve higher resource efficiency, for the most part through the mediation of 
the commercial branch that sells the produced goods to the household sector. On 
the other hand, it increases real income as a direct impact that resources that are 
removed from retail payments are added to the real sector and expand production.
However, the re-allocated resources only expand the activities of the real sector 
to an extent lower than their previous efficiency (Figure 7). The efficiency of the 
primary resources applied in the model is typically higher in the sector of financial 
Figure 6
development of real incomes in the various areas















Source: calculations using the adjusted HUPS model
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activities, to which retail payments belong, as compared to the remaining part of 
the economy. This difference is quite significant in the case of capital efficiency. We 
can partially break down the impact of substitution on economic growth, based on 
the usual growth accounting. By allocating the GDP growth according to the CES 
functions generally applied in the model we can make the statement that for the 
Figure 7
Resources in the production of the real sector















Source: calculations using the adjusted HUPS model
Figure 8
Breakdown of GdP growth as a result of efficiency improvement and expansion of 
resources




Source: calculations using the adjusted HUPS model
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larger part growth may be associated with the increase in the efficiency of resources 
already existing in the real sector, and not with the reallocation of the resources 
released in the field of payment services (Figure 8).
Based on the results of our model calculations, substitution between methods of 
payment ultimately improves the competitiveness of the economy through three 
channels. The classic, direct channel is the utilisation of resources drawn from 
payment transactions in the real sector. This channel can be partially analysed 
through savings on social costs. However, the model-based analysis shows that 
in our case this channel is less significant, since the efficiency of several sectors 
typically falls behind that of payment services; therefore the impact is lower than 
the full nominal volume of savings. The second channel is the general efficiency 
improvement of the resources, accomplished by more efficient payment services, 
manifested for the most part through the mediation of the commercial sector. 
Therefore, substitution between methods of payment also improves the efficiency 
of resources already existing in the real sector. Since HUPS is a disaggregated model, 
the impact is manifest in a way typical of the input-output models.
The third channel is a structural change in the economy that does not directly affect 
production technologies. In the modelled economy, deadweight loss may occur as 
a result of a pricing system that is not entirely prime cost-based and based on the 
system of taxation. The HUPS model follows the pricing practice and the regulations 
applying to the activity, and therefore the market of various methods of payment 
is detached from their actual costs. The cross-pricing of the methods of payment 
was already demonstrated by the study of Turján et al. (2010), as was the fact that 
the extent of cross-pricing is quite significant in cash transactions and paper-based 
bank transfers. In recent years, in addition to this several regulatory changes have 
been implemented that further increased the difference. By contrast, in payments 
by card on the retail side the typical arrangement is costs charged on the annual 
card fee, which have been partly incorporated into the decisions of the consumers, 
and on the corporate side cross-pricing decreased as a result of the regulation of 
interbank commissions. Based on the detailed results of the model, the impact 
can be led all the way, the prime cost – shadow price – of payment services is 
significantly different than the market price in several cases, which runs all the way 
through the supply chain. Since the corporate actors apply the full price in their 
decisions on resource demands, and it is not characteristic of the actual cost, they 
make suboptimal decisions concerning the entire economy. They consume more 
than the optimal level of resources that utilise more intensively the method of 
payment with a reduced price through cross-pricing. For this reason, in accordance 
with the theoretical models, a deadweight loss occurs in the economy. Concerning 
the impact on the taxation system, following a similar logic, the structural change of 
substitution between the products with different tax burdens on the one hand and 
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the resources on the other hand modifies the deadweight loss. The results of the 
model also lead to the conclusion that the pricing of cash payments and the related 
tax burden is more distorted than in the case of transactions with debit cards, and 
therefore the substitution presumptions examined by us have a favourable impact 
on the performance of the economy through this channel as well.
In summary, it is safe to say that the savings calculated in the social cost calculation 
are realised directly to a lower extent as incremental production, since payment 
transactions typically have more added value per one resource unit than the 
rest of the sectors. However, indirect effects cannot be neglected, and in the 
case of changes in payment habits a switch between various, non-prime-cost-
based methods of pricing (a shift towards pricing with less distorting effect) and 
other channels of economic effects also contribute to a significant extent to the 
improvement of the entire competitiveness of the economy.
6. Conclusions
In our study we analysed the question of how and to what extent substitution 
between methods of payment contributes to the performance and competitiveness 
of the economy. To this end, we assessed the substitution impacts between retail 
cash and debit card payment transactions in the case of the Hungarian economy. In 
our research, we first assessed the cost situation of the methods of payment under 
examination and demonstrated that, despite the constant increase in electronic 
payments, concerning average costs cash transactions still have an advantage. This 
advantage can be observed at every economic agent (payee, merchant) individually 
as well. As the first step for surveying the economic impact of substitution, we 
analysed the structure of the social costs of the two payment methods.
Using the social cost data of retail payments for 2010, adjusted and calibrated to the 
situation in 2015, we assessed the impacts of three different levels of substitution 
compared to the baseline scenario, i.e. in comparison to the ratio of card payments 
of 11 per cent currently registered in retail payments. We defined our assumptions 
on the extent of the substitution in such a manner that, with the small level of 
substitution, according to the projection of the current trends, we should recah the 
ratio of payment by card which is attainable within a few years in the retail sector 
(25%), in the case of medium-level substitution we should accomplish the current 
average rate of payment by cards in the European Union (50%), while in the case 
of a significant level of substitution we should get the reverse of the ratio of the 
baseline scenario (almost 90%). This latter figure can be considered an extremely 
high level of card use, which currently only a few European countries with the most 
developed payment system approach at best.
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Based on our partial analysis, we demonstrated that by increasing the ratio of 
card use actual cost savings are attainable both at the level of society and at the 
individual level of actors in the economy. The process, however, is not linear. Owing 
to the different structures of cash and debit card transactions, at a small level of 
substitution the total cost for society rises temporarily; however, after the turning 
point it is possible to accomplish exponentially increasing actual savings with an 
increase in the level of substitution. Since social cost calculation in itself is not 
capable of quantifying the impact on the macroeconomy and on competitiveness, 
we were unable to gauge the utilisation of savings by this method. In addition, we 
were also not able to assess the impacts of complicated cross-pricing, changes 
in taxes, oligopolistic pricing and changes in the structure of technology. For this 
reason we extended our analysis and estimated the anticipated macroeconomic 
impacts of the previously identified social cost savings using a static general 
equilibrium model which takes into account the costs of payment transactions in 
detail as well and is calibrated to the Hungarian payment system and economy.
The applied model is capable of quantifying all of the impacts listed above and 
directly estimating their combined effect. Our results showed that the substitution 
of cash payments with transactions by debit cards has a favourable impact on 
the performance and competitiveness of the economy, increases real income, real 
consumption and the level of GDP, and also has a favourable impact on the tax 
income of the state. We also demonstrated that in contrast to the turning point in 
the average unit costs of the methods of payment under examination, the impact 
on total productivity can be registered even in the short term, including the case 
when we assume a low level of substitution of methods of payment. The reason is 
that the general equilibrium theory approach summarises impacts realised through 
multiple channels. On the one hand, the resources released in the field of payment 
services are utilised in the real economy, but only at a lower level of productivity 
than earlier, since the resource efficiency of the real economy is typically lower than 
that of the financial sector. However, the indirect effects of substitution between 
methods of payment also improve the performance of the economy. Owing to the 
increase in the ratio of electronic means of payment, the handling of payments 
becomes more efficient for every economic actor, and thus the companies’ own 
technology improves, which also improves the efficiency of their existing resources 
as a multiplier effect. In addition, the substitution of the methods of payment 
presented in our article also has a favourable impact on the economy owing to 
the different level of cross-pricing of cash and debit card transactions. The reason 
is that according to our model calculations the pricing of debit card transactions 
causes a lower level of deadweight loss than more significant and more complex 
cross-pricing related to payments in cash.
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Therefore, the savings identified in social cost calculation are realised directly to 
a lower extent as incremental production, since payment transactions typically 
have more added value per one resource unit than the rest of the sectors. However, 
indirect effects cannot be neglected, in the case of a change in payment habits 
a shift towards a less distorting manner of pricing and other indirect channels 
of the economy also substantially strengthen the favourable macroeconomic 
impacts. Based on our findings, in total we can formulate the conclusion that by 
promoting and accelerating the constant efficiency improvement of retail payments, 
economic policy is able to improve the performance and competitiveness of the 
entire economic system both directly and indirectly.
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The objective of our study is to determine the characteristic features according to 
which an individual can be evaluated from the aspect of his/her financial culture. 
People filling in the questionnaire consisting of 36 questions may determine how 
much they can be characterised by individual features or behaviours. We worked 
with two types of personality profiles. One of them was compiled by the author 
of the test (preliminarily defined personality profile). In this case, respondents get 
feedback on the results they achieved in each pre-defined dimension (Price-sensitive, 
Economizing, Moderate, Saver, Diligent, Controls his finances). Among these 
dimensions, awareness and diligence are positive preliminary indications of the 
level of the person’s financial culture. The high level of saving and price-sensitivity 
did not correlate with good results achieved in other personality dimensions. 
In addition, we elaborated another personality profile obtained in empirical way. 
In order to establish the dimensions, we performed factor analysis. The established 
dimensions are: Short of cash, Economizing; Money-devouring; Order creates value; 
Price-sensitive; Collector; Planner; Ups and downs; Diligent and Cannot control his 
finances.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Classification: A13, D03, D12, I22
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1. introduction
Individuals’ financial behaviours and habits may be extremely varied in both space 
and time, as the formulation and modification of these are influenced by a number 
of factors.
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With the present research (Béres et al. 2015), our objective is to explore what 
dimensions can be determined from the aspect of the financial personality, and 
how they can be evaluated from the aspect of financial awareness.
This research qualifies as basic research,1 i.e. the primary objective is to offer 
a starting point for further research. However, we would like to point out that with 
a little bit of further thinking, the results may be directly suitable for “objectivising” 
the subjective risk analysis considerations in the field of retail lending, i.e. it is 
possible to use the results directly in the industry.
2. Financial personality
Since the 1970s, a number of researchers have been examining financial attitudes 
and personality types, trying to find out the factors according to which people’s 
financial behaviour patterns evolve. This study examines the financial personality 
and the individual’s relation to money from economic and psychological points of 
view. In processing the professional literature, from the studies completed in this 
area we review those which we found relevant to this research and which served 
as a basis for our own evaluations.
The first such study is related to the names of Goldberg and Lewis (1978). They 
distinguished three types of individuals in their study: collectors, individuals striving 
for independence and power players. They came to the conclusion that individuals 
striving for independence accumulate money to reduce their feeling of discomfort, 
while collectors accumulate money to avoid damages originating from economic 
and environmental changes. As opposed to the first two groups, the main objective 
of power players is not to ensure security, but to use their money to attract the 
attention and earn the admiration of other people.
A decade later, Forman (1987) supplemented the system of Goldberg and Lewis 
with another category, the gamblers. The members of this new group connect 
the acquisition of money to an intensive status of excitement and emotions – 
poker or roulette may be similar – and sometimes the stock exchange itself can be 
interpreted as a kind of gamble.
Similarly to Mellan (1997), Yamauchi and Templer (1982) defined the attitude 
to money as a multi-dimensional term.2 According to their research, the first 
dimension is the power-prestige, in which money is the symbol of success and 
1  The report on the research can be found on the website of the Pénziránytű Foundation   
http://www.penziranytu.hu/helyes-diagnozis-nelkul-nincs-hatekony-terapia
2  Later, a number of researchers, including Furnham (1984) and Tang (1992) also used dimensions to define 
individuals by financial personality.
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power in the individuals’ attitudes. In this sense, money helps the individual 
acquire power, security and freedom, and become special compared to others. 
This is identical with Goldberg and Lewis’ earlier (1978) research results and Zsótér 
and Nagy’s later (2012) research results. This is supplemented with the research 
by Bell (1998) and Durvasula and Lysonski (2010) in a way that the continuously 
increasing consumption by individuals belonging to the power-prestige dimension 
also increases the materialism-centred nature of people, and its climax may be 
compulsive shopping activity. The second dimension is retention-time. In the case 
of individuals in this group, the main focus is on preparation for the future and 
keeping the financial situation under continuous control. For these people, saving 
and amassing are of primary importance, and they regularly record the situation of 
their finances. They are able to give up present consumption in the hopes of later, 
probably bigger consumption. Giving up may be explained over the short term by 
strengthening their sense of security.
The third financial personality dimension of Yamamuchi and Templer (1982) is 
distrust. The common feature of individuals in this category is that they look at 
money with suspicion, almost with fear. For them, money is practically the source 
of distrust. In general, we can say that individuals that have no trust in money 
and finances, usually do not trust themselves either to the necessary extent. For 
instance, this may be the case when someone does not have enough experience 
or knowledge in a given area, in this case, in finances.
The fourth and last dimension of the authors contains anxious individuals, who 
tend to be nervous (anxiety dimension). For this type of personality, money is 
a controversial phenomenon, as it means both anxiety and protection for them. In 
other words, we could simply say that they are the “what will happen, when we 
do not have it” personalities. A characteristic feature of the paradox personality is 
that they ease their anxiety by shopping, and it may become a compulsive activity 
(Valence et al. 1988).
The above described typology of Yamamuchi and Templer (1982) was used by Bauer 
and Mitev (2011) in Hungary as well. In their study, they used the so-called “Money 
Attitude Scale” retention-time dimension to examine relations with compulsive 
shopping. Based on their results, the retention of money and prudent spending may 
not form one dimension. In their opinion, retention and compulsive shopping may 
exist side by side, as there may be consumers who can afford compulsive shopping. 
This is in line with the results of the study published earlier by Ridgway et al. (2008).
Furnham’s work in 1984 focused on beliefs and behaviour patterns related to 
money. The scale he used is called the “Money Beliefs and Behaviors Scale”. The 
sixty statements on the scale are reduced to only six factors. These are (1) obsession, 
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(2) power/spending, (3) retention, (4) security/conservative, (5) inadequate, (6) 
effort/ability.
In the studies of Furnham (1984), obsession means that individuals use money as 
a basis of comparison with others. These persons associate the possession of money 
with superiority, from which the second category, i.e. power is separated to a small 
extent only. In the case of people in the power category – similarly to the results of 
earlier research – possession of money is the primary (with a little exaggeration, the 
exclusive) basis of power. The third dimension is retention, which – in Furnham’s 
opinion – focuses on financial conservativism and placing security at the forefront. 
A common feature of people belonging to the dimension of dissatisfied persons is 
that they never feel that they have enough money, i.e. they are characterised by 
the attitude of “more is better than much”, which is a kind of driving force for them 
as well. Last, but not least, according to Furnham, the effort dimension includes 
all people for whom the motive of work appears in connection with money and 
their attitude to money, and that reflects certain values as well. It can be seen that 
Furnham’s results are not significantly different from the results of earlier studies.
Furnham’s scale of 60 statements (1984) was used by Christopher et al. (2004) in 
a shortened version for their study. In the case of Christopher et al., the received 
dimensions compared to the original six factors are: dissatisfaction (which is 
identical with one of the factors of the original research), self-praising, conservative 
approach, and negative feelings about money. It is obvious that the meanings of 
the factors have also changed in their contents. All of this is even more obvious 
in the study by Masuo and partners. The three factors they specified are: power, 
security and financial modesty.
Based on the attitudes to money, Tang (1992) identified six factors, which also 
contain affective, cognitive and conative factors. Within the affective component, 
the good and the evil side of money is presented, i.e. the feelings triggered by 
money. Within the cognitive component, performance, respect and power emerge, 
i.e. kind of evaluating thoughts related to money. The budget emerges within the 
conative component, i.e. this is what primarily determines actual behaviour. The 
questionnaire that originally contained 30 statements (metering scale) was later 
used by Tang in a shortened version, first with 12 statements (Tang 1995), and 
finally with 6 statements (Tang and Kim 1999). The six statements determine three 
factors. The first factor is budget (“I control my budget with care”, “I use my money 
carefully”), the second factor is negative feelings about money (“money is bad”, 
“money is the source of all bad things”), while the third factor is that money is the 
token of success (“money is the symbol of success”, “money reflects performance”).
Compared to previous researchers, Mellan (1997) identified more, altogether nine 
personality types on the basis of their attitude to money.
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In Mellan’s typology, the saver is person who sticks to his money, finds it hard to 
buy things that would cause momentary pleasure to himself or its beloved ones. 
Money represents a kind of security to him, so hedonist behaviour is far from him.
For the spender type of personality, the pleasure is in spending his money when and 
on what he feels necessary – this status is usually related to an external stimulus. In 
other words, they could also be called impulsive. Saving money and making budgets 
are not the characteristic features of this personality type.
It makes Money Monks feel bad when they have a lot of money. This makes them 
feel guilty in a way, especially when they get a large amount of money suddenly. 
They are convinced that money spoils everything.
People who try to avoid daily tasks about money are called avoiders by Mellan 
(1997). Individuals belonging to this group do not like to deal with their finances, 
so they usually also do not produce budgets. In fact, this characteristic feature 
can be compared to Yamamuchi and Templer’s (1982) uncertainty category, i.e. 
it is possible that they evaluate their financial skills in an unrealistic way and are 
convinced that they have no proper knowledge about finances.
Figure 1
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The next category is the hoarder personality. The main feature of people in this 
category is that the amount of money available to them – or rather the increase of it – 
is one of their main objectives, as that is the way they can also prove their power.
The combination of the saver and the spender personality types are called rioters by 
Mellan (1997). This person tends to economise for a while (say, for the achievement 
of a major objective), but if he is affected by an external stimulus (impulse), he is 
able to buy something without consideration.
The anxious personality type is also present here. The common characteristic 
feature of people in this group is that they lack self-confidence, they are afraid to 
lose control, and therefore they control their finances. Typically, they continuously 
monitor their financial situation.
For people in the group of risk-takers, money means adventure, excitement and 
freedom. They like to risk their money, as they enjoy the shivering and adrenaline, 
which come with it.
And last but not least, the last category of Mellan (1997) is the group of risk-
avoiders. For them, money equals security, therefore, they prefer keeping their 
money at home, if they can.
Based on the above points, we can say that research on financial personalities has 
significant roots, but, at the same time, we can also say that certain personality 
types cannot be clearly distinguished from each other: there are some overlaps 
between them (Béres et al. 2015).
Considering the time that has elapsed between the individual studies (and the 
different metering scales), we can draw the conclusion that the individual group-
creating features also change with time (the emphasis is shifted).
3. Methods
3.1. Questionnaire
In order to identify the financial personality types of respondents, and to find out 
what behaviour patterns, habits and attitudes characterise them, we compiled 
a personality test containing 36 statements (Annex 1). For each item of the 
questionnaire, the responding persons had to decide to what extent the given 
statement was true for them. They were able to do so by using a Likert scale of 
five degrees, in which 1 means not agreeing at all, and 5 means full agreement.
The questionnaire was inquired on-line from the www.penziranytu.hu website, from 
3 June 2015 to 17 August 2015. In the specified period, a total of 3,139 respondents 
filled in the questionnaire, and following data cleaning, 3,088 persons remained. It 
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can be seen that not a lot of respondents had to be excluded in the course of data 
cleaning. Those who started to fill in the questionnaire, usually completed it. In 
the case of on-line questionnaires, it may often happen that respondents interrupt 
the completion of the form for some reason (they find the questions boring, they 
think that the questions are not relevant for them or may find them disturbing, or 
do not understand the statements, etc.), therefore they cannot be included in the 
final analysis. In this study, this problem did not occur. Another similar problem 
with the on-line self-completion methodology may be that respondents do not 
take the answers seriously, and tick the same answer to each question (e.g. one), or 
tick the answers erratically, without any thought. In order to mitigate this problem, 
we incorporated reversed statements, i.e. when statements of similar contents 
are included in both assertive and negative forms. All of this allowed us to exclude 
respondents who entered contradictory answers.
In the present research, the high rate of respondents and the honest replies were 
facilitated by the following factors.
Way of phrasing: We tried to phrase the statements in a way that respondents 
would not feel the subject too scientific or remote, and be more motivated to give 
honest answers to the questions. At the same time, the simple and respondent-
friendly phrasing also allowed us to minimise the risks of misunderstanding.
Omission of sensitive issues, ensuring anonymity: We requested no demographic 
data in the questionnaire, so that respondents would not feel that they could 
be identified at the end of the study. The lack of demographic variables can also 
be interpreted as a limitation of the research, but it significantly increased the 
willingness to reply, and thus we were able to analyse the contents of the scale 
with a sample of large number of items.
Inclusion of motivation element: Following the completion of the form, respondents 
immediately received the evaluation of their profile suggested by their replies. The 
inclusion of this feedback into the research also resulted in higher willingness to 
participate, and facilitated honest replies as well.
3.2 Personality profile
In the course of this research, we worked with two types of personality profiles. One 
of them was compiled by Erzsébet Németh, the developer of the test, and that is 
referenced in this article as a pre-defined personality profile. In this case, following 
the completion of the test, respondents immediately get a so-called personality 
profile and an evaluation of their scores achieved in the pre-defined dimensions 
(Price-sensitive, Economizing, Moderate, etc.).
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In addition, we worked out another personality profile obtained in an empirical 
manner. These personality dimensions were obtained with mathematical-statistical 
methods on the basis of the answers to the individual statements.
3.2.1. Pre-defined personality profile
The questionnaire is a so-called Likert-scale of 36 questions. The respondents may 
use a scale from one to five to evaluate the extent a specific characteristic feature 
characterises them. They have to answer questions such as: “It happens that on 
a bigger shopping trip, I spend more than I planned”; “I will make a snack so that 
we do not have to buy anything in the buffet”; “The yellow cheques are killing me”, 
or “I know exactly what costs what”, etc.3
Considering the fact that the research put the emphasis on features that are 
related to financial culture and that are considered positive, in the development 
of the individual personality profile patterns and the statements representing 
them, the pre-defined personality types also reflect these elements. In other 
words, the individual statements belonged to six categories: (1) Price-sensitive, 
(2) Economizing, (3) Moderate, disciplined, (4) Saver, (5) Diligent, (6) Aware.
In the questionnaire, six statements belonged to each dimension.
The pre-defined personality profile was immediately evaluated, so the respondents 
received prompt feedback. The basis of the evaluation was the value of the answer 
given to individual questions on the Likert scale, i.e. if they fully agreed, it was 5 
points, if they did not agree, it was 1 point. If somebody achieved more in a given 
dimension than 17 points,4 then they received a positive evaluation along that 
dimension, and if they received 17 or less, it was a negative evaluation. 
Pre-defined personality profiles are evaluated in two ways. On the one hand, we 
select those who received the most or the least points in a given dimension, and 
compare their averages with each other, and, on the other hand, we check how 
they perform compared to the average of the total.
3.2.2. Personality profile obtained in an empirical manner
According to our hypothesis, the pre-defined personality profile – especially because 
of the overlaps between individual financial personality dimensions – will differ 
from the personality profile obtained in an empirical manner. In order to determine 
the latter, we apply mathematical-statistical methods with multiple variables (e.g. 
factor analysis).
3  For details, see: http://www.penziranytu.hu/penzugyi-szemelyisegteszt
4  If the respondent enters the value of 1 to each question, the minimum number of points is six, so we did 
not take half of the possible maximum, i.e. 30, which would have been 15, but lifted the dividing line, so 
the dividing value was 17 points.
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4. Results
4.1. Characteristics of the basic dataset
The number of items in the sample mentioned in the methodology description 
is 3,088. Socio-demographical data are not related to the database, so we are 
unable to check the representative nature of the dataset (we treat it as a non-
representative sample), but the large number of respondents allow us to consider 
our results valid.
4.2. Answers to the statements in the questionnaire
In connection with the 36 statements in the questionnaire, respondents had to 
decide whether or not that statement was true about them. The number one 
indicates that something is not typical at all for the respondent, while number 5 
means that it is totally typical of him.
The largest number of fives were given to the statement that people know exactly 
how much money they have. Although we must not forget the fact that the less 
resources are available to us, the more attention we pay to that, we take it as 
a positive feature for the financial personality, because when we do not know what 
we control, we will probably not achieve a good result.
Approximately 45% of respondents indicated that economizing was totally true for 
them when they had little money, and also, that they did not like to throw out still 
usable things, which we also evaluated in a positive way, as the former reflects an 
economizing character, while the latter reflects the proper assessment of values 
(being aware of the real value of a given thing).
In addition, more than 30 per cent of respondents thought it was completely 
true for them that they controlled their spending, always had enough savings, 
compared the prices in shops where they took shopping lists compiled with proper 
consideration. From the aspect of the financial personality, we evaluated these 
features as positive aspects in each case. There was only one exception in the 
category over 30%, which we evaluated a bit more negatively, namely the situation 
when someone wants to provide his child with everything. The reason for the more 
negative qualification is that in our opinion – considering pedagogical aspects, too 
– it is not necessarily a positive process over the long term when a child receives 
everything and does not have to work for it. However, the reason why we do not 
consider it as a clearly negative feature is that respondents may have interpreted 
this statement in a more moderate sense.
Reversing the scale, a little more than three quarters of respondents said that they 
had no financial problems at the end of the month, i.e. they did not have to borrow 
money. This is completely true for 4.37 per cent only. From the aspect of judging the 
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financial personality, we also considered this as a positive feature, because when 
someone needs no loan at the end of the month, it means he is able to economize, 
and it implicitly means that he has enough income to maintain his standard of living.
A little higher ratio is represented by people who think it is completely true for 
them that they have an enormous amount of debt (7.8 per cent), but for the vast 
majority it was still not true at all – almost 64% of the respondents. 
In addition, more than 40% of respondents think that they are always able to pay 
their bills in time (people who always pay late represent a ratio of 8.55 per cent). If 
we look at the ratio of people for whom this is not really the case (who selected 1 
or 2), their total ratio is close to 70 per cent (if we add those who selected 3, they 
represent 80 per cent), and looking at the whole dataset, it is also a positive feature.
The most dividing statements (where each category was selected by at least 14 per 
cent of respondents) are as follows: (1) When I need more money, I take on extra 
work. (2) I make a sandwich, so that we do not have to buy one in the buffet. (3) I 
always have enough savings for unexpected expenses.
The more they feel the above three statements are true about them, the more 
positive their assessment will be from the aspect of financial personalities. 
Considering the fact that all three mean a kind of willingness to perform extra 
activity (work), we think that – also considering the features of the work supply 
curve – the statements looking at the approach to work belong to the key factors of 
financial personality. The reason is that individuals can be best distinguished from 
each other by these features.
Last but not least, we should mention statements that resulted in the most 
neutrality, i.e. where the number of 3 responses given to the statements was highest 
in the replies. In our case, these statements were “we like it, when our home is nice 
and warm”, or “we spend a lot on healthy food and mineral water”. Almost 35% of 
respondents gave a value of 3 to these statements. In our views, from the aspect of 
judging the financial personality, these are negative statements, but in these cases, 
together with the 1-s and 2-s, the total picture is positive, i.e. these statements are 
not typical of more than 73 and 64 per cent of respondents.
4.3 Pre-defined financial personality profile
In each category we defined, we examined if respondents belong to the positive or 
negative range within the given financial personality dimension (to what extent the 
given dimension is true for them), and on the other hand, we compared them with 
people who were least characterised by the given feature (who received the least 
points to the six questions in the given dimension). In the evaluation of the above 
results, a dimension was considered positive if the people with above-average 
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results in that dimension also had similar results in other dimensions, because the 
pre-defined dimensions were defined by using the positive financial personality 
features.
4.3.1. The price-sensitive
Within the total dataset, altogether 327 people (10.6%) received the highest points 
on categories defined for price-sensitivity. On the other hand, for 554 people 
(14.3%) price-sensitivity was the weakest feature.
With the exception of being moderate, price-sensitive people always have a positive 
assessment, so they are in the positive domain on the pre-defined scale (their 
average value is higher than 17), but looking at the total dataset, they do not 
exceed the average. At the same time, it is interesting to note that the least price-
sensitive people have the best performance in all other dimensions. Therefore, our 
conclusion is that price-sensitivity is not necessarily a positive category when we 
talk about financial personalities.
4.3.2. The economizing
More than one fifth of the total dataset (20.95 per cent) reached the highest 
points in the economizing dimension. It can be said about them that their financial 
personality image is positive in terms of all characteristic features according to pre-
defined categories, but even despite its size, the group is below the average of the 
whole dataset. Based on that , we can say that economizing in itself does not mean 
a positive personality image – all the more because in other categories, people who 
can manage their money in a less efficient way, usually perform better. At the same 
time, it must be noted that the differences between individual dimensions are by 
far not as large as they were in the case of price-sensitive people.
4.3.3. The moderate (disciplined)
Regarding the group of moderate people, the most interesting point is that 
almost 22% of those asked belong to people for whom this is their least typical 
characteristic feature, and it is most typical for only 5.76 per cent of them. The 
moderate are closest to the average of the whole dataset in the respect of saving 
and diligence. Therefore, we can draw the conclusion that being moderate does 
not necessarily influence whether or not someone is a saver or hard-working. The 
difference between the most and least economizing people is smaller than in the 
case of price-sensitive and economizing people, i.e. the sample is better-balanced 
along this dimension.
4.3.4. The savers
Only 12.4 per cent of those asked belong to the group of people for whom saving 
is the most important thing, and those, for whom saving is the least important 
feature, represent only 8.1 per cent.
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It is important to note that the members of both groups are above the expected 
value of 17, i.e. saving characterises all respondents independently of the fact 
whether they found it important or less important.
To make it even more interesting, the least thrifty people are the ones who 
performed above the average of the whole group in each dimension. Therefore, 
our conclusion is that saving is important for individuals, and it is a good indicator 
to judge one slice of the financial personality, but it may be misleading in itself.
4.3.5. The diligent
The most important conclusion regarding the dimension of diligent people is that 
most of the respondents (approx. 23.67 per cent of all respondents) received the 
least points in this category, i.e. the number of people who are not really diligent 
is the highest within all categories. The most and least diligent people are above 
the pre-defined dividing line of 17 in every other category.
4.3.6. The aware
Aware respondents are people who are able to control their finances. We find it 
a very positive feature that 25.4 per cent of respondents, i.e. more than one fourth 
of them received the highest points on awareness. Individuals putting financial 
awareness in the focus received more points in each category than those who rated 
another feature higher. Based on that, it is obvious that financial awareness, i.e. 
when someone is able to control his finances is clearly the best indicator for judging 
the financial personality. It happens only in the case of people preferring awareness 
that they always perform above the average of the overall dataset, but it is also 
due to the fact that they represent the highest ratio, so no more conclusions are 
drawn from this.
4.3.7. Lessons from pre-defined dimensions
Having examined the individual dimensions one by one, we collected useful pieces 
of information. The first and most important thing is that for the description of 
a financial personality – to decide what can be considered a positive direction – in 
most cases it is not enough to make decisions on the basis of a special indicator, 
but in individual cases, it may serve as an extremely good guidance.
It turned out from the results that the price-sensitive do not necessarily have proper 
financial personality profiles. We accept that as a result, as on a second thought, 
when price is a primary consideration for someone, then quality (be it a product 
or a service) is only of secondary or lower priority, so it may happen that at the 
end we have to spend more times and higher amounts on something. This may 
refer to the lack of long-term thinking and investment-centred thinking, which is 
not positive from the aspect of the financial personality profile. In summary, if we 
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look at price-sensitivity only, in our opinion, people who are less price-sensitive are 
judged in a more positive way.
It is usually judged in a positive way when someone is able to economize with 
the sources available to him. In our case, it has not been clearly proved about the 
economizing personality whether it is positive or negative from the aspect of the 
financial personality; this requires more examination.
As far as being moderate is concerned, this was the characteristic feature for 
which the majority of respondents received the least number of points. Based on 
the values of the respondents, we were able to draw the conclusion that being 
moderate does not influence the fact whether someone is able to economize or not.
The number of people who thought saving was the most or least important thing 
is low. That leads us to the conclusion that saving is a feature that is considered 
important by most people participating in the survey, but it is not important enough 
to play a role for them. This is why we think that saving in itself cannot be an 
indicator for the assessment of the financial personality. This is important because 
in the credit rating systems of banks, savings (or, in other words, saving up money) 
are included as evaluation considerations regarding saving. From macro-economical 
approach, it is important because saving is not of primary importance in the views 
of respondents, but investments realised from savings are important at the national 
economy level. What this means to us is that both the competitive sphere and the 
public sphere should continuously stimulate savings with their own measures, in 
order to take the economy in a positive direction.
We found it an important positive feature that the ratio of the least diligent people 
was the lowest within the whole dataset. It also means to us that respondents 
attribute real value to income obtained through work, so it is less likely that they 
will spend it carelessly – in other words, it is more likely that they will maximize their 
usefulness with a choice on the basis of proper value for money, when it comes to 
spending their income.
Last but not least, it can be considered as a significant positive feature that most 
respondents control their finances, so they received the most points on awareness. 
This is all the more positive because individuals classified as aware pay more 
attention to their environment, and it happened only once in their case that 
they performed better in each dimension (received a higher average value) than 
respondents who attributed the least importance to awareness. Therefore, we think 
that the best way of assessing the financial personality is to put awareness in the 
centre of future examinations and research.
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4.4. Personality profile obtained in an empirical manner
We have already seen the results that could be achieved by evaluating the financial 
personality profile through the pre-defined financial personality dimension. 
However, when designing this study, we were aware that an individual’s financial 
personality profile may be determined according to different dimensions as well, 
because there are sometimes only slight differences between individual dimensions. 
In the following, we examine other dimensions according to which respondents 
could be evaluated.
In establishing the dimensions, we ran factor analysis for the statements in the 
questionnaire, or rather, for the answers. Based on the factor analysis, a total 
of nine groups emerged. On the basis of the results of people who statistically 
received similar number of points to the same questions, we have created our own 
dimensions: (1) Economizers with little money, (2) Money-devouring (opposite of 
moderate), (3) Order creates value, (4) Price-sensitive, (5) Collector, (6) Planner, (7) 
Ups and downs, (8) Diligent, (9) Cannot control finances
It is obvious from the categories that there are overlaps with pre-defined categories, 
but the factor analysis allowed us to set up more sophisticated dimensions.
4.4.1. Economizers with little money
The dimension of economizers with little money includes people who have trouble 
managing their finances, most of them struggle with debts, but at the same time 
and as opposed to it, it may happen that they also have some savings. Economizers 
with little money, while struggling with their financial problems, are convinced 
that they are able to control their finances well. We found it a positive feedback 
for the conclusion drawn for the pre-defined categories that economizing does not 
necessarily mean a positive financial personality image.
4.4.2. Money-devourers
Among the characteristic features of money-devourers, it is primarily the short-term 
features that dominate – they love to have fun, they immediately buy what they like, 
they love shopping and often reward themselves. It is important to point out that 
risk-taking is also present here. All in all, we could call this category “dolce vita”, i.e. 
sweet life, but this cannot be maintained over the long term, so the assessment of 
respondents belonging here is not positive from the aspect of financial personality.
4.4.3. Order creates value
From the aspect of the financial personality, it is worth focusing on this dimension. 
If someone performs well here, he keeps track of his expenses, knows exactly when 
and how much money he has, and from this, it partly comes that he keeps his home 
and household tidy, and before shopping, always thinks over what he needs. If we 
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had to find one indicator for high-level financial culture, this would be it, on the 
basis of the profile gained in an empirical manner.
As the factor consists of four statements, respondents were able to give altogether 
20 points. Based on Figure 2, we found it a positive feature that a significant portion 
of respondents gave an average mark of at least 4 to the four questions (both the 
modus and the median values are 16), and, in addition to that, more than half of 
the respondents gave a value of 16 or higher.
From the pre-defined categories, the dimension of the aware is closest to the order 
creates value dimension.
4.4.4. The price-sensitive
The dimension obtained in an empirical manner contains people for whom it is most 
typical that they compare prices before shopping, and as a result, are able to take 
their time in selecting the articles. They know the exact price of everything, and 
because of the time and energy invested in the process, they find it hard dispose 
of their belongings.
Figure 2
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This dimension is different from the price-sensitive group defined by us in advance, 
as in this case, the focus is rather on good value for money and on long-term 
interests, while in the pre-defined group, price-sensitivity meant that individuals 
could have additional expenses in the future, because low prices may be coupled 
with poor quality – thinking about the Veblen-effect – and may generate additional 
expenses in the future.
The above points also indicate the general weak points of financial personality 
profile definitions – which were partly known during the processing of the technical 
literature – which means that the definition of the financial personality dimensions 
of people always involves certain challenges without the firm definitions of terms.
4.4.5. Collectors
In this dimension, those people reached higher scores who take advantage of sales 
and try to amass everything. They do not necessarily keep their environment tidy, 
but when they do, they realise how many unnecessary things they have. When 
they go shopping, they usually buy more items than they planned. We can say 
that they are capable of long-term thinking, but momentary impacts and impulses 
divert their behaviour in the wrong direction. In other words, we could call them 
the victims of marketing.
4.4.6. Planners
The name of the dimension refers to the fact that people reaching higher scores 
in the category usually compile a list before shopping (they plan what they want 
to buy). We can feel that they have awareness, but based on their features, they 
are different from the order creates value dimension. Therefore, we think that in 
addition to the order creates value dimension, it is the planners dimension that 
clearly indicates a positive financial personality.
4.4.7. Ups and downs
In this dimension, savers and spenders are together, so we thought that Mellan’s 
(1997) rioter category would fit them best. However, rioters clearly refer to 
a negative category, and therefore we felt it important to ease the description. In 
fact, from the aspect of financial personality, their assessment depends on which 
feature is stronger in the given respondent.
4.4.8. Diligent
This dimension corresponds to the diligent category pre-defined by us. The 
central organising principle is work, in connection with which individuals assess 
the acquired income, and as a consequence, they are able to appreciate it. The 
assessment of individuals reaching highs scores in this category is clearly positive 
in respect of their financial personality.
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4.4.9. Cannot control finances
When giving a name to this dimension, we could have selected the use of the 
money-devouring category, because even people with high scores here spend 
money like water, and are unable to fully control that. The difference from the 
previous money-devouring category is motivation. While in the previous category 
the motivation (e.g. shopping) was to maximise the advantages over the short 
term (pleasure), here the individuals are not able to appreciate the real value of 
the goods they wish to consume, and over the short term it means that they are 
surprised at the amount they have to pay at the cash-desk, and over the long term, 
it may take the development of their children in a negative direction, as they give 
everything that their children desire. From the aspect of the financial personality, 
we do not classify it as a positive dimension.
4.4.10. Lessons learned from dimensions obtained in an empirical manner
It is obvious from the established dimensions that in the creation of the individual 
financial personality profiles, it is not possible to draw sharp dividing lines, which 
is a weakness – and a strength – of all financial personality profile studies.
We found it a positive feature that several of the pre-defined financial personality 
dimensions could partially or fully be matched with the new personality dimensions 
created on the basis of empirical data, for instance price-sensitivity, diligence, 
planning and being moderate. Personality dimensions obtained in the empirical 
way were also interpreted as the validation of pre-defined dimensions.
The order creates value dimension and the planner dimension obviously contain 
characteristic features which are the most likely bases of having a positive financial 
personality that can be considered good. This is all the more important as in loan 
assessments by banks, the weight of subjective elements is high, but the set of 
tools available to assess it is rather limited – it is primarily based on personal 
impressions. Consequently, what this research can offer as a contribution to the 
development of such systems is the implicit questions, based on which we can draw 
some conclusions about the debtor’s personality and behaviour pattern, and the 
key point for the bank is whether or not the person will be able to repay the loan.
5. Summary
This research served two purposes. On the one hand, with proper foundations from 
the technical literature, to determine and test financial personality dimensions 
which lead us to believe at the beginning of the research that it would be possible to 
define the financial personality profile of an individual. On the other hand, we were 
aware that, because of the overlaps between individual dimensions, real life will not 
fully confirm our ideas. Therefore, our secondary objective was to determine new 
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dimensions typical of the given dataset, using mathematical-statistical methods, on 
the basis of the answers received. We also used the latter to validate our originally 
established model.
Our sample used in the research was not representative, but it contained a high 
number of elements (almost 3,100), and therefore we believe that the conclusions 
from the sample are suitable for drawing effective conclusions. It must be noted 
though that respondents’ points in individual dimensions may depict a better picture 
of domestic financial awareness, than measuring the same in a representative 
sample. It can be supposed that if someone devotes the time to fill in a test (and 
finds it), he will be interested in the subject more than the average.
Our most important conclusion is that it is very difficult to evaluate the financial 
personality of individuals along one specific dimension: it may present a number 
of challenges and false directions. However, it is important to note that both the 
pre-defined and the empirical dimensions contain dimensions that may be suitable 
for this purpose.
Among the pre-defined dimensions, awareness and diligence are such categories, 
while among the dimensions obtained in an empirical manner, these were diligence 
and planning. As the names are not separated significantly, the contents of these 
dimensions are not significantly separated from each other. Planning, a long-term 
approach, the assessment of money through the work done for it are all positive 
features for the financial personality.
As to the usability of the results of the research, we think that they can be used 
best as a starting point for further financial personality research, but they could also 
be well utilised for business purposes. One option is loan assessment in banks, as 
the answers given to the statements may offer some objective information on the 
borrower, which used to be part of subjective loan assessment before.
Finally, we can also draw macro-economic conclusions, based on individuals’ 
preferences. Saving seems to be an objective that is considered important by the 
majority of the participants of the surveys, but it does not play a central role in 
their financial personality profiles. In other words, we can say that retail savings 
are able to grow and will grow as a result of incentives only, whether these are 
induced by the private sector or the public sector, it is irrelevant from the aspect 
of the financial personality.
The most important lesson to be learned from the research is that individuals can 
do a lot to be better off. Both the pre-defined and empirical dimensions indicate 
that the most efficient strategies are financial awareness (planning and recording 
expenses) and the improvement of diligence. Economizing and price-sensitivity 
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alone are not enough, especially if the person tends to do impulsive shopping. 
It is worth building subsequent examinations on the results of the research, and 
carefully examining these personality types and relations.
The results of the research may be a useful source of information in the 
development of domestic programmes aimed at improving financial culture, and 
may offer some support to the formulation of the national strategy of financial 
culture development and to the development of operating plans.
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About ageing – for economists
György Németh
In Issue 2/2015 of the Financial and Economic Review, Emese Kreiszné Hudák, Péter 
Varga and Viktor Várpalotai published their study entitled “The macroeconomic 
impacts of demographic changes in Hungary in the context of the European Union”.1 
While I have no reason to dispute the essential statements presented therein, the 
notion of ageing – just as in the entire specialist literature – was not elaborated 
in their study, perhaps because the authors believe that it is self-explanatory, 
evident, trivial, etc. But it is not. Ageing in the context of the economy has a much 
narrower meaning than ageing in the demographic and social sense. Moreover, 
the measures of ageing combine two demographic processes of fundamentally 
opposite judgement, i.e. the increasing average life expectancy, which is judged 
positively and the fertility rate below the level of simple reproduction, which is 
judged negatively. The author of this paper is convinced that a correct (macro) 
economic policy programme can only be drawn up, if the impacts of ageing are 
analysed separately by its components. 
The attention of economics turned to the population2 as a whole two centuries ago, 
since the appearance of Malthus. It is the population that creates and operates 
the economy, and a part thereof is the beneficiary, while another part of it is the 
loser of the happenings of the economy – i.e. of all that is examined by economics. 
Malthus worried that food production, increasing along an arithmetical progression 
would not be able to satisfy the population’s needs increasing along a geometrical 
progression.3 Shortage of food results in overpopulation, while overpopulation 
generates conflicts that escalate to (civil) wars, where the soldiers dying with 
weapon in their hands and the unarmed civilians killed by the weapons literally 
give their life for the reinstatement of the balance between the population and 
food production. Since war is a moral evil, and moral evil should be prevented, 
Malthus recommended birth control, and – as the means thereof – abstinence 
and late marriage.
 *  The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the offical view 
of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
 György Németh, sociologist-economist, former employee of the Hungarian Demographic Research Institute
E-mail: n.gyorgy@t-online.hu.
1  http://hitelintezetiszemle.hu/letoltes/4-kreiszne-varga-varpalotai.pdf
2  Thomas Malthus published – anonymously – his book entitled “An Essay on the Principle of Population” 
in 1898, which he republished – already with name and fully revised – in 1903, essentially as a new book.
3  Mathematical progression (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ...) and geometrical progression (1, 2, 4, 8, 16, …). 




Malthus is usually received with resignation: he did not foresee the crop-increasing 
impact of the scientific and technical development, and that people will be inclined 
to restrain their reproduction even without abstinence and late marriage (and 
for this they will undertake abortion and contraception, also regarded by him as 
moral evil). Nevertheless, historians can provide numerous examples of the truth 
of Malthus. It is often a basic formula for war that the party short of resources 
attack the holders of resources to acquire such resources, of course usually trying 
to justify it by retaliation for an injury it has suffered or some other noble-looking 
objective. Just one example: the nomadic tribes living to the north of China usually 
found an excuse to attack China (the Great Wall was built against them) when 
cereal prices soared in China due to poor harvests.4 Malthus – still regarded by 
many as an amateur Anglican country vicar who meddled with demography only 
to kill time – was professor in political economics, one of the greatest figures of 
classic English economics, and in several respects he was ahead of Keynes, and 
he was right – contrary to his famous contemporary and rival Ricardo – in several 
questions. (As Keynes noted, Ricardo prevailed over him, because he expressed his 
thoughts more precisely and he was able to capture the imagination of the London 
gentlemen better...). It was Malthus who introduced into economics the awareness 
of the finiteness of resources, and the weight of this topic only became a practical 
issue for mankind towards the end of the 20th century, when the viability of the 
planet Earth turned out to be at risk.
Malthus’ attention focused on the most important characteristics of population: 
its size, i.e. the number of individuals. Another important attribute of population 
is the age of the individuals, that is the age structure of the population and the 
change thereof. One possible direction of the change is ageing. The focus on ageing 
is a substantially more recent phenomenon, with a history of merely twenty-five 
years. Most generally, ageing means that the ratio of the old increases and that of 
the young decreases. It is a question to be answered when and why this may be 
interesting for economists. It is not self-explanatory.
4  In the language of economics: the intention was to fill the current account deficit generated in bilateral 
trade relations by booty or reparations. (Under reparations also meaning the annual tax paid by the Chinese 
state in lieu of peace (non-aggression), which in the language of economy means that the Chinese assumed 
the current account deficit, or – to some extent – accepted the unequal exchange). If the attack failed, the 
consequence was a decline in population resulting from famine. The nomadic stockbreeders needed settled 
agriculturalists, but this was not true, or not to the same degree, in the other way round. Agriculturalists had 
a large variety of options to improve crops without damaging the soil, while the nomadic stockbreeders spoil 
their pastures if they increase the number of animals. Ways to break out of this trap could have included 
the changeover to agriculture, engagement in long-distance intermediary trading (as international service 
activity) or the creation of strongly export-oriented industry (including the mining of raw materials, if any 
can be found on their territory). The first two was not possible due to the geographic conditions, while 
the principle conditions of the third one were established only after two thousand years. The result, on 
the one hand, is the populous and rich China, while the nomads – which were once feared by the Chinese, 
and under the reign of Genghis created the empire with the largest area of world history, also occupying 
China – became insignificant and poor.
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Notion of ageing
Ageing (or aging), as a technical term, is the attribute of two disciplines. These 
are (medical) biology and demography. These are two separate worlds, albeit the 
first one does have something to do with the latter, and in the future it will be 
increasingly so.
It is a biological fact that all creatures, and thus humans as well, age. The earlier we 
learn and understand the biological processes leading to ageing, the more probable 
it is that we find the way to decelerate such, prolonging life and – hopefully to an 
even larger degree – the years spent in health. There are two distinct positions as 
to how long ageing can be decelerated and where the uncrossable limit of human 
life is. According to the first one the uncrossable limit is 120–130 years, the human 
organism is “configured” for that much; this makes average lifetime over 100 years 
imaginable, and perhaps in the middle of the second half of the 21st century, and 
almost surely by the beginning of the 22nd century it will be reality. According to the 
second position, we do not yet know and see where the uncrossable limit is, but it 
is surely higher than 120–130 years. Irrespective of this, it is a fact that in the past 
decades there was a considerable rise in average life expectancy, however – and 
this may appear to be paradox – this was not primarily due to the fact that people 
generally lived longer, but because there was a fall in the number of those that 
died before they reached adulthood. This trend is about to run out: the source of 
a further rise in average life expectancy will increasingly be the fact that people 
live longer generally as well.5
The other discipline is demography. Demography is a science of descriptive nature 
(as the second part of the ‘graphia’ Latin compound words, originating from 
Greek, means description, drawing), which presents the size and age structure 
of the population, as well as the birth and mortality rate, and external migration 
impacting it directly, and marriages, divorces and internal migration, affecting it 
indirectly. In demography the smallest unit of population is the “individual person”, 
with two attributes: sex and age. In addition, we know that the creation of the 
“individual person” requires two “individual persons” of the opposite sex, of which 
the biological age of the woman is (more) limited6 than that of men.
5  This may also be helped by the invention of anti-ageing molecules that with time may as well be applied 
as medicine. Researchers at the US Salk Institute were surprised to find during their research for anti-
Alzheimer drugs that it “rejuvenated elderly mice”, which was supported by a number of physiological 
parameters: their memory and cognitive capacities improved, their brains’ vascular system became 
healthier and their physiological functions developed.      
See: htps://sg.hu/cikkek/115835/lassitja-az-oregedest-egy-molekula.   
The referenced study is available at www.impactaging.com.
6  Demography considers women between the age of 15 and 49 being in the fertile age.
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Demographic descriptions call for explanations (what made the size and age 
structure of the population exactly like that), which is also addressed by population 
science of sociological nature, which is also referred to – albeit inaccurately – as 
demography. Demography describes specific populations, and compares them 
with other specific populations, while population science tries to find sociological 
explanations for the demographic features of individual societies and the cause 
of the differences. Population science is built on demography; demography 
serves as the starting point, the dataset to be interpreted and which it interprets. 
In demography it is the population, while in population science it is the society 
that ages. A population does not necessarily constitutes a society, while a society 
can always also be described by its population. Population and society are not 
synonyms.
As mentioned before, ageing in the most general sense means that within a given 
population the ratio of the old increases, while that of the young decreases 
between two dates. Since this may also happen the other way round, youthing also 
exists, but this technical term did not become part of the demographic thinking, 
probably because in the history of mankind ageing is a basic trend, which has 
been interrupted rarely and only for a short time by periods of youthing. This can 
be claimed with high certainty even without the possibility of proving it (we have 
rather limited data to support this from the periods other than the last one-one 
and a half century), and perhaps it can be made more accurate by saying that the 
constant age structure may be the most general (with shifts within the margin of 
error), but when there was a perceivable change that usually meant ageing.
Measuring ageing
Before moving on, it is worth briefly touching on the established methods of 
measuring ageing, mostly to make their unsatisfactory nature clear later on.
The direction of the change in the age structure (ageing or youthing) and the 
magnitude of the change can be determined, if the age structures existing at 
different points of time can be condensed into a single statistical index. Of course, 
statistical indices disguise a large part of the compound, complex reality that they 
are meant to describe, but in lieu of the lost information at least we obtain a tool 
that is perfect for comparison: numbers. There are three solutions in use for the 
generation of numbers for the purpose of comparison.
Solution I – calculation of the average age: at a given point of time we add the age 
of all members of the population and divide it by the number of constituents. This is 
regarded to be useless to such a degree that neither the international organisations, 
nor the national statistical authorities calculate it.
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Solution II – finding the median age: that is the age where half of the population is 
younger and the other half is older than that. This is regarded to be an essentially 
better index than the average age,7 and it is calculated both by the international 
organisations and the national statistical authorities. The world’s median age in 1980 
was 22.5 years, the estimate for 2015 is 29.6 years; according to the UN’s advance 
calculations it will be 33.1 and 36.1 years in 2030 and 2050,8 respectively. It will fall 
short of Hungary’s 2010 figure – i.e. 39.9 years9 – even in 2050.
It is obvious that of two populations compared at a given point of time that one 
whose respective age is higher is the older one, and a given population ages 
between two dates if that age increases.
Solution III– creating some kind of quotient. An essential condition for this is to 
determine the age when we regard elderly people to be old. The old are included 
in the numerator and the total population – or perhaps only the population without 
the old (total population minus the old) – in the denominator. On the other hand, if 
we take the approach that “old age” should be interpreted not relative to the total 
population or to part of the population without them, but relative to “the young”, 
the age over which one is no longer regarded to be young must be determined. 
Then we measure “old age” with the quotient of the old to the young. For example, 
the ageing index used by the UN is the quotient of the 60-year old and older (60–) 
and those younger than 15 years (–14); however, the quotient of the 65-year old 
and older (65–) and those younger than 20 years (–19) is used more often. If the 
reason for the enquiry about ageing is more directly the issue of providing for the 
old, then the denominator contains the “middle-aged” population – who, as follows 
from their age, already and still operate the economy – rather than the old and 
the young. The dependency ratio also measures “agedness”, but – being a slightly 
more practical indicator – in the ageing index it tries to determine “middle age” in 
accordance with the hypothetical age of entering the labour market and retiring.
The drawback of “quotients” is the coercion to determine age: where old age starts 
(and where youth ends), which inevitable contains some arbitrary approach. In the 
case of average age and median ages, this is not a concern.
7  The main reason for this is that, compared to the average (arithmetical) age, it includes some extra 
information related to the variance around the average.
8  http://esa.un.org/unpd/popdev/Profilesofageing2015/index.html
9  For the median ages of the individual countries between 1950 and 2010, by intervals of ten years, see: 
http://ourworldindata.org/data/population-growth-vital-statistics/age-structure-and-mortality-by-age/. 
You will find the median age by countries and in male-female breakdown, as an estimate for the given year 
(when writing this paper for 2015) on the website of the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
According to that Hungary’s estimated median age in 2015 is 41.4 years, 39.5 years for men and 43.8 years 
for women. The same in the world is 29.9 years, 29.1 years for men and 30.6 years for women. So, it is 




Ageing – why should economists care about it?
Ageing in the most general sense – that is in the context of demography – means 
that within a given population the ratio of the old increases, while that of the young 
decreases between two dates. This alone is not sufficient to raise the interest of 
the economists, but it is not known by the economists either when it is sufficient. 
This is why they talk about ageing in general, while in fact they mean only a special 
segment thereof. This needs a bit more elaboration.
Let us assume a population with a constant mortality rate where women give 
birth on average to eight children during their life. In one year, a female age-group 
reaches the childbearing age that changes the established fertility attitude and from 
then on the average becomes four children. As a result of this, the population is 
ageing quickly, and although its number of inhabitants increases, the rate thereof 
decelerates. (Provided that the mortality rate assumed to be steady is not so high 
that the four born children is not sufficient to ensure simple reproduction.) The 
ageing resulting from this decrease in fertility in the last one and a half century 
– considering its social and economic consequence in the age of modernity – is 
a positive development to be welcomed. Namely, the fast growth of population is 
the source of huge problems, as it is unlikely that the number of jobs can keep up 
with it and it is impossible to build so many more flats, or expand public institutions 
(schools, hospitals, etc.) and infrastructure at the same rate. Before the age of 
modernity, when subsistence farming provided for the living of the vast majority 
of the population and there were abundant resources, the fast growth of the 
population was a lesser problem, or could even have socio-economic advantages: 
people cut down forests, reclaimed land and ploughed uncultivated land, thereby 
the fast growing population created a living for itself; moreover, the higher density 
of population could create more intense and efficient trade relations. Due to the 
finiteness of resources and the economic-technical development, this is no longer 
a viable option. The society, economy and politics have become much more 
“population-sensitive”.
In the example above, we assumed constant mortality rate. If it is assumed to 
improve – on a historical scale this is the only option – it may have bi-directional 
impacts. On the one hand, the improvement in mortality before the end of the 
childbearing age – and we can be sure that almost the entire improvement will be 
in that age bracket – slows down the ageing determined by the drop in fertility, 
since a larger ratio of the women born live until childbearing age and give birth 
to children. Contrary to the youthing effect of the lower mortality rate, the mere 
“longer living” has an ageing effect. The question is the outcome of these two 
opposite effects; it is certain that an improved mortality rate after childbearing 
age solely has an ageing effect. The main reason for demographic booms is that at 
a relatively high fertility rate, as a result of the improved infant and child mortality 
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rates, more women live until childbearing age; it is very rarely attributable to an 
increase in fertility (this may mostly happen if a very high mother mortality rate is 
reduced drastically).
Ageing is a demographic-social basic trend of mankind, and hence there is nothing 
special in it; nevertheless we talk about it more and more often and only in the 
negative context. Ageing is a negative demographic phenomenon and it would be 
best to turn it around, but there is little chance for the youthing of the population, 
hence – for lack of something better – we have to submit to it. In fact, it is youthing 
that should be talked about only in negative context, while we do not even mention 
it. How would we take the situation when under constant fertility the population 
became younger due to higher mortality rate among the middle-aged and the old, 
or under constant mortality rate due to an increase in fertility, for example in the 
overpopulated black African or Arab countries? It is easy to see that the attention 
of economists is turned to the demographic phenomenon called “ageing” by the 
nearness of a distinguished demographic point. This point is the level of fertility 
around simple reproduction. This level in the developed countries is 2.1 (=TFR, 
Total Fertility Rate). Ten women during their live have to give birth on average to 
twenty-one children to reproduce themselves and a man. The reason why more 
than twenty is because on average one does not reach her fertile age.
From this, we may conclude that the notion of ageing used by us is not accurate and 
not sophisticated enough. Below I attempt to differentiate three notions of ageing:
ageing in the demographic sense: in a specific population, the ratio of the old 
increases and that of the young decreases. The opposite thereof is youthing. The 
basic trend is ageing.
ageing in the social sense: ageing in the demographic sense has a social impact that 
is not necessarily negative, but requires attention and political responses in terms 
of social and welfare policy. (Increase in the number/ratio of the elderly requiring 
care and support.)
ageing in the economic sense: the decline in fertility below the level of simple 
reproduction (independently of the mortality rate). This situation raises economic 
problems not yet known and clarified in full (which is not the case with ageing in 
the social sense; moreover, it may often contribute to the resolution of economic 
problems). We also talk about ageing in the economic sense, when fertility 
increases, but does not go beyond the level necessary for simple reproduction 
(while in the demographic sense this is youthing, unless offset by an improved 
mortality rate).
I propose that economists should talk about ageing in the economic sense since 
after all they use the notion of ageing in this sense.
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And finally one more proposal. There is no such thing as ageing in general, as it is 
the result of two opposite processes: a falling fertility and an improving mortality 
rate. It is wrong to treat these alike as is the case with all established ageing indices. 
While an improved mortality rate and the lengthening of human life are clearly 
positive developments to be welcomed, the fall in fertility below the level of simple 
reproduction is negative, which deserves the government’s attention and becomes 
the justification for taking pro-natalist demographic policy measures.
We need a twin index of ageing that shows to what extent the ageing of the 
population can be attributed to the increase in average life expectancy and to 
what extent to the decrease in fertility. Such a twin index has yet to be developed.
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The core-periphery paradigm was conceived in the 1960s and early 1970s as one 
of the various theoretical explanations of the phenomenon of socio-economic 
development and especially underdevelopment. These theories were generally 
related to the Third World, designed mainly in Latin America and generalised by I. 
Wallerstein in his book The Capitalist World Economy (1979); they did not say too 
much about the future of “developed” societies. They grew out of the theories 
of economic growth and societal modernisation derived from Western thinking 
and experience. At that time, there was consequently little concern about the 
question of whether or not development theories or paradigms should or can at 
all be applied to the case of Europe. The advanced countries of the West, it was 
assumed, had arrived. 
This has changed since the value system of Western modernity has been biased 
by developments like the oil crisis, the decline of some key industrial sectors, 
the emergence of uncontrollable financial markets and, most particularly, the 
successive enlargements of the European Community, originally designed for highly 
industrialised countries, to include less advanced new member states with differing 
economic, political and cultural structures. Increasing heterogeneity and inequality 
led to the emergence of differing political and economic development patterns and 
respective national interests.
One of the first attempts to apply this paradigm to the case of Europe was the 
project of the European Association of Development Training and Research 
 *  The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the offical view 
of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
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Institutes (EADI) to analyse the implications of the accession of Greece, Portugal 
and Spain for the future of the European integration process (cf. Seers-Schaffer-
Kiljunen: Underdeveloped Europe (1979), Seers-Vaitsos: Integration and Unequal 
Development (1980), Seers-Vaitsos: The Second Enlargement of the EEC - Integration 
of Unequal Partners (1982). Since that time, further successive enlargements 
particularly involving Eastern European countries, and political, economic and 
financial crises, have significantly increased the divergence of responses to common 
challenges by individual member states and have therefore revealed possible and 
actual conflict potentials.
As stated in the introductory note, this volume of contributions by 17 authors takes 
a comparative and theoretical approach using a variety of case studies. It examines 
how mounting economic, political and cultural divergences have transformed 
the European Union and how these crises have both exacerbated tensions in 
centre-periphery relations within and outside the Eurozone. Accordingly, a rather 
pessimistic conclusion is drawn: the EU as a supranational organisation may have 
reached its limits in terms of multilevel governance.
Most of the contributions focus particularly on the asymmetrical relations between 
the economically stronger core countries (e.g. Germany, Austria, Netherlands, and 
Finland) and those of the periphery (e.g. Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy) within the 
context of the Eurozone crisis. Brigid Laffan emphasises that, especially in the case 
of Greece, the manner in which this problem has been managed was modelled on 
a German paradigm, since the crisis was never just about sovereign debt, but rather 
about a mismatch between the banking sectors of the creditors from the core and 
the lenders from the periphery. The article concludes that the asymmetry of power 
between the core and periphery has made it very difficult for the peripheral states 
to obtain sufficient political capacity to secure an alternative policy mix. Angelos 
Sepos outlines the theoretical foundations of the core-periphery paradigm and 
their applicability to the economic and political power relations in the European 
Union, concluding that the creation of a full-fledged symmetrical, cooperative EU 
federal model, rather than more differentiated integration, could help the Union to 
bridge the divide. Taking account of the actual state of the Union, such an argument 
seems to be, most regrettably, wishful thinking rather than a pragmatic way towards 
a feasible solution. The article of Christian Schweiger takes a more realistic position 
in analysing the national interests and differential integration patterns of the three 
strongest member states: Germany, France and the United Kingdom. It points out 
the fundamentally different strategic approaches of these countries to the financial 
crisis and the subsequent divergence that even under profound crisis conditions 
they display tendencies to defend their national interests and the perceived 
competitive advantages of their domestic political economies. All of this seems to 
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be true even in the case of the current refugee crisis, which, of course, could not 
have been anticipated when this article was written.
The following chapter by Stefan Auer stresses the interesting aspect of the different 
political cultures in the way how the crisis is supposed to be managed. He states 
that there were no value-neutral solutions to the euro crisis, and the myriad of 
measures adopted appear to have largely reflected the preferences and interests of 
Germany. In fact, the euro was intended to be a German-type currency. The author 
quotes Mario Monti as saying that for Germany “economics is a branch of moral 
philosophy”. According to protestant ethics, fiscal sinners are to be punished and 
the righteous have nothing to apologise for, whereas in the countries influenced 
by Catholicism sins can always be forgiven if the sinner repents. In countries of 
orthodox faith such as Greece there is not even a need for forgiveness.
The thesis of the chapter by José M. Magone is that Southern European countries 
had an idealised image of the European Union and there was a general belief that 
the very fact of being members would resolve their political and economic problems. 
Accordingly, there was a tendency to be the passive receivers of democratisation 
and modernisation packages instead of being pro-active in solving their own 
problems. This certainly may be true for Greece and most of the Eastern European 
candidate countries, but as this reviewer recalls, Spain and Portugal negotiated 
thoroughly on accession for more than eight years, while at the same time making 
serious efforts to restructure their domestic economies to become able to satisfy 
the conditions of international competitiveness. On the whole, however, European 
integration has contributed to greater stability and democratic accountability in 
these countries. The EU turned out to be a vincolo esterno in order to modernise 
and democratise society.
Three Hungarian authors contributed to this volume. The chapter by Attila Ágh 
deals with the special case of the Eastern European new member states. The 
author rightly points to the fact that the whole debate on differentiated integration 
has so far been restricted to “technical” aspects, side-lining the politics and 
policy dimensions, whereas democracy backsliding has become a widespread 
phenomenon in some member states resulting in an increasing democracy gap 
within the EU. Some of the new member states have produced reduced, formal-
legal, low-performing democracies with poor governance and non-sustainable 
social progress. Accordingly, the expectation that the collapse of communism and 
the victory of Western liberalism would make for swift convergence between the 
eastern and western parts of Europe has turned out to be an illusion. The author 
concludes that it should be the task of the EU institutions to push the new member 
countries more energetically towards convergence with mainstream European 
values and developments. It may of course be questioned whether such efforts by 
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the EU could prove to be even counterproductive by strengthening nationalistic 
tendencies in the countries affected.
A similar approach is taken by Oliver Kovács in his contribution on Hungaryʼs agony 
over Eurozone accession, as he emphasises that mere fulfilment of the accession 
criteria in mathematical terms does not guarantee successful integration afterwards. 
It is equally essential to refocus on the role of the state and its institutional settings. 
Based on a series of comparative statistical indicators, the article shows that 
Hungary’s seemingly dynamic growth trajectory in the period 2000–2006 was 
mainly driven by rising indebtedness while the period 2009–2012 was characterised 
by expenditure-based fiscal consolidation combined with unconventional economic 
policies leading to mounting uncertainties. Poor performance in innovation, 
autocratic nationalism and macroeconomic populism do not enhance the good 
governance required for sound socio-economic development. Beyond pure 
numerical economic targets, important qualitative aspects such as trust, credibility, 
and responsible public management should be better integrated into economic 
analyses and policies.
The central thesis of the chapter by Bela Galgoczi is that the problem of 
competitiveness of the Southern and Eastern countries in the periphery of Europe 
cannot be adequately analysed and solved by reference to factors such as diverging 
labour costs. Non-price aspects such as export structure, productivity and quality, 
which are largely ignored by adjustment policies, play a crucial role in overall 
economic performance. Given the lack of effective adjustment mechanisms in 
the Eurozone, the surplus-deficit gap evolved into a more complicated creditor-
debtor relationship. The distortions in terms of basic economic structure were not 
addressed. But if convergence is exclusively driven by purely economic processes, 
the result will not be durable and balanced.
A series of case studies highlights the specific problems, challenges and responses 
in the individual countries of the European periphery. In her paper, Anna Visvizi 
presents a thorough and concise analysis of the Greek crisis and the role of the 
so-called Troika. She emphasizes that the effective implementation of economic 
adjustment programmes requires a broad political consensus and programme 
ownership cannot be limited to the ruling government itself but needs to stretch 
across the entire political spectrum. The chapter by Bernadette Connaughton deals 
with the special case of Ireland which was once regarded as the most successful 
peripheral country, but due to the financial crisis had to adopt rigorous austerity 
measures. Although the crisis was unleashed by the global credit crunch, it 
was strongly aggravated by “home-grown” governance and policy failures. The 
structural adjustment programme yielded fairly successful results, but Ireland 
remains vulnerable and the government must be ready to take measures to address 
potential future risks. Two further case studies by José M. Magone are included in 
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this volume: the case of Spain and that of Portugal. Both papers present a thorough, 
informative analysis of the respective problems and the measures taken to address 
them. As for Spain, this country was able to escape the intervention of the Troika, 
but despite major reforms some structural problems in the Spanish economy still 
remain unresolved. One important difference compared to the cases of Greece 
and Portugal is that Spain is a much larger economy and its banking sector is more 
robust and more embedded into international networks. With regard to Portugal, 
this country, once a “good pupil of the EU”, is hit by major social and political crisis. 
The debt problem was merely a symptom of an economy and society that has 
proved to be basically weak. In an interesting analysis of the Italian case, Marco 
Brunazzo and Vincent della Sala conclude that the traditional perception of Italy 
as a central state of the EU has eroded in recent decades, the country now has 
the ambiguous position of being at the same time part of the centre and part of 
the periphery. In his paper on the balance of Poland’s ten years of membership in 
the EU, Maciej Duszczyk reports on the dynamic economic growth and significant 
investments over the last decade thus narrowing the development gap between 
Poland and the core countries of the Union. Nevertheless, if Poland wants to 
play the role of a core country, it should reaffirm its willingness to accede to the 
Eurozone. Finally, in the case of Cyprus, the paper of Thorsten Kruse shows in detail 
that the causes of the financial crisis were manifold and the approach employed by 
international creditors to resolve this crisis were quite different from the measures 
implemented in other affected European countries. After the Greek “haircut” and 
on the way towards insolvency a so-called bail-in was designed as a mechanism to 
recapitalise the banking sector and thus prevent final bankruptcy. Nonetheless, the 
island’s economy has to be restructured and diversified, and the enormous debt 
must be carefully reduced.
The last three chapters of the volume deal with the global impact of the European 
crisis. In an interesting paper focusing on the Unionʼs changing role in the world, 
Carolin Rüger quotes the former Belgian minister Mark Eyskens in saying that the 
EU is an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm. However, when 
the economic giant tumbled, it also lost its newly gained political ambitions. 
The financial, economic and sovereign debt crisis has affected not only the core-
periphery relations within the EU, but also the Union’s global role in the world. 
Centrifugal tendencies additionally hinder common external action. The dilemma 
of EU foreign policy remains: “all member states, both core and periphery, would 
like the Union to wield the joint weight of the 28 states, however, the willingness 
of each member state to cooperate with the other 27 is much more limited.” As 
a consequence, Europe is on the road from the global core towards the global 
periphery.
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A similar question is raised by Edward Yencken in his article on the impact of the 
Eurozone crisis on third-country perceptions of the EU, although his conclusion 
seems to be less pessimistic. He admits that the crisis has had a significant impact 
in negatively influencing external perceptions of the EU as an international actor. 
Certainly, the crisis may bring tensions into the Union’s relations with third 
countries, the crisis is unlikely to substantially alter the extent to which the EU 
is perceived to be an important global player. The EU-Australia relationship is an 
example that the Eurozone crisis has failed to disrupt bilateral cooperation.
In the last chapter, the three editors of the volume try to summarise the findings 
and to draw, within the realm of the possibilities, overall conclusions. Successive 
enlargements led to a Union of highly developed economies and a Southern and 
Eastern periphery of economically significantly weaker member states. Since the 
EU is not to become a “Transfer Union”, cohesion policy is serving as a means for 
Europeanisation and modernisation which proved to be unable to bridge the gap. 
The core countries profited the most from the integrated market, and the global 
financial crisis hit more severely the weaker member states thus exacerbating the 
core-periphery rift within the Union. Paradoxically, the experience of the crisis 
makes it even more difficult to enhance solidarity. Enhanced transfers require trust, 
and trust is a scarce commodity in the EU. The chapter concludes with the assertion 
that only the future will tell if a new compromise between stability and flexibility 
will emerge and bear fruit over the long run.
This volume is certainly a useful and well-edited book, although it does not contain 
radically new arguments. Nevertheless, it reinforces earlier findings and, partially, 
old wisdom. The European Community once designed for six member states at 
a comparable level of both economic development and political interests has, 
through a long series of enlargements, become a quasi-imperial supranational 
entity with all the advantages and disadvantages of an overcharged empire which 
is now challenged by the particular problems and conflicts among its individual 
members. There is no doubt about the fact that economic strength and political 
power are, to a significant extent, unevenly distributed in the European Union but 
is too late to blame the European institutions (not so much the Commission rather 
the Council) for the decisions to enlarge the scope of integration and to extend 
their sphere of influence.
The British-American historian Paul Kennedy has, in his monumental work The 
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, demonstrated that boundless overstretching 
and subsequent significant economic and political divergences within an empire 
can become the main causes of increasing vulnerability and possible final decay. In 
case of the European Union, such a development would be more than a historical 
tragedy that should, by any means, be avoided.
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As a result of the development of natural science, we now can model the movement 
of atoms with a high degree of accuracy, understand the repetitive nature of 
animals’ eating habits or easily find out from the weather forecast whether it will 
rain the day after tomorrow. Although the world around us exhibits numerous 
regularities, we tend to believe that in the fast-paced world of the new millennium 
this does not apply to human actions at all. In most cases, we do not know in 
advance where we will spend next Saturday night, and perhaps we would find it 
offensive and even scary if someone stated that they knew with a certainty of 80 
per cent what we would do exactly this minute a month later. Albert László Barabási, 
a Transylvanian-born Hungarian physicist and network researcher, points out in 
his book that most of us are far from being as spontaneous as we would like to 
believe: it is more difficult to predict the whereabouts of a bumble bee than that 
of any human being.
Barabási’s book analyses the role of chance in human behaviour through the history 
of the peasants’ war led by György Dózsa, while trying to find out whether the 
uprising was indeed predictable. The book closely follows the development of the 
uprising in 1514, mainly due to the prophecy of István Telegdi, the treasurer of King 
Ulászló II, who – according to the chronicle – forewarned the king and archbishop 
Tamás Bakócz of the bloody outcome of the crusade. Although the story, which runs 
for almost half of the book, relates to the work’s narrower topic only tangentially, 
the alternation of the natural science and history chapters makes the book truly 
interdisciplinary.
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As in his book The New Science of Networks, Barabási provides an insight into 
the development of his research results in Bursts as well, while at the same time 
illustrating through several examples how much luck one also needs for scientific 
inventions. We would know much less about the speed of virus propagation had the 
craze of tracking banknotes over the internet not spread, or the German Theodor 
Klauza would be known by everyone if Albert Einstein had been more quick to 
accept his five-dimensional space theory unifying gravity and electromagnetism 
in a single scheme. The book not only reveals the patterns of human behaviour, 
but also presents the results of key studies bringing us closer to it, along with the 
history of the creation of these patterns, which makes the book really interesting.
Based on the stories included in the book, we can assume that most natural science 
research is commenced by an idea occurring during friendly talks – or, in keeping 
with the title, a burst – as occurred with the research of the velocity of cash or 
the migration of albatrosses. Dirk Brockmann, a German physicist, learnt about 
the wheres-george.com site, registering the location of banknotes, from his friend 
in Vermont. Using this database, Brockmann found that, similarly to cash, the 
propagation of viruses also follow a Lévy flight, which may help to prevent the 
spread of epidemics in the future. Similarly, with the help of a database received 
from his cousin, Sergey Buldyrev found that the migration of albatrosses, which 
covers several thousands of kilometres without landing, may also be described by 
a Lévy flight, which could be concluded from the wet and dry signals of the detectors 
fastened to their legs. The question as to what degree the human behaviour can 
be described by the distributions observed in nature, and – if there are patterns 
in our actions similar to the propagation of cash or the migration of albatrosses – 
then to what extent they can be used for forecasting our future decisions, gradually 
unfolds in the book.
According to Barabási, human behaviour follows a number of patterns, due to 
which – in contrast to albatrosses or bumble bees – our future whereabouts can be 
estimated relatively well. Although we are affected by a number of new impulses 
every week, the actions of most people follow a similar pattern: on weekdays we 
get up at the usual time, we are at work from early morning to late afternoon, 
usually returning home thereafter. Although our weekend programmes can be 
very diverse, our behaviour can still be predicted relatively easily due to our daily 
routines. According to Barabási, due to our repetitive behaviour, the whereabouts 
of most of us follow a Gaussian distribution, as a result of which at any moment it 
can be estimated with an average certainty of 80 per cent where we are and what 
we are doing.
According to the book, although our actions can be forecast by normal distribution, 
power distribution is more suitable for the characterisation of the frequency of our 
activities. In contrast to migratory birds and cash, the average daily travel distance 
190 Book review
Zsigmond Pálvölgyi 
covered by humans – due to our repetitive activity and permanent home – can 
be better described by the power distribution than by the Lévy distribution. Most 
of us stay in a district of a few kilometres on a daily basis, while others commute 
several hundreds of kilometres daily due to their work; but, contrary to the Lévy 
distribution, it is not typical of us to change our relatively narrow whereabouts on 
a monthly basis. Similarly to the travel distance of humans, the number of emails 
sent by us or the calls initiated from our phones also follow power distribution; 
however, what is much more interesting than that is the distribution of these over 
time.
Barabási points out that our repetitive actions are far from being accidental: they 
show bursts, hence they can be forecast similarly to our whereabouts. Our phone 
calls follow an abnormal distribution, as usually we make several subsequent calls 
followed by a pause of several hours – i.e. we may expect that if somebody initiates 
a call, very soon he will make several additional calls. Moreover, based on our 
actions in the past and our habits, the time elapsed between the bursts can be 
also predicted, thus it can be estimated with relatively high accuracy when we will 
make the next phone call.
On the whole, although we believe that it is spontaneous when we reach out for 
the phone, in fact – according to Barabási – in addition to our telephoning habits, 
a number of our repetitive actions also follow power distribution, and hence can 
be forecast with high accuracy. Our life is made more exciting by numerous bursts, 
but it appears from the book that these are far from being accidental: by obtaining 
deeper knowledge of the bursts the future may also become predictable some day.
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Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen are both economists and co-authors of numerous 
publications. These two acknowledged researchers of India are also excellent social 
scientists, and the analysis of economic development and social justice, as well as 
the social consequences of growth bear utmost importance in their publications. 
Additionally, Amartya Sen was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in 1998 for his 
activity in the reform of welfare economics.
This work describes India’s economic changes and the influence of such on the 
society and on the welfare of its people since the country’s independence. As also 
suggested by the title, the balance of the past period of almost seventy years is 
rather contradictory. In ten chapters, the book details the impact of the GDP growth 
seen in past decades, including the effects in the area of education and healthcare, 
and also analyses the freedom of press, corruption, poverty and the situation of 
women within the population. The work openly takes a critical tone, and social 
inequality occupies a central place. At the same time, it is a good read, written in 
a free and easy style, with a rich bibliography. This review focuses on the chapters 
examining India’s economic performance.
After the end of an era as a British colony, India won its independence in 1947, 
becoming the world’s most populous democratic state. Economic growth 
accelerated: as opposed to the first half of the 20th century (when annual average 
GDP growth was 0.9 per cent), the annual average growth between 1950 and 1980 
was 3.5 per cent, rising to 5.2 per cent, 5.9 per cent and 7.6 per cent in the 1980s, 
1990s and 2000s, respectively. This makes India the second fastest growing economy 
among the developing large economies. Regarding the growth rate, the country 
 *  The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the offical view 
of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
Antal Mester is a PhD student of the University of Pécs; his research area is the economic relation of India and Hungary. 
E-mail: mester.antal@gmail.com.




is catching up with its regional competitor, China. In the period under review, 
life expectancy at birth increased more than twofold (from 32 to 66), the infant 
mortality rate fell to one quarter of its previous level, and the illiteracy rate among 
women decreased from 91 to 35 per cent. However, the benefits of economic 
growth were not distributed evenly among the various social strata, thereby further 
increasing inequalities in terms of income. Furthermore, the authors highlight the 
difference that while in China a large portion of the growth results was reinvested 
in infrastructure developments and the establishment of the social care system, 
this was not typical in India. Basic services, such as clean potable water, electricity 
and primary healthcare, are still not available for hundreds of millions of people.
In the first decade of independence, India’s leadership set the goal of implementing 
two five-year plans. The initial growth of the economy (4.1 percent average annual 
GDP growth) lasted until the mid-1960s. This was followed by severe droughts in 
several subsequent years, which substantially retarded the performance of the 
primary sector which had a dominant weight; in addition, between 1965 and 1973 
India was at war with Pakistan, which generated major expenditures for the budget. 
As a result of these factors, the GDP growth rate decelerated in that decade, and 
due to poor average harvest results in agriculture, masses of people had to live in 
need. The growth of gross domestic product accelerated once again in the 1980s, 
initially induced primarily by the development of the agricultural sector. This was 
a collateral social benefit of the period during which higher harvest yields made 
a strong contribution to the reduction of general poverty, since in that social class 
agriculture was the only source of living for many households. The increase in the 
trade deficit and external indebtedness was also a phenomenon of the 1980s, 
which – coupled with soaring oil prices – finally led to a financial crisis in 1990. 
However, this crisis did not last long, and as a result of structural changes and the 
increase in foreign investments, growth accelerated from the 1900s. Meanwhile, 
several economists noted that the actual income of workers increased to a much 
lesser degree than the GDP growth would have justified. Drèze and Sen present 
China as an example: between 1981 and 2005 the income of industrial workers in 
China rose by 600 per cent, while the increase was only 70 per cent in India during 
the same period.
Probably the most thought-provoking chapter of the book is the comparative 
analysis of India and the poorest countries of the world. Based on extensive 
research, the authors analysed a huge volume of parameters and compared the 
economy’s general indicators with the numbers measuring the wealth of the 
population. The results highlight the Janus face of the boom in India: the Indian 
state is at the end of the row in several general society indicators even among the 
poorest countries; these include the ratio of undernourished children (2010: over 
40 per cent), infant mortality (2011: 47 per 1,000 live births), existence of basic 
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hygiene conditions (when the book was written, half of all households lacked water 
systems), number of years spent in school among the population over 25 years of 
age (2011: 4.4 years) or illiteracy among women.
In the next chapter, the authors compare the performance of the Indian state with 
the countries of the region (Bangladesh, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and China) 
based on the data from 1990 and 2011. The figures show that per capita GDP 
measured using purchasing power parity increased here to the largest degree 
after China. Nevertheless, in terms of the improvement in indicators reflecting the 
social situation (life expectancy at birth, vaccination coverage of children, etc.), 
India underperformed severely compared to its neighbours. This resulted in the 
unusual situation where in terms of many indicators India performed relatively 
better in 1990 than in 2011, despite the substantial GDP growth. According to 12 
such indicators, compared to the aforementioned countries, India advanced only in 
terms of per capita GDP as mentioned above. This can be regarded as a failure and 
clearly highlights the improper use of the achievements of the prospering economy. 
The authors cite Bangladesh as an example: there the per capita income is less than 
half of that of India, but the infant mortality rate is lower, children’s vaccination 
coverage rate is higher, and general hygiene conditions are also much better. 
Comparing the data with the indicators of other BRICS countries, the shortfalls are 
even more spectacular. However, the two authors emphasise that there are major 
differences between the individual federal states of India: in the more advanced 
southern region (such as Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Maharastra) the indicators 
are much closer to the figures of the BRICS states, in contrast to the circumstances 
in the northern territories. In the north, the ratio of those living below the poverty 
line is extremely high, coupled with almost no access to healthcare and education 
services.
On the whole, it may be stated about the book that the authors always support 
their arguments with figures; on the other hand, it should be noted that they do not 
investigate examples where the country made major achievements. These include, 
for example, the highly qualified labour force easily communicating in English, or 
the strength and growth potential of the industries representing high added value 
(information technology, pharmaceutical industry).
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In his book, Michael Pillsbury has created a special genre: the book is simultaneously 
a memoir (based on his career of over 40 years with the CIA, RAND and the 
Pentagon) and an analysis of China’s present situation, embedded in a kind of 
historical framework. One central thesis of his book is that the hawks in China 
have successfully persuaded the Chinese leadership to view the United States as 
a dangerous hegemony which it must replace. The title of this plan is “The Hundred-
Year Marathon”, the goal of which is that by 2049, i.e. the 100th anniversary of 
proclaiming the People’s Republic of China, China should ultimately end the age of 
Western humiliation and create a world order with China as the Number One power. 
Pillsbury is firmly convinced that implementation of the goals of “The Hundred-Year 
Marathon” is progressing successfully, essentially due to two factors: one of them 
is that the Western countries, particularly the USA, make erroneous assumptions 
in respect of their perception of China, and the other is that China is following 
a successful strategy derived from its own historical experience.
According to the author, there are basically five false assumptions in the USA. The 
first is that the engagement shown by the Western countries in China increases 
China’s willingness to cooperate. Pillsbury believes that the policy followed by 
China in Afghanistan, Sudan, Iran and North Korea demonstrates that China is not 
willing to cooperate in global interests and has no intention of taking part in the 
international order as a responsible participant. The second false assumption in the 
view of the author is that China is on the road to democracy. He believes that there 
is no evidence of this; moreover, the Chinese Communist Party has demonstrated 
spectacular flexibility in the recent decades, which presages the long-term autocracy 
of the party. The third typical misconception is that the situation of China and the 
 *  The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the offical view 
of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
Viktor Eszterhai is the senior analyst of the Pallas Athena Geopolitical Research Institute. 
E-mail: eszterhai.viktor@pageobudapest.hu.
Financial and Economic Review, Vol. 15 Issue 2., June 2016, pp. 194–196.
195
China’s secret strategy to replace the USA
Chinese economy is unstable, and thus – in order to avoid chaos – no pressure 
should be exerted on China. According to Pillsbury, this is not true. Indeed, quite 
the contrary: while the West is worried about China’s woes, the Chinese economy is 
increasingly catching up with the USA. The fourth false conclusion of the American 
general public and leadership is that China wants to be just like the USA, which – 
according to the author – merely comes from America’s hubris. And finally, the 
last misconception is that China’s hawks are weak and play no major role in the 
governance of the country, in the army and among intellectuals. Pillsbury states 
that the hawks have been advising Chinese leaders since Mao Zedong, but were 
invisible to the outside world.
According to the author, the Chinese hawks derive their strategy from the 
Warring States Period, which contains nine key elements: (i) Induce complacency 
in your opponent, who thus becomes careless: you must not openly provoke 
the controlling power, unless it is no longer possible to interrupt its rise. (ii) Be 
patient – for decades or even longer – and continue developing your skills. (iii) 
Manipulate your opponent’s advisers. For this purpose, China gives money to US 
think tanks and scientific institutions, it lobbies companies and individuals, pursues 
direct advertising and occasionally threatens (e.g. cyberattacks). (iv) Steal your 
opponent’s ideas and technology for strategic purposes: For this purpose, China 
conducts continuous scientific espionage and does not recognise patent rights. (v) 
Military might is not the critical factor in winning a long-term competition. This 
partly explains why China has not devoted more resources to developing larger, 
more powerful military forces. (vi) Recognise that the hegemony will take extreme, 
even reckless action to retain its dominant position; thus, China must be prepared 
for such situations as well. (vii) Never lose sight of ‘shi’ (the flow of power). China 
is waiting for the point of maximum opportunity to erode the role of the USA. (viii) 
Employ metrics for measuring your status relative to other potential challengers 
accurately. (ix) Always be vigilant to avoid China being encircled and make others 
believe that China cannot be encircled.
Pillsbury comes to the conclusion that the USA must dispel the false assumptions 
stemming from its own strategy and China’s strategy and cope with the new 
situation. Pillsbury proposes that a new Cold War be announced, since with this 
method the USA already managed to overcome a similarly threatening situation 
in the past. As part of this, the USA’s strategy should comprise of the following 
elements: give nothing to China that may further strengthen its capacities; formulate 
a uniform US position in terms of goals; build a coalition with other nations against 
China; and finally the USA should support the Chinese opposition and the pro-
democracy powers within China, to undermine the power of the Communist Party.
Pillsbury enriches his story with a large volume of (primarily intelligence agency) 
information, which easily captivates readers due to its personal style. The 
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information presented in the book, however, is often known already, and provides 
a convincing, albeit distorted picture. From the Hungarian reader’s point of view, 
Pillsbury’s prophecy and warnings do not achieve their objective, since the author’s 
concern about China’s intentions originates from his desire to preserve the global 
status which America obtained after World War II. The methods criticised by the 
author are often not foreign to US leaders either, and hence condemnation of 
such methods on a moral basis cannot be expected outside the USA. Despite its 
intentions, the book is also suitable for gaining insight into the thinking of not only 
the Chinese, but also of the American hawks.
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CB Books, 2014, p. 482
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As an economic advisor to former president of the European Commission José 
Manuel Barroso, Philippe Legrain obtained direct insight into the practices of 
European crisis management, the political deals emerging, and all the concerns 
and political interests that shaped European crisis management. The author earned 
his degree in economics and international political economics from the London 
School of Economics. Since graduation, he has worked as a journalist and written 
several books.
The first structural unit of the book describes the events leading up to the 
emergence and escalation of the European debt crisis following the financial 
crisis arising in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Along with 
a description of European crisis management, it specifically addresses the crisis 
management practice of the UK, discussing similarities and differences. The 
escalation and prolongation of the financial crisis in Europe is attributed to a series 
of errors in decision making. European leaders failed to recognise that the problems 
were not fiscal in origin. Rather than through restrictions, they ought to have been 
addressed through a renewal of the European institutional system, by breaking 
the relationship between banks and sovereigns. The author argues that crisis 
management and the future of the euro area cannot follow the German example, 
and the European institutional system cannot be redesigned in a German approach, 
which is unsustainable both economically and politically.
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The European crisis was not caused by imbalances in fiscal policy. Turbulences in the 
bond markets did not increase because a set threshold of public debt was breached, 
but as a result of incorrect policy decisions. Following the financial disruptions in 
the aftermath of the American subprime crisis, after emergency liquidity injections 
by the ECB, concerns over the survival of the euro area had not yet surfaced. 
However, instead of providing fiscal stimulus, decision makers in the euro area 
tried to stabilise European economies through a wide range of restrictions. The 
author argues that the European crisis started to escalate when the possibility of 
Greek insolvency emerged. Due to the inadequate institutional structure of the euro 
area, and primarily to errors in policy decisions, the crisis reached a systemic level.
Banks should have only been rescued subject to orderly reorganisation and a review 
of their business policies. The author highlights the bank rescue packages following 
the onset of the American subprime crisis. As part of those packages, governments 
provided assistance on a large scale to financial institutions in distress, without 
the orderly resolution or reorganisation of such. In the euro area there were no 
common resolution requirements in place, as a result of which, despite the fact that 
banks’ operations allowed them to grow large on a real European scale, when they 
were wound up their solvency had to be restored within national powers, which 
imposed a great burden on governments.
Greek debt should have been restructured immediately. Right from the start, it was 
obvious that Greek sovereign debt was unsustainable and that the country was 
insolvent. However, arguing that a Greek bankruptcy would lead to Lehman-style 
panic, European decision makers opted against restructuring the country’s debt. 
Even after the first Greek rescue package, it was apparent that Greece remained 
insolvent and would need further assistance shortly. Decision makers also refused 
to write off part of the debt on grounds of the ‘no bail out’ clause of the Treaty. 
The refusal carried the message that other European countries could also become 
insolvent in the event of their inability to refinance their debt.
Forced crisis management aimed at fiscal balance was harmful and failed. Following 
the Greek rescue package, European decision makers opted to implement a wide 
range of rebalancing measures. With subdued demand from the private and 
financial sectors, government restrictions resulted in a deep recession, while at 
times of turmoil it was only governments that could have generated additional 
demand in the economies. 
Confusing the problems of illiquid countries with Greek insolvency only exacerbated 
the crisis. When Greece was bailed out, it was proposed that going forward, 
countries in distress would be aided using community funds, with the involvement 
of the private sector. Under that proposal, member states that were forced to seek 
assistance due to turbulences caused by market disruptions rather than insufficient 
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economic fundamentals (such as Spain and Italy) would be allowed to shift losses 
on the private sector. As a result, the crisis spilled over to other countries, and 
European government bond yields continued to soar.
Raising the possibility of Grexit was a bad decision. Liquidity had been provided 
to Greek banks by the ECB, discontinuing which would have forced the country to 
exit the euro area. As a result, the euro was no longer trusted as an irreversible 
single currency.
The consequences of the above policy decisions caused the government bond 
yields of each country to increase. Given that government securities account for 
a significant portion of European banks’ balance sheets, the impairment of such 
caused financial institutions to incur major losses, requiring them to seek assistance 
from the state, which in turn increased government bond yields further. That is, the 
negative feedback process between banks and sovereigns destabilised countries.
Crisis management based on the German model was founded on erroneous 
assumptions and failed to resolve the problems of the euro area. Over the past 
15 years, the German economy made considerable progress, primarily by means 
of an artificial brake on wage growth. Wages did not grow at the same rate as 
the productivity of the German economy, which gradually improved Germany’s 
competitiveness and generated a huge current account surplus. The author 
considers that surplus to be harmful, arguing that except for Greece, southern 
countries were not destabilised as a result of their excessive indebtedness, but 
rather by Germany’s excessive savings. Due to insufficient domestic demand for 
credit, German capital created asset price bubbles in southern countries. The 
author finds fundamental flaws with the German position that southern countries 
should recover their competitiveness and increase their exports through internal 
devaluations, i.e. by cutting labour costs. The German model cannot provide 
a solution for the European Union as a whole. The EU is the largest market in the 
world, and as such it must not generate an excessive current account surplus, since 
those surplus exports should also be consumed by some countries, for which there 
is no real chance.
The crisis of the euro area was finally put to an end by ECB President Mario Draghi’s 
speech on his commitment to preserve the euro. Soaring European government 
bonds collapsed immediately. The main problem was therefore caused by the fact 
that as opposed to other countries, the central bank of the euro area was not 
mandated to act as a lender of last resort. This in turn meant that countries in 
distress had to be rescued through fiscal policies, which resulted in unsustainable 
social and political tensions.
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For the sake of the euro area’s future, the shocks caused by the debt crisis must be 
prevented, its consequences must be mitigated, and losses must be distributed in 
a transparent manner and as decently as possible. For the preservation of euro area, 
the author considers four institutional arrangements to be viable: the prevalence 
of the German approach, a technocratic future, a federal euro area, and a flexible 
euro area. The German approach foresees increased German dominance, a stronger 
coordination of fiscal policies, and German-style measures to rebalance and improve 
competitiveness (wage cap), accompanied by a minimum level of shared risk and 
solidarity. The technocratic arrangement involves an operational banking union, 
centrally supervised fiscal rules, the introduction of Eurobonds, and a stronger 
dominance from Brussels in setting economic policies. In the federal approach, 
a European Central Treasury would be set up, which would collect tax revenues in 
its own right, allowing it to issue debt of its own, which would be a safe asset in 
times of crisis. Additionally, the Treasury could provide fiscal incentives, and the 
ECB, in its role as lender of last resort, could support the sustenance of trust in 
central debt. The fourth option is the creation of a flexible euro area, which involves 
a comprehensive banking union, and stronger coordination accompanied by the 
preservation of autonomous fiscal policies. In this case, in its role as lender of last 
resort, the ECB could support illiquid member states, while the debt of insolvent 
member states would be restructured under IMF supervision.
Of the possible visions, the author considers the federal approach to be the most 
ideal one, which, however, is not a realistic outcome in the current political climate. 
The second best approach would be a flexible fiscal union, but that also raises the 
question of how much autonomy each institution should enjoy. To what extent 
would the single supervisory mechanism give equal weight to addressing the 
problems identified in various member states? Would insolvent member states 
subject themselves to IMF schemes? How long would the ECB grant assistance 
to illiquid member states in the event of Germany’s possible protest? The author 
argues that we are heading in the German direction, with technocratic additions. 
That is, the community institutions are being set up, but are used by Germany to 
promote and enforce its own will and policy. That means to improve competitiveness 
and to establish export-oriented economies, primarily by cutting wage costs. 
However, the German technocratic arrangement is politically unsustainable, as it 
undermines democratic support for the single European project and will ultimately 
lead to a new crisis across the region.
The economies of the euro area and the UK are facing similar difficulties. The author 
compares the crisis of the UK to that of the euro area, and finds that their problems 
are shared in several aspects. In both economies, subdued corporate lending and 
moderate growth pose a severe problem. The problems in both economies are 
attributable to insufficient crisis management. In the UK, growth failed to recover 
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despite the absence of a bond market crisis. In most cases, the UK approaches 
problems from a Washington perspective, but its response to the economic crisis 
was definitely European in the form of severe rebalancing measures. As a result 
of the restrictions, demand in the UK plunged, while the fiscal balance failed to 
improve. The government ultimately abandoned fiscal adjustments. Attempts 
to generate additional demand were made through the support of the Bank of 
England’s large asset purchase programme. However, this failed to bring about 
a meaningful improvement in growth prospects. Consequently, the UK is facing 
difficulties that are similar to those of the euro area. The author highlights moderate 
growth, high unemployment and subdued corporate lending.
In the second structural unit of the book, the author discusses the challenges that 
the EU and the UK must meet in order to lay the foundations for economic success. 
Europe’s problems result from the poor adaptability of the economy, low growth 
potential, the consequences of aging society, the culture of risk aversion, and 
the fact that the interests of the political elites contradict changes. Following the 
discussion of the problems, the author proposes the implementation of so-called 
ADD (adaptive, dynamic and decent) reforms. In order follow up on past successes, 
the European continent needs economic and political change; a European spring.
The economy suffers periodic shocks, both internal and external. As the market 
economy and the financial system are essentially stable, it is the adaptability of the 
economy that needs improvement. The risks stemming from the financial system 
need to be mitigated by increasing the quantity and quality of capital. The mobility 
of the factors of production and of labour in particular need to be improved so 
that they are utilised where they are needed the most. The standardisation of 
markets and the abolition of unnecessary regulations enable competition to become 
more intensive, giving companies incentives for efficient operations. Therefore, the 
adaptability of the economy to various shocks must be improved.
Economic growth must be facilitated, and the dynamism of the economy increased. 
Growth requires more innovation, more start-ups, and more initiatives. To that 
end, entrepreneurship in society must be strengthened from early childhood. 
Education plays a key role in shaping creative thinking and an enterprising spirit. In 
public and higher education, efforts must be made to foster creativity and develop 
entrepreneurship. Innovation emerges in proportion with the density of social 
connections as part of social interactions. This is why innovations occur primarily 
in cities. As a result, the number of human interactions and the density of human 
connections must be increased. Apart from all this, the required funding also needs 
to be provided. The conditions for access to funding by start-ups must be provided. 
The government must develop government services and must spend more on 
research and development. The ability of the economy to grow can be improved 
with the support of new ideas and innovations.
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European social values must be centred around equal opportunities. Society works 
the most efficiently when every individual has equal opportunities to accomplish 
the objectives set. The state must therefore reduce the differences between 
individuals by supporting those in distress. Excessive differences in income must 
be eliminated. Incomes should be determined on the basis of social utility. Efforts 
are needed against undeserved revenues; therefore, taxes must be levied on land, 
and agricultural subsidies must be reviewed and discontinued. With a view to the 
most efficient use of resources, granting equal opportunities must be given priority 
in society.
The author argues that rather than through German-style restrictions and the 
UK’s asset purchase programmes, European competitiveness should be restored 
by means of measures facilitating the adaptability, growth potential and decency 
of the economy. And that requires radical economic and political changes, i.e. 
a European spring.
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Report on the lessons from the capital market 
conference of the Budapest Stock Exchange 
(BSE) and the Association of Hungarian 
Economists (AHE)* 
Márton Teremi 
The stock exchange conference, organised jointly by the Budapest Stock Exchange 
and the Association of Hungarian Economists, took place on 26 May 2016 in the 
ballroom of the Váci street headquarters of Magyar Külkereskedelmi Bank. In the 
morning session of the conference, the presentation of the representative of the 
Ministry for National Economy was followed by a discussion by the heads of the 
Zagreb, Belgrade and Bucharest stock exchanges on the development trends, 
successes and challenges of the regional stock exchanges. In the second part of the 
conference, the various dimensions of boosting the Budapest floor were discussed 
by Márton Nagy, Chairman of BSE and the Financial Section of AHE, and a panel 
comprising of the Chief Executive Officer of BSE and actors in the industry. 
The participants were welcomed by Richárd Végh, Chief Executive Officer of BSE 
and Benedek Sándor, Deputy Chief Executive Officer of MKB, designating the 
discussion of the regional and domestic stock exchange development trends as 
the key objective of the event. Ágnes Hornung, State Secretary at the Ministry 
for National Economy in charge of finances, highlighted the stock exchange’s 
significant role in the national economy and the latest supporting measures of the 
Government. The upgrade of Hungary by Fitch on 20 May 2016, the administrative 
easing implemented within the framework of the recently adopted modification of 
the Capital Market Act, as well as the regulations facilitating the development of 
new capital market structures all clearly reflected the Government’s commitment 
to developing the stock exchange. Hornung also assured the audience that there 
were ongoing consultations with stakeholders to ensure further measures in the 
2016 autumn legislative session. 
Ivana Gažić, CEO of the Zagreb Stock Exchange, provided a very thorough summary 
of the factors influencing the path of the Zagreb stock exchange so far and the future 
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prospects, with special regard to the initiative related to the regional stock exchange 
association. As she noted, the development of the Croatian markets was hindered 
by several internal and external factors: the poor macroeconomic environment and 
high external vulnerability, the low willingness to privatise, the financing model with 
the banks in focus, the low free float, and the underdeveloped institutional investors 
all contributed to the stagnation of the Zagreb stock exchange. This was further 
exacerbated by an economies of scale problem, as the international regulation and 
the increasing requirements for technological investments gave preference to larger 
stock exchange operators. Gažić was of the opinion that other stock exchanges in 
the region struggled with similar problems, which gave rise to the initiative known 
as SEE Link. The SEE Link association was established by the stock exchanges of 
Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia, and was soon joined by another five national stock 
exchanges in the region. The products of the other stock exchanges became visible 
and accessible for the member stock exchanges participating in the association 
and for their partners free of charge, which facilitated the realisation of the orders 
between the various stock exchange systems and intermediaries by setting up 
a shared protocol. In the medium run, the integration of new stock exchanges may 
support strengthening of the SEE Link initiative, while in the longer run the trend 
of the development may be represented by deeper harmonisation of the trading, 
post-trading and other stock exchange rules and systems.
Siniša Krneta, CEO of the Belgrade Stock Exchange, started his presentation by 
drawing a distinction between the European and Asian processes. Over the last 
ten years, the liquidity of the European stock exchanges, with the exception of the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange, had declined significantly, while turnover on the Asian 
stock exchanges had multiplied in the same period. Krneta highlighted that this 
development was only partially linked to the different impacts of the financial and 
economic crisis in the two continents; the differences between the approach to 
the role of the stock exchange may have been equally important. The European 
model was more focused on trading, and the regulation was very favourable for the 
emergence of the alternative markets, while the Asian model gave preference to 
the financing function and paid special attention to the regulated markets. Krneta 
encouraged the strengthening of the financing channel in Europe as well, which 
may be realised by new issuances generated by the strengthening of the connection 
between the stock exchange and the real economy. The Belgrade stock exchange will 
also be joining the SEE Link initiative, in addition to listing state-owned companies 
and developing an adequate regulatory environment, in order to lay the foundation 
for higher liquidity, which was essential for the development of the stock exchange.
Ludwik Sobolewski, CEO of the Bucharest Stock Exchange, highlighted the fact 
that not much time was left to boost the development of the capital markets. 
In his view, the transformation phase of the economic and social systems in the 
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countries of the region was approaching its end, and hence the maximum time 
left for defining the role of the national stock exchanges at a new, higher level 
may be 3–5 years. According to his regional experiences, the presence of foreign 
investors had had a positive impact both on pricing and financial literacy; on the 
other hand, their participation had also depended on the broadness of the issuer 
base, as well as on the flexibility of the capital market infrastructure and regulatory 
environment. In addition to encouraging stock exchange privatisation, the Bucharest 
Stock Exchange had also established the Aero market for SME-sized enterprises. 
He believed that there were no supply problems in Romania, while on the demand 
side it was necessary to enhance the financial awareness of private investors and to 
manage the liquidity risk. As regards the future, Sobolewski hoped that the latest 
regulatory initiative would not undermine the functioning of the capital market and 
believed that the arguments for the stock exchange consolidation clearly pointed 
to integration in the longer run.
Márton Nagy, Chairman of BSE and the Financial Section of AHE, reported on recent 
research that dealt with the features of the companies eligible for listing and may 
serve as a basis for BSE’s issuer acquisition activity. As a starting point, he stated that 
the financing opportunities of companies were substantially influenced by the fact 
that the inflow of the EU funds would decelerate significantly in the coming years 
and the central bank loan programmes would also run out in the foreseeable future. 
Thus, the companies would change over to “normal” market-based financing by 
2020, whereby BSE must play an important role. However, for this it was necessary 
to define the criteria that determined the range of companies eligible for listing 
and along with this to identify those companies with which BSE should initiate 
further cooperation. The specialist literature measured companies’ eligibility for 
listing on a quantitative scale, based on which the most important factors for 
being successful on the stock exchange included age, export capacity, size, growth 
and capital structure. The backbone of the qualitative scale was comprised of the 
market share, other industry features, the ownership structure and the corporate 
governance system. SME-sized companies best satisfying these criteria typically had 
higher ROIC-based return and export activity, and lower leverage, and usually paid 
higher wages to their employee than the entire SME universe. 44 per cent of the 
headquarters of the SMEs eligible for listing were located in the Central Hungary 
region and they mostly operated in the manufacturing sector.
As regards the BSE’s objectives, it was an important aspect that if the 50 most 
eligible SMEs entered the stock exchange, it would increase market capitalisation 
only by 5 per cent. Hence, BSE also deemed important to involve the large corporate 
sectors, but this worked through a different channel. Nevertheless, it was still 
worth making efforts to support the capital market entry of the SME sector, which 
the BSE intended to facilitate by providing support and consultation services 
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during companies’ preparation process. The framework of this would be the BSE 
Anteroom, which would help eligible companies that were just about to enter the 
stock exchange with training and consulting programmes focused on corporate 
finance. Another anticipated initiative was the designated consultant system based 
on foreign best practices, which in part supported the preparatory process and in 
part also fulfilled an investor protection role. In addition, it was important to note 
that the actors in charge of regulation also recognised the need for this, which was 
reflected in the modification of the Capital Market Act. Hopefully a capital fund, 
supported by EU resources, would also be established, which would support both 
the supply and demand sides of SME transactions by capital market exit and the 
subscription of capital market issuances.
The panel discussion was attended by Róbert Cselovszki, CEO of ERSTE Befektetési 
Zrt., Ádám Hegyi, Director of KBC Securities, Róbert Barlai, Executive Director of OTP 
Treasury, György Jaksity, Chairman of Concorde Értékpapír Zrt., and Benedek Sándor, 
Deputy CEO of MKB Bank, with Richárd Végh, CEO of BSE, acting as moderator.
The participants first commented on the analysis presented by Márton Nagy, the 
purpose, approach and methodology of which was essentially welcomed and 
regarded as suitable for identifying and approaching potential issuers. On the other 
hand, György Jaksity and Róbert Cselovszki expressed their doubts about the way 
to access a substantial range of investors and achieve liquidity for the shares of 
SME-sized companies, which may have a fundamental influence on acquisition 
activity. In recent years, the stock exchange performance of smaller companies had 
been marked by unfavourable experiences and due to this at present there was no 
investor interest in the smaller shares. On the other hand, the participants agreed 
that in the present low yield environment and by introducing additional incentives 
it could be possible to find a way to boost investor interest again and resolve the 
credibility problems of stock exchange investments.
Richárd Végh mentioned some methods to reach the SME-sized issuers and 
encourage their presence on the stock exchange. Benedek Sándor was of the opinion 
that successful enterprises had increasing reserves and may be able to implement 
their investments even without external finance. György Jaksity proposed to 
capitalise on the succession problem – he believed that the stock exchange may 
be a real alternative for owners which had already fostered somewhat independent 
management in the governance of their company, and hence the governance 
structure of their enterprise may be more suitable for the stock exchange. On the 
other hand, strategic investors may be competitors in this case as well. Ádám Hegyi 
mentioned in general that their SME clients typically searched for other alternatives 
after having fully utilised the solutions of credit nature, but this connection was not 
inevitable. He believed that substantial demand for stock exchange financing may 
arise only when it provided a solution not only for the financing problem, but was 
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also advantageous in other respects as well, such as – for example – the absence of 
the requested tangible collaterals. Róbert Cselovszki mentioned the unfavourable 
nature of the present regulation in respect of the issuance transactions as an 
obstacle, while Richárd Végh believed – as was noted in the presentation by Ágnes 
Hornung – some progress had already been made in this respect.
Richárd Végh raised the question to what extent the designated consultant structure 
may be viable at BSE. The participants essentially found the model, which has 
already applied in a number of markets in the EU, to be viable in Hungary as well, 
but at the same time they repeatedly called attention to the importance of fiscal 
incentives in this area as well. In addition, Ádám Hegyi also mentioned that in the 
issuances of recent years institutional investors were not present in the range of 
investors, which would have been reassuring for small investors as well in terms of 
pricing and the safety of their investment.
Reacting to the presentations during the morning session, Végh asked the 
participants about the opportunities they saw in the SEE Link initiative and to 
what extent it might be advisable for the BSE to join the association. Róbert Barlai 
stated that the Xetra integration of BSE had not achieved the expected positive 
impacts, and thus the disadvantages of the integration should also be clear. Róbert 
Cselovszki and György Jaksity also mentioned that the integration would result in 
the equalisation of the participants’ trading and other costs, which may be definitely 
advantageous for investors and the actors of the industry.
Finally, the focus was on the future of the national stock exchanges. Róbert 
Cselovszki and György Jaksity called attention to the process of turning the stock 
exchange and investment services activity into a “public utility”, accompanied by 
increasing competition and disruptive structure (MTF markets); thus the prospects 
were negative at present. On the other hand, national stock exchanges play a unique 
role, and hence the participants did not see the need for and the sustainability of 
these exchanges as being in question.
Richárd Végh thanked the lecturers and attendees of the conference for their 
participation. In his summary, he mentioned that Ágnes Hornung had informed 
the participants about the latest regulatory developments and based on this the 
participants may hopefully expect measures supporting the further development 
of the stock exchange. The managers of the regional stock exchanges discussed 
a number of topics containing significant lessons for BSE and the participants 
thereof, and the stock exchange association also provided an important view on 
the cooperation opportunities. The presentation of Márton Nagy and the panel 
discussions mainly focused on national considerations, but these related to the key 
challenges faced by BSE and hopefully strengthened the belief in the development 
of the stock exchange.
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Conference on financial market liquidity – 
Report on the 6th Annual Financial Market 
Liquidity Conference (AFML 2015)*
Péter Csóka – Dániel Havran – Kata Váradi  
The Financial Research Centre, established in 2014 by the Department of Finance 
of the Corvinus Business School, Corvinus University of Budapest, held the 
international conference at the Corvinus University of Budapest on 19–20 November 
2015. This was a joint project with the “Momentum” Game Theory Research Group 
at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
The conference was held for the sixth year in a row, focusing on the following 
topics: Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity; Liquidity Aspects of Systemic Risk; 
Game Theoretic Aspects of Liquidity and Financial Risk; Global Liquidity (both Public 
and Private) and Regulations; Leverage and Macroeconomic Determinants; Market 
Microstructure with Emphasis on Liquidity; Asset Pricing and Management with 
Illiquid Assets; and Illiquid Alternative Investments and Asset Innovations.
The 2015 conference was attended by about 150 registered participants from 
the international and Hungarian academic sector and from the industry, and 
30 motivated students were also selected. The language of the conference 
was English. The following speakers were invited. Keynote speaker: Lasse 
H. Pedersen (Copenhagen Business School and NYU Stern School of Business). Other 
invited speakers: Jonathan A. Batten (Monash University), P. Jean-Jacques Herings 
(Maastricht University), Sviatoslav Rosov (CFA Institute), Michael Sternberg (Morgan 
Stanley), Vera Száz (Mol Group), Balázs Székely (MSCI), Niklas Wagner (Passau 
University), Adam Zawadowski (Boston University and Central European University).
In addition to the 9 invited speakers listed above, there were also another 35 
speakers who registered for the conference after the scientific committee of the 
conference accepted their applications. 10 of them participated with a poster.
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The conference was opened by Zita Zoltayné Paprika, dean of the Corvinus 
Business School. She highlighted that this was the first year with parallel sessions 
in the conference, and the participants also had the opportunity to publish their 
research work in the special issue of the international journal Studies in Economics 
and Finance (chief editor: Niklas Wagner). Jonathan A. Batten, editor of Finance 
Research Letters, was also interested in the research papers of the participants.
We can proudly say that the 2015 conference once again achieved its goals of 
connecting theoretical and empirical academia and industry experts, and discussing 
the latest results in the field of market liquidity in a friendly, interactive environment. 
We are thankful for the support of our sponsors: Foundation of the Department of 
Finance, the Pallas Athéné Domus Scientiae Foundation, CFA Society Hungary, MSCI, 
Morgan Stanley, Foundation ISC, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences “Momentum” 
Program, Keler CCP, EFFAS, and the Institute for Training and Consulting in Banking. 
The conference was organised in the framework of the event series “Celebration 
of Hungarian Science 2015”.
The next conference will take place on 17–18 November 2016; the keynote speaker 
will be Anthony Saunders (NYU Stern School of Business). We recommend this 
event to practitioners and leaders who would like to know and understand the 
answers given by researchers to the latest questions generated by market needs, 
and achieve a competitive advantage based on this knowledge at the operative 
and strategic level as well.
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